

A HISTORY
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION

8vo. Vols. I. and II. 18s. each. Sold
separately

**A HISTORY OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION**

By H. MORSE STEPHENS

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

AIYANGAR COLLECTION


A HISTORY
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION

BY
H. MORSE STEPHENS

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

VOL. II.

THIRD IMPRESSION



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

1901

All rights reserved

PREFACE.

I REGRET, but can hardly apologize for, the delay in the publication of the present Volume. A Paradise haunts the dreams of the Historian, as well as of the Lover and the Fool. To glide through happy, laborious years in the eloquent silence of his library, free from the necessity for that ungrateful literary drudgery, from which he escapes only by fits and starts—in feverish haste, the balance and continuity of his ideas well-nigh lost,—to some cherished work, often laid aside, long neglected, and at last almost despaired of; to feel himself, as it were, a lily of the field, neither bound to toil nor spin Solomon-raiment for himself, but only for his thoughts; to enjoy the inestimable boon of scholarly leisure, roaming through archives and collections, with no call to grudge the hours which slip by as one investigation branches off into a hundred equally as enticing, ruminating some doubtful point, or rounding some awkward period in his twilight garden or beside his friendly study fire; to concentrate his every thought upon the *magnum opus*, towards which all his studies have for years been tending, which he sees daily growing under his pen, big with the promise of future fame; ever busily improving, reviewing, and revising, till shortly he becomes his best, and gives of his best to the world, and of his best only.

Such is the Historian's golden dream. Such was mine. For me, as for many another—alas, how much more worthy!—an Eldorado wholly unattainable; for between us and those mirage bowers stretch long years of desert sand. Shall we journey on and on, hoping that some day we may peradventure reach the ever-receding place of rest? Or shall we rather do what little we may in the hurry and press of the march? Life is short, the future is uncertain; and for me the balance has been tilted by the sympathetic insistence of one or two faithful friends, and by the encouraging appreciation of reviewers and correspondents in England, France, and America. So the volume shall go. Those who praise it will never know what it has cost me; those who blame would hardly believe how far it falls short of the ideal I had steadily cherished and once hoped to attain.

Though to unravel the tangled skein of the history of the French Revolution, without once snapping the thread, demands a continuous labour and an undivided attention, which were not always mine to bestow, surely it cannot be that so much pains and anxiety should wholly fail to add something to the fund of historical knowledge, to present a fairly veracious picture of the period—a mere sober study in “black and white,” aiming neither at Venetian colour nor Impressionist dash,—and, perchance, to impart to a few readers here and there some contagion of interest and enthusiasm.

To Mr. F. York Powell, of Christ Church, Oxford, I am deeply indebted for unfailing encouragement, assistance, and advice, and to Mr. Arthur Hassall, of the same Society, for his kindness in reading the proof-sheets of the present


Volume. My thanks are also due to M. F. A. Aulard, Professor at the Sorbonne, who procured for me from the Archives at Paris the list (never before printed) of the deputies sent on mission at the beginning of 1794, which appears in Appendix X., and to Mr. G. K. Fortescue, of the British Museum, whose extensive knowledge of the pamphlets of the period was always at my service.

If there still remain perforce unanswered some of the very many kind and helpful letters, which my earlier chapters called forth, I here beg the writers to accept my regretful excuses.

By a slight modification of plan, this volume closes at the end of 1793, instead of with the fall of Robespierre. During the last five years hardly a week has passed without some book, pamphlet, or article throwing new light upon obscure subjects and important facts in my period. I try to keep up with this ever-growing literature, but having already in my former Preface pointed out its main features, I refrain from its detailed analysis till I put out my last volume, to which I hope to prefix a complete biographical introduction, explaining the nature of the new authorities and the use I have made of them.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

OXFORD, 1891.



CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

	PAGE
The new deputies—The Royalists—Vaublanc—The Feuillants—Mathieu Dumas—Bigot de Préameneu—The left—Girondins and Enragés—Vergniaud—Guadet and Gensonné—Merlin de Thionville—Chabot and Basire—The characteristics of these parties—Brissot—The salons—Madame de Staël—Madame Roland—Madame de Condorcet—Lucile Desmoulins—The cafés—The theatres—The journals—The position of the court—The policy of Leopold—The ministers—The new Assembly's first decrees—The massacre at Avignon—The question of the émigrés—The princes at Coblenz—The army of Condé—The plot for seizing Strasbourg—The question of the priests "insermentés"—Resignations of Bailly and Lafayette—Pétion, mayor of Paris—The Department of the Seine—Roederer—The Jacobin Club—The close of the year 1791 ...	I

CHAPTER II.

THE GIRONDIN MINISTRY.

The attitude of the Girondins and Jacobins towards the idea of a foreign war—New ministry—The Comte de Narbonne—Narbonne's policy with regard to the war—Professor Koch—The Legislative Assembly menaces the Emperor Leopold—His answer and death—The reign of Leopold and his advice to Marie Antoinette—Dismissal of Narbonne and formation of a Girondin ministry—Dumouriez—Roland—The "bonnet rouge"—Robespierre's and Dumouriez' attitude towards it—Fête given to the released Swiss soldiers of Château-Vieux—War declared against Austria	44
---	----

CHAPTER III.

THE TWENTIETH OF JUNE.

The Jacobins oppose the war—Robespierre and Marat—Jacobin journalism—"The Fête de la Loi"—The policy of Dumouriez—Austria—England	
---	--

—Prussia—Why it failed?—The state of Belgium—Commencement of the war—Murder of Dillon—Servan's recommendation of a camp of fédérés near Paris—The king vetoes the recommendation and a measure against the priests "insermentés"—Roland's letter to the king—Dismissal of the Girondin ministry—A demonstration plotted for June 20—Santerre, the brewer of Saint Antoine—Conduct of the local authorities—Behaviour of the National Guard—The petitioners assemble, and defile before the Assembly—The mob passes the Tuileries, enters the Place du Carrousel, and finally breaks into the Tuileries and insults the king—Santerre protects the queen—Feeling in the Legislative Assembly—The king's interview with Pétion—Lafayette in Paris—Vergniaud's speech of July 3—The country declared in danger—Suspension of Pétion and Manuel—The "Baiser Lamourette"—The Federation—The enrolment of volunteers—Prussia declares war—The Duke of Brunswick's manifesto	PAGE 64
---	------------

CHAPTER IV.

THE TENTH OF AUGUST, AND THE MASSACRES OF SEPTEMBER.

Preparations for insurrection—The Girondins make overtures to the court—The king rejects plans of escape—The Jacobins win over the fédérés—The directory of insurrection—Arrival of the Marseillais—The song of the "Marseillais"—Preparations for the insurrection—The petitions of the sections—The sections at the Hôtel de Ville—Final arrangements for the defence of the Tuileries—Mandat murdered at the Hôtel de Ville—Santerre marches on the Tuileries—The king goes to the Assembly—Attack on the Tuileries—Murder of the Swiss Guards—The debate in the Assembly—The king at the convent of the Feuillants—A national convention summoned—Lafayette protests and deserts—Girondins and Jacobins—The state of Paris—The elections in Paris—The massacres in the prisons of Paris—Massacres in the provinces—The massacre at Versailles	107
---	-----

CHAPTER V.

THE CONVENTION, AND DECLARATION OF THE REPUBLIC.

Effect of the policy of the Legislative Assembly—The insurrectionary commune of Paris—Gaiety in Paris—The young nobles join the army—Last measures of the Legislative Assembly—The elections to the Convention—Parties in the Convention—Barère—Other deputies of the Marsh—The Girondins—Buzot—Brissotins and Buzotins—The Jacobins—Robespierre—Marat—Danton—The deputies of the Mountain—First measures of the Convention—Declaration of the Republic—Struggle between the Girondins and the Mountain—The Girondin ministers—Monge—Garat—Madame Roland's salon—The Jacobins and their journals—The <i>Père Duchesne</i> of Hébert—Social life in Paris—Dumouriez in Paris	151
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

THE COUNTRY IN DANGER.

	PAGE
Attitude of the sovereigns and princes in Germany—The invasion of France—Dumouriez takes up a position in the defiles of the Argonne—The advance of the Prussians—The cannonade of Valmy and retreat of the Prussians—Negotiations of Dumouriez with the Prussians—The Austrians besiege Lille—The army of the Rhine—Biron—Custine—Custine invades Germany—Occupation of Savoy—Occupation of Nice—Composition of the army—Result of the <i>levée en masse</i> —Existence of patriotic not military spirit in the army—Dumouriez in Paris—Dumouriez invades Belgium, and wins the victory of Jemmappes—Opening of the Scheldt—Mistakes and bad policy of the Girondins	181

CHAPTER VII.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GIRONDINS AND THE JACOBINS.

Personal disputes in the Convention—Representatives on mission—Dumouriez and Danton—Dumouriez and Pache—Decrees of December 16 and 18—The question as to the king—The king's trial—Speeches and votes on the trial—Treatment of the king in prison—Execution of the king—Character of Louis XVI.—Murder of Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau—Reorganization of the Committee of General Security—Resignations of Roland and Pache—Efforts for the war—News of defeats on the frontiers—Foundation of the Revolutionary Tribunal—The defeat of Neerwinden—The Committee of General Defence—The desertion of Dumouriez—Establishment of the Committee of Public Safety—Girondins and Jacobins	207
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FALL OF THE GIRONDINS.

The Girondins attack Marat—The Commune of Paris attack the Girondins—Trial and acquittal of Marat—The Committee of Twelve—The 31st of May—François Hanriot—The <i>coup d'état</i> of the 2nd of June—The Constitution of 1793—Life in Paris—Murder of Marat by Charlotte Corday—The campaign in French Flanders—Losses of the French—Victories of Hondschooten and Wattignies—The defence of Mayence—The campaigns in the South—Disturbances in the interior—Risings in Brittany and Anjou—Rebellion in La Vendée—Campaigns in La Vendée—Rossignol and Ronsin—Suppression of the rebellion—Insurrection of the great cities—Lyons—Marseilles—Bordeaux—The Girondins in Normandy—Wimpfen—The battle of Pacy—The wanderings of the proscribed Girondins—The death of Buzot and Pétion, and their friends—Character of the Girondins	236
---	-----

CHAPTER IX.

THE GREAT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

	PAGE
The need for a strong executive—The history of the Committee—It establishes the Reign of Terror—The instruments of the Terror—The origins and careers of its members—Robespierre—His early life—His rôle in the Constituent Assembly and in the Convention—Never had a majority in the Committee—Couthon—Saint-Just—The working members of the Great Committee—Carnot—Priour of the Côte-d'Or—Jean Bon Saint-André—Priour of the Marne—Robert Lindet—Billaud-Varenne—Collot d'Herbois—Hérault de Séchelles—Barère, the reporter—The value of biographies of revolutionary leaders—The mode of government of the Committee and the division of labour among its members—The ministers—What was the Reign of Terror, which it established?	281

CHAPTER X.

THE TERROR IN PARIS.

The Reign of Terror—The revolutionary or sans-culotte army—The revolutionary committees—"Cartes de sûreté" and the system of denunciation—The Committee of General Security—Its history—Its members—Amar, Vadier, Rühl, Guffroy, etc.—The weakness of Robespierre's influence over this committee—The Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris—Its history—Judges and jurors—Fouquier-Tinville—The procedure of the tribunal—Early trials and acquittals—The trials and executions of Marie Antoinette and of the Girondin deputies—Other executions—General acquiescence in the Reign of Terror—Gaiety in Paris—Life in the prisons—The necessity for amusing the Parisians—The stage during the Terror—The Comédie Française—The Opera—The <i>pièces de circonstance</i> —Art in Paris and the art students of David—The Republican fêtes—The economical condition—The law of the maximum—The restaurants and cafés during the Terror—The women of the Terror—Olympe de Gouges—The "tricoteuses"—Republican affectations and extravagances—Conclusion.....	321
---	-----

CHAPTER XI.

THE TERROR IN THE PROVINCES.

The provinces in 1792—The institution of deputies on mission—Its development—The increase of their power—The proconsuls and their system of government by Terror—Special missions—The Terror in Lyons—Collot d'Herbois and Fouché—The Fusillades—The Terror at Marseilles—Barras and Fréron—The Terror at Toulon—The Terror at Bordeaux—Tallien, Madame Tallien, and Ysabeau—The "destruction" of La Vendée—The Terror at Nantes—Carrier—The Noyades—The Terror at
--

	PAGE
Arras and Combrai—Joseph Le Bon—The Terror in the Vaucluse—The “destruction” of Bedoin—Maignet—The Terror at Saint-Étienne—Javogues—The insurrection of Charrier in the Gévaudan—The Terror in the Lozère and Haute-Loire—Châteauneuf-Randon and Reynaud—Moderate proconsuls; André, Dumont, Lakanal, etc.—The Proconsulates of Bernard of Saintes, Dartigoyte, Lecarpentier, Borie, Cavaignac, etc.—Cities and districts which escaped the Terror—The tribunals of the Terror in the provinces—The victims of the Terror—Noblemen who escaped—The Comte d’Haussonville—Conclusion	362

CHAPTER XII.

THE REPUBLICAN ARMY AND NAVY.

The Republican army—The military policy of the Convention—The War Office—Pache—The Military Committee of the Convention—Calon—The reports of Dubois-Crancé—The system of demi-brigades—The control of the war by the Great Committee of Public Safety—The Topographical Committee—D’Arçon and Montalembert—The deputies on mission with the armies—The deputies on mission to the interior for military purposes—Nôel Pointe—The armies of the Republic—The armies of the North and the Ardennes—Jourdan—The army of the Moselle—Hoche—The army of the Rhine—Pichegru—The situation of these armies—The mission of Saint-Just and Le Bas—The Terror in Strasbourg—Schneider—The winter campaign of Hoche and Pichegru, and expulsion of the Austrians from Alsace—The army of the Alps—The value of the neutrality of Switzerland—The army of Italy—The insurrection, siege, and capture of Toulon—The occupation of Corsica by the English—The armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees—The generals of the Republic—The effect of the rule of the Great Committee on the army—The state of the navy—Its disorganization under the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies—The naval policy of the Convention—Jean Bon Saint-André—Naval expeditions in the Mediterranean—Surrender of the Toulon fleet—The Brest fleet—Saint-André restores discipline—The French frigates and privateers—Conclusion	415
---	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

THE COLONIES AND THE ÉMIGRÉS.

The colonial policy of the Legislative Assembly and the Convention—The abolition of slavery—The effect of the Revolution on the Colonies—San Domingo—The rule of Sonthonax and Polverel—The English Invasion—Martinique—Guadeloupe—Saint Lucia—Tobago—French Guiana—The Île de France, or Mauritius—The Île de Bourbon, or Réunion—The French settlements in India—General result of the Revolution in the Colonies—The émigrés—Hatred and fear felt for them in France—
--

	PAGE
Feeling in Europe towards them—The position of Monsieur—The conduct of the Comte d'Artois—Policy of the great powers towards the émigrés—Their attitude towards the great powers—The military émigrés—The religious émigrés—The émigrés in Germany—The émigrés in England—The émigrés in Switzerland—The émigrés in America and India—Poverty and heroism in adversity of the émigrés—Contrast between the state of France at the close of 1791 and at the close of 1793	468
APPENDIX I.	
MINISTERS FROM 1791 UNTIL THE MINISTRIES WERE ABOLISHED, 12 GERMINAL, YEAR II. (APRIL 1, 1794)	515
APPENDIX II.	
PRESIDENTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 1, 1791, TO SEPTEMBER 21, 1792	516
APPENDIX III.	
PRESIDENTS OF THE CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 21, 1792, TO 4 BRUMAIRE, YEAR IV. (OCTOBER 26, 1795)	517
APPENDIX IV.	
THE GIRONDIN PARTY.....	522
APPENDIX V.	
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1793 COMPARED WITH CONDORCET'S SCHEME ...	530
APPENDIX VI.	
THE COMMITTEES OF THE CONVENTION	535
APPENDIX VII.	
THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY TO 9 THERMIDOR, YEAR II. (JULY 27, 1794)	539
APPENDIX VIII.	
THE COMMITTEE OF GENERAL SECURITY TO 9 THERMIDOR, YEAR II. (JULY 27, 1794)	541

Contents.

XV

APPENDIX IX.

	PAGE
THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL OF PARIS	544

APPENDIX X.

THE REPRESENTATIVES ON MISSION	548
--------------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX XI.


THE ARMIES OF THE REPUBLIC	555
----------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX XII.

CONCORDANCE OF THE REPUBLICAN WITH THE GREGORIAN CALENDAR ...	561
---	-----

PLAN.

THE TUILERIES IN 1792	90
-----------------------------	----



CHAPTER I.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

The new deputies—The Royalists—Vaublanc—The Feuillants—Mathieu Dumas—Bigot de Préameneu—The left—Girondins and Enragés—Vergniaud—Guadet and Gensonné—Merlin de Thionville—Chabot and Basire—The characteristics of these parties—Brissot—The salons—Madame de Staël—Madame Roland—Madame de Condorcet—Lucile Desmoulins—The cafés—The theatres—The journals—The position of the court—The policy of Leopold—The ministers—The new Assembly's first decrees—The massacre at Avignon—The question of the émigrés—The princes at Coblenz—The army of Condé—The plot for seizing Strasbourg—The question of the priests "insermentés"—Resignations of Bailly and Lafayette—Pétion, mayor of Paris—The Department of the Seine—Roederer—The Jacobin Club—The close of the year 1791.

WHEN Mirabeau advocated the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, in 1790, and the summons of a new legislature, he begged the king to insist upon an interval of some three months before the meeting of the second assembly, during which the executive might recover some of its proper power; but if he had perceived the advantage which such an interval would give to the royal authority, the leading members of the Constituent Assembly saw it equally clearly, and had no intention of giving royalty this last chance. They decreed, therefore, that the first elections under the new Constitution should begin upon August 25, and be over by September 25, and that the new Assembly should meet on October 1, 1791, the day after the Constituent Assembly had dissolved itself. Thus there was not an interregnum of even a single day in which

the king could obtain any advantage. The composition of the new Assembly was very different from that of its predecessor. There was in the new Legislative Assembly, as in the Constituent, a large proportion of lawyers, but there was also a far greater number of professional politicians, and a far smaller number of priests. Indeed, the clerical element was conspicuous by its absence; and, with the exception of Lecoz, Fauchet, and Lamourette, such priests and bishops as did appear were not calculated to do credit to their order. The most striking feature was the large proportion of men of scientific and literary ability who were elected, among whom were Lacépède, the great naturalist; Guyton-Morveau, the chemist; Bigot de Préameneu, the jurist; Koch, the famous professor of international law; Arbogast, the mathematician; Ramond, the geologist; Broussonet, the naturalist and secretary of the Agricultural Society of Paris; Carnot, the engineer; Cerutti, the ex-Jesuit journalist and correspondent of Mirabeau; Quatremère de Quincy, the author of the articles on architecture in the "Encyclopédie;" Dusaulx, the translator of Juvenal; François de Neufchâteau, the poet and dramatist; and Condorcet, the Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, who supplied arguments to his party, though his weakness of speech prevented him from being an orator. The new Assembly at once split up into sections, but there was no great central party such as had formed the majority in the Constituent Assembly, and the line of demarcation between right and left was from the first distinctly drawn. Both the right and the left were divided into two marked sections. On the right there sat, side by side, the Royalists and the Feuillants; while on the left there agreed together for the time the elements of the two parties of the Girondins and the Jacobins which were to fight so fierce a battle for supremacy one year afterwards.

The Royalists were few in number, but contained many men of ability, and, what was more rare, of courage to support a falling cause. It is true that there were no such bigoted supporters of the ancien régime as d'Esprémesnil and Mira-

beau-Tonneau; but the place of Cazalès was well filled by the fiery young Dutchman, Daverhoul; and the wisdom of Malouet was well matched by the experience of Vaublanc. Vincent Marie Viennot, ci-devant Comte de Vaublanc, was the son of a Burgundian nobleman by a rich creole, and was born in the island of San Domingo in 1755. At the age of seven he was taken to Paris, and educated at the military school there. In 1774 he became an officer in the Régiment de la Sarre, and then went to San Domingo, where he married. On his return to France in 1782 he left the army and established himself near Melun. He took part in the elections of 1789, and acted as secretary to the noblesse of the bailliage of Melun, though he did not succeed in being elected a deputy. He followed the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly with great interest, particularly its behaviour with regard to San Domingo, and in 1791 he was elected deputy to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Seine-et-Marne.¹ He was a representative of the Royalist party of a very different type from Daverhoul. His attachment to the monarchy was not due to youthful enthusiasm and romantic sentiment, but to a belief that in a strong government alone the anarchic condition of France and her colonies could find a remedy. He was by no means a hearty supporter of the new constitution, but he had sworn to observe it, and intended to keep his oath. His courage and his wisdom were more than once tried as the chief representative of the smaller section of the right, and his name occurs more than once as its leader in the most stirring debates in the Legislative Assembly.

The Royalist section was very few in numbers, though it contained, as has been just said, some men of great courage and ability. The strongest party numerically in the whole Assembly was that of the *Feuillants*. After the events of July 17 the club of the *Feuillants*, which had originally grown out of the Monarchical Club, was joined by most of the former members of the left of the Constituent Assembly, and

¹ *Mémoires* of Vaublanc in Berville and Barrière's *Collection des Mémoires*.

particularly by Barnave and his friends who had seceded from the Jacobins when they recognized the supremacy of Robespierre there. Their influence had secured the election of a large number of deputies who thought as they did, to the Legislative Assembly; but the consistency of these new deputies was not to be depended upon, and a great many who were originally elected as Feuillants or Constitutionals voted eventually, under the influence of the eloquence of the Girondins or of the threats of the Jacobins, in opposition to their own party. The main tenet of these Feuillant deputies was that the Constitution of 1791 must be adhered to at all costs, and they firmly believed it was the most wonderful conception that the human brain had ever produced. They could see no faults in it, and fought for it obstinately; and the inherent weakness of their position arose from the fact that the Constitution of 1791 was not perfect. Their two most distinguished leaders were a young soldier and aide-de-camp of Lafayette, Mathieu Dumas, and the learned jurist, Bigot de Préameneu. Mathieu Dumas was the son of a treasurer of the finances, and was born at Montpellier in 1753. He entered the army in 1767, and acted as aide-de-camp, first to the Comte de Puysegur and then to General de Rochambeau, in the war of American Independence, and after serving as assistant-quartermaster-general in America, was promoted major in 1784. He there made his mark as a staff officer, and after filling two military missions at Constantinople and Amsterdam was appointed secretary to the council of war, in the place of the Comte de Guibert.¹ When the Revolution broke out he was chosen by Lafayette to be one of his aides-de-camp; and as he came frequently to the sittings, he became well known to the deputies of the Constituent Assembly, who entrusted him with two important missions, the one to put an end to the religious disturbances at Montauban,² and the other to command the various bodies of national guards, who were escorting the king from Varennes to Paris.³ He gave so much

¹ *Souvenirs du Comte Mathieu Dumas, 1770-1830*, vol. i. Paris: 1839.

² Vol. i. chap. xvi. p. 491.

³ Vol. i. chap. xv. p. 453.

satisfaction, that he was at once promoted *maréchal-de-camp*, and was sent to Metz to organize the first battery of horse artillery ever known in France. While thus engaged he was elected by the department of the Seine-et-Oise to the Legislative Assembly. His friendship with Lafayette and the men who made the Constitution of 1791 kept him faithful to the work they were so proud of, and he quickly gathered round him a group of young *Feuillants*, such as Beugnot, Becquey, Dumolard, Jaucourt, and Théodore de Lameth, elder brother of Charles and Alexandre de Lameth, who all believed in the new Constitution.

Félix Julien Jean Bigot de Préameneu was the son of an *avocat* at Rennes, and had been born in that famous city of great lawyers, in 1747. He had taken the degree of Doctor of Laws at the university there in 1768, and had then come to Paris to practise his profession. He had at once formed a close alliance with the deputies who were elected in Brittany to the Constituent Assembly, and was a very early member of the Jacobin Club. The numerous Breton lawyers acknowledged him their master, and through them he exercised great influence on the work of the Constituent Assembly. In December, 1790, his legal abilities were recognized by his being elected judge of the fourth *arrondissement* of Paris, and he gave such satisfaction in that capacity that in September, 1791, he was elected one of the deputies for the capital. He naturally became the leader of the older and more prudent of the *Feuillants*, for they knew that he had had great influence in the drawing up of the Constitution of 1791, and felt a personal pride in it, while at the same time he was less violent and impetuous than Dumas and his friends.

There sat, upon the opening day, on the left of the new Assembly a crowd of deputies unknown to Paris, who had all begged for admission to the Jacobin Club the moment they reached the capital. For some weeks they all seemed animated by the same aims, and to be under the influence of the same prejudices; but it was not long before a distinct difference could be observed between certain deputies who were generally

known as the "enragés" Jacobins, and that section which formed the nucleus of the future Girondin party. In opinion, indeed, all the members of the left differed but little. They all hoped for a Republic, and wished for the destruction of the Monarchy. But the Girondins dreamed of an ideal Republic in which they should be the orators and the tribunes; while the extreme section looked forward to a Republican system of government in the hope that their energies might then obtain active employment. The name Girondin was in the following year made to include many men who had no connection with the department of the Gironde, but the party took its title in this Assembly from three deputies belonging to the great city of Bordeaux, the capital of the new department of the Gironde. These three men—all men of great distinction but all dreamers—were destined to a short but brilliant career, and were all to die miserably. They were Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonné.

Sir Gordon Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud, the greatest orator, not only of the Girondin party, but of the whole period of the Revolution, was the son of a contractor for provisions to the cavalry regiment stationed at Limoges, and was born in that city on May 31, 1753. At school, he showed his ability when but a little boy, and he attracted the kindly interest of Turgot when intendant of the Limousin, who gave him a bursarship, or scholarship, at the Collège du Plessis at Paris, on his father becoming a bankrupt. His indolence prevented him from winning high distinction at school or at Saint-Sulpice, where he afterwards pretended to study divinity, for he found it easier to write poetry and vers de société, which obtained him an entrance into many ladies' drawing-rooms, and in particular to the salon of Thomas, the Academician. His friends exerted themselves to get him an appointment in the Civil Service, but the drudgery disgusted him, and he threw up his post and retired to live with his ruined father at Limoges. His brother-in-law advised him to go to the bar, and he established himself in Bordeaux, where he took the degree of bachelor of laws in 1781, and was admitted an avocat in the following August. At Bordeaux he met an old Paris acquaintance, the President

of Parlement, Dupaty, who made him his secretary. He won his first cause in April, 1782, and soon obtained a large practice at the bar.¹ He also made great friends with the leading avocats of the day at Bordeaux, who then formed a society of great ability, and took the keenest interest in the progress of the Revolution. By 1790 he had made two or three remarkable public speeches, especially an "éloge" on Mirabeau, and for his eloquence was elected one of the first administrators of the department of the Gironde. He was afterwards elected fourth deputy to the Legislative Assembly, in 1791, and by his speeches during the elections justified the high reputation he had won. On his arrival in Paris he became a member of the Jacobin Club, and so distinguished himself by his eloquence in the very first debates in the Legislative Assembly, that he was elected its third president. The genius of Vergniaud was essentially oratorical and not political, and it is only necessary to remark here that his imagination had been charmed by the idea of a Republic, and that he became the orator of the Gironde and the spokesman of the Republican party in the Legislative Assembly. Only his great indolence prevented him from being a great statesman; he was a far more profound thinker than his associates, and was essentially a disciple of Montesquieu, and not of Rousseau, but though he did not mind taking an infinity of trouble over his speeches, he would not submit to the drudgery of practical politics, and therefore failed to obtain the commanding position which he deserved.

Though not such great orators or statesmen, Vergniaud's two most important colleagues in the representation of the Gironde, Guadet and Gensonné, were far more industrious politicians than he was.² Marguerite Élie Guadet, the son of the mayor of Saint Émilion, was born in 1755, and was therefore two years younger than Vergniaud. He had been admitted at an early age an avocat at Bordeaux, and was the

¹ *Vergniaud. Manuscrits, lettres et papiers, pièces, pour la plupart inédites, classées et annotées*, by Charles Vatet. 2 vols. Paris: 1873.

² *Les Girondins, leur vie privée, leur vie publique, leur proscription et leur mort*, by Joseph Guadet. 2 vols. Paris: 1861.

leader of the bar there in 1789. He had written an address to the Bordelais during the electoral period, and had acquired such a reputation for political knowledge that he would have been elected a deputy to the States-General in 1789 if he had not been considered too young by the electors. He had adopted austere Republican principles, and came up to Paris with the intention of using all his efforts to bring about a Republic. He at once joined the Jacobin Club, and soon showed his ability there, for he was immediately elected a member of the committee of the club. He allied himself with Brissot, who obtained great influence over him, and it was through Guadet that Brissot influenced Vergniaud himself. Armand Gensonné, a friend of Guadet's, and an abler though quieter man, was born at Bordeaux in 1758. In that city he had not made so great a reputation as Guadet or Vergniaud, but he was considered, and rightly, to be a more profound lawyer than either of the two more brilliant advocates,¹ and his reputation caused him to be elected, in 1791, a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal by the Gironde. He had greatly interested himself in the affairs of San Domingo; and on behalf of the merchants of Bordeaux, whose prosperity depended greatly upon that of the colony, he had sent in to the Constituent Assembly a memoir proving that the freedom of the negroes would be advantageous to the colonies. The Constituent Assembly was favourably impressed by his memoir, and gave him a mission to examine the feelings with which the people regarded the "insermentés" priests in the departments of the west of France. He presented his report to the Legislative Assembly, and from that time was recognized as an authority in the Assembly on the question of the clergy.

The party of the Enragés was very small, but made up for its small numbers by its noisiness and vigour. The three most conspicuous members of this group were men of very different qualities and very different education; all vigorous, but not all equally honest. Undoubtedly the ablest of them,

¹ *Le Barreau de Bordeaux de 1775 à 1815*, by H. Chauvot, pp. 165-199. Paris : 1856.

who was to gain great fame as a representative on mission and as a statesman under the Convention, but who had in the Legislative Assembly his reputation to make, was Merlin of Thionville. Antoine Christophe Merlin came of an old bourgeois family of Thionville, where his father practised as a procureur, and was born in 1762. He was educated at the college of the Lazarists at Metz, and was intended to take orders, but he refused to become a monk after a sojourn, of which he has left a description, at the Chartreuse of Val Saint Pierre. He therefore studied law at Paris, and, after acting for a time as his father's clerk, was admitted an avocat at Thionville. He had a great success there, and showed his romantic disposition by marrying a blind girl, in 1787, on which occasion the little town was quite en fête.¹ Both he and his family took a keen interest in the progress of the Revolution, and when the new local authorities were chosen he was elected a municipal officer, and his father president of the directory of the district. His natural eloquence gave him great weight with the popular society of Thionville, and in 1791 he was elected a deputy to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Moselle. His eloquence and his advanced principles soon marked Merlin of Thionville out as a leader of the extreme party in the Legislative Assembly, and though he acted with some men of infamous character his life and his principles were always pure. During the session of the Legislative Assembly he was too unsparing an opponent of all the measures proposed by the king or the ministers, but when once he had shared the responsibility of government he became one of the grandest figures in the Convention, famous alike as a representative on mission and as the defender of Mayence, and after the 9th Thermidor, as a statesman with a real knowledge of foreign affairs.

Chabot and Basire had neither the high Republican spirit nor the Republican integrity of Merlin. The former had been a Capuchin friar, the latter was an avocat, who had been for

¹ *Vie et correspondance de Merlin de Thionville*, by Jean Reynaud. Paris: 1860.

some years secretary of the archives of Burgundy; they were closely connected in the Legislative Assembly and in the Convention, and both were at last guillotined upon the same day. François Chabot was the son of a college cook at Rhodéz, and was born at St. Géniez, in Rouergue, in 1759. He took orders and entered a convent of Capucins, but he seems to have had no vocation for the priesthood, and abandoned his monastery after the February decree of the Constituent Assembly. He was appointed Grand Vicar by Grégoire, Bishop of Blois, and was elected by the department of the Loir-et-Cher to the Legislative Assembly. Without the eloquence of Merlin of Thionville, he yet showed extreme vigour during the session of the Assembly; and not contented with attacking the ministry and Lafayette, he joined Basire in causing a breach between the Girondins and the Jacobins by attacking Brissot himself. In spite of his vigour and real courage, he failed to make a great reputation for himself in the Legislative Assembly from his coarseness and roughness; but, having been a monk, he was always listened to on clerical subjects. Though it must be acknowledged that he was a vigorous politician, it is impossible to feel for him the same sympathy as was inspired by his friends Merlin and Basire. Claude Basire, who, as has been said, was secretary of the archives of Burgundy, was an extremely young man, and was born at Dijon in 1764. He had there distinguished himself by his earnestness for the Revolution, and had been elected a member of the first directory of his department. His popularity secured his election for the department of the Côte d'Or, and he immediately took up his position on the extreme left of the Legislative Assembly. Though a more highly educated man than Chabot, and certainly more scrupulous, he shared with him and Merlin the leadership of the Enragé party; and if not their equal in energy and assurance, he was a more amiable character than Chabot, and his reputation has not suffered by his strenuous attempts to save the Swiss soldiery after the capture of the Tuileries on August 10.

These were the chief new men sent up from the provinces

to the Legislative Assembly, and the most notable point about them was their extreme youth. With the exception of Bigot de Préameneu, who was about forty-four, none of the leading deputies were more than forty years of age, and their youth partly accounts for their enthusiasm. It may be noticed that these deputies were, nearly without exception, men who had made their names in the new local administrations or law courts; and that they were purely local men, who represented entirely the spirit of the departments for which they were elected. Many of them, notably Guadet and Basire, had shown ability as local administrators, and had thus gained the confidence of their fellow-citizens, and were able to speak from experience of the advantages or disadvantages of the new system of local government; but, as happened with regard to the deputies to the Constituent Assembly, the fascination of Paris drew them within the magic influence of the capital, and their inspiration was not derived from their provinces but from the Jacobin Club, of which they had been elected members, or from the salons. Though some of them had slight experience of local government, but few were acquainted with great questions of national politics; and the mistake which the Constituent Assembly had made in its self-denying decree of May 10, 1791, soon appeared when the lack of experience of the members of the Legislative Assembly was shown in the same unpractical behaviour which had ruined the good intentions of the Constituent. If there was no man of the political power of Mirabeau among them, there were many whose eloquence was great, many who were sustained by their strong enthusiasm and their confidence in the cause of the Revolution, many who were destined to be drawn by its fatal excitement into courses which led to their deaths, and the different political principles which afterwards distinguished the Girondins and the Jacobins can be traced in the speeches of the representatives of these parties in the Legislative Assembly.

Brissot, from the first, took the leadership of the left, and it was not until March, 1792, that Chabot's attack upon him proved that the deputies of the left were not all moved by

the same influences. His political career as a journalist and the founder of the *Société des Amis des Noirs* belongs to the early history of the Revolution,¹ but his election to the Legislative Assembly marks a new epoch in his life. He had now got an opportunity of showing if he had any practical knowledge of politics, and he conclusively proved that he had none. While distinctly republican in his ideas, he certainly never intended to dethrone the king by force, but he was quite ready to make the position of Louis so uncomfortable that he would be glad to abdicate. What he would do when he had established a Republic he himself did not know; but whatever he did, he was determined that his own name should be in all men's mouths. If the large majority of the deputies in the Constituent Assembly were theoretical politicians, Brissot surpassed them all, and his theories were not tinged with the poetry which threw a glamour over the dreams of the other Girondins. Though far inferior to any of them in eloquence or ability, his specious pretence of knowledge of "la haute politique," and especially of foreign affairs, gave him extraordinary influence over the brilliant group whose policy he was for a time to direct.

The character of Paris which so greatly enthralled the Girondins and had such immense influence on the Revolution—not so much, as has been shown, because its political life differed from that of the provinces, but because it was like the sphinx, to which Mirabeau compared it—seems to have inspired every man of ability to try to drag its secret from it. Very different was the Paris which the Girondins and the new deputies came up to see, from the Paris which had received the first news of the States-General, and which had watched with such keen interest the progress of the Constituent Assembly. The salons and the journals and the clubs which had influenced the Paris of 1789 were all entirely changed, but the new Paris was not yet tired of the excitement of Revolution, and was longing still to make fresh changes, and to strike new blows at all received ideas. In only one point did the Paris of 1791

¹ Vol. i. chap. iv. pp. 100, 101.

resemble the Paris of 1789, and that was its gaiety. Theatres and gambling-houses and places of amusement had increased and multiplied, and if the new deputies had a mind—as many of them had—to enjoy themselves, they might well be excused for yielding to the magic fascination of the capital. The salons had greatly changed in power and in character since 1789. The emigration of the Royalists had deprived many of the most famous drawing-rooms of their wittiest and gayest frequenters; and in their stead new men, fresh from the provinces, had to be the heroes of the ladies. But little did the ladies mind, for those who still remained in Paris were all violent politicians. To begin with, the old Royalist salons were broken up. No longer could Madame de Chambonas or Madame de Sabran receive the flower of the French court. Their power was gone, and those ladies had themselves left France. But certain ladies still tried to maintain the influence of French political women, and to assemble the chief leaders of parties in their drawing-rooms. It cannot be said that there was a single Royalist salon now in existence. True it was that Madame de Tessé still welcomed her friends who had been so powerful in the Constituent Assembly, and that Madame de Broglie continued to receive Barnave and his associates; but those ladies were no longer able to rejoice that the most influential men in France were their guests, for without exception the old leaders of the Constituent Assembly, and even the young men of the triumvirate,¹ who, for the time, had won such great popularity, now met with a dejected air to discuss how the progress of this terrible Revolution might be checked, and how the monarchy might be preserved. The excitement and gaiety of the Paris of 1791 was to be found rather in the drawing-rooms of Madame de Genlis, Madame de Staël, and Madame Roland, than in those of Madame de Broglie and Madame de Tessé. The salon of Madame de Genlis had not changed in character since the commencement of the Revolution, but the friends who had assembled round her when governess to the children of the Duke of

¹ Duport, Barnave, Charles de Lameth: see vol. i., pp. 240-243.

Orleans had now given place to men of much greater importance. Then she had only received the friends of a discredited and disliked prince of the blood. Now she had moved from her old home in the Palais Royal, and had taken a house in the Rue St. Honoré, close to the Legislative Assembly; and there gathered round her most of her old guests and some new ones, whose names were to be yet more famous. Her husband, the ci-devant Marquis de Sillery, was now a man of great importance—far more so than when he had been but the colonel of the Duke of Orleans' guards,—and he brought to his wife's drawing-room to meet her former guests, Laclos and Saint-Huruge, men of the new generation of politicians, such as Guadet and Gensonné. In the same way, Madame de Beauharnais no longer received only young noblesse of liberal ideas and literary men of the former generation, but was proud to do honour to journalists who had formerly had no position, but who were now powers in the land, such as Gorsas, the disgraced schoolmaster, and Garat, the radical professor of history at the Lycée. Madame Talma still received the flower of the literary world of Paris, and at her house both Girondin and Feuillant was welcomed if only he loved the arts and the drama. But there were two new salons where two very young women entertained, which completely outshone the old meeting-places of 1789, and these were the salons of Madame de Staël and Madame Roland.

Madame de Staël, the daughter of Necker and wife of the Swedish ambassador, was at the height of her reputation as a woman of politics and fashion. She was but twenty-five years of age, and had shone in Paris ever since her marriage to the Baron de Staël-Holstein, in 1787. Until her mother had left Paris she had only been an ornament of Madame Necker's salon, but she had now completely discarded her mother's old friends and formed a coterie for herself. Of this coterie Comte Louis de Narbonne-Lara was the star. The affection which Madame de Staël entertained for him was well known to all the world, and she was not ashamed of it. The young count believed that he was the man who could change the present

state of affairs, and make it favourable to the king; and, in the drawing-room of his beloved, many plots were concocted for bringing him into the ministry. Around him and around her gathered all those believers in the Constitution who were now designated Feuillants; and though the more extreme Royalists of the Assembly refused to have anything to do with the new party, with all the ability of a loving woman she had collected around her all the men who were best able to help the Comte de Narbonne. The idea of Madame de Staël was that all the young Feuillants should give an appearance of being as advanced in their revolutionary ideas as the Girondins themselves; that they should enthusiastically applaud every patriotic sentiment, and, when they had got the ear of the Assembly and of all France, should endeavour to strengthen the power of the king. But neither king nor queen cared much for Madame de Staël and her coterie. They would not trust to her offers of alliance now, because in former years the young ambassadress had shown herself a supporter of the party of movement in the Constituent Assembly. But Madame de Staël's power in Paris had become very great, and it will be seen that the king was at last obliged to yield to her wishes and to admit the Comte de Narbonne into the ministry. But the drawing-room of Madame de Staël, though it was the head-quarters of all the young Feuillants, was by no means closed to the brilliant leaders of the Gironde, and in her rooms those who opposed each other in the Assembly met on common ground. Unfortunately, Madame de Staël's love was rather for an individual than a cause, and the Girondins, feeling that, were more at home in the yet more famous salon of Madame Roland.

Manon Jeanne Roland was the daughter of an engraver,¹ who lived at Paris towards the close of the eighteenth century. From her very childhood she declares that she had been possessed by a longing for social equality, and had been disgusted when but a mere child that the ladies of the court should be able to dress so well. With this love of social

¹ See *Étude sur Madame Roland*, by C. A. Dauban (Paris: 1866); and his edition of her *Mémoires* (Paris: 1865).

equality had grown up an equally enthusiastic love for political liberty. Plutarch had been the favourite of her childhood, and she used to study his biographies at mass instead of following her missal, just as Marie Antoinette had read a far worse book. Her enthusiastic nature had in early childhood led her into an affectionate friendship for two girls whom she knew at her convent school. To them she poured out every hope of her heart; for them, with delightful frankness, she discussed the qualities of her various lovers, and tells them why she had accepted for her husband¹ the man who is known in the history of the Revolution as the "virtuous Roland." He was old enough to be her father, but she had somehow imbibed the idea that she would like to be of assistance to him in his labours as inspector of manufactures at Lyons, and that she would thus be helping in the furtherance of the doctrine of equality. Unfortunately, Roland was a man of cold exterior and very methodical habits, and he could not win the heart of his enthusiastic young wife, though he loved her very truly indeed. Her early affections were therefore centred on her child, and, at a later period, on a member of the Constituent Assembly, who played a great part in the history of the Girondin party in the Convention, Nicolas Buzot. The contrast between husband and wife had struck Arthur Young when travelling in France in 1788,² and still more did it strike the hearts of the enthusiastic young Girondins who were brought to her drawing-room during the winter of 1791. Madame Roland was an enthusiastic Republican, and hated the queen with a personal hatred, and treated her with a want of respect and a brutality of language which she must have repented bitterly when she needed pity herself. Round this enthusiastic priestess of liberty, rather than the coquettish and plain Madame de Staël, did the young Girondins collect.

¹ *Lettres de Madame Roland aux demoiselles Cannelot*, edited by C. A. Dauban. Paris: 1863.

² See Arthur Young's *Travels*, ed. 1790, vol. i. p. 275, for his visit to Roland. "This gentleman, somewhat advanced in life, has a young and beautiful wife."

Vergniaud alone, the greatest of them all, seemed careless of her attractions, and preferred the artistic society of Madame Talma and his quiet home-life with his colleague Ducos.¹ But with Buzot and Brissot ever by her side, Gensonné and Guadet usually in her drawing-room, and the younger members of the party, such as Louvet and Grangeneuve, coming to receive inspiration from her, Madame Roland indeed became a political power in Paris. Enthusiasm was the quality which gave the Girondins their influence and made them of such political importance, and it was enthusiasm which Madame Roland inspired into the numerous frequenters of her drawing-room.

These were the two chief salons of the winter of 1791, but those of two other ladies must also be noticed, who, though they cannot be called political women, had far more beauty, both of character and face, than those who have been just mentioned. Sophie de Grouchy, sister of the marquis of that name, and, since 1786, Madame de Condorcet, was one of the most charming women of the whole Revolutionary period. She was the sister of Madame Cabanis and of the future Maréchal de Grouchy, formerly an officer in the Gardes du Corps, and now colonel of the 2nd Dragoons, and had married Condorcet, in spite of his cold exterior, for love. He was as cold and stiff in his demeanour, and it might be added as plain, as Roland himself; but Sophie de Condorcet was a more womanly woman than Madame Roland, and loved her husband as dearly as he loved her. Her great beauty and her rank would have enabled her to become a leading lady of fashion, but she preferred a quiet home life; and though she never lost a friend who frequented her drawing-room, she never attempted to make it a resort for politicians. Mirabeau, who disliked Condorcet, declared that not even the beauty of his wife could secure the election of the long-winded pedant to the Council-General of the department of the Seine; but had she cared to exert her powers of pleasing, there might have been a very

¹ See the letters of Madame Ducos to her husband in Wallon's *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire*, and Aulard's *Orateurs de la Legislative et de la Convention*, vol. ii. pp. 579, 580.

different result. She took a pride in the fact that her husband was willing to work on quietly, without being downcast at rejection in any particular election. He had been elected to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Seine for his reputation, not for his eloquence, for his voice was so weak that it could hardly be heard. His name has been always associated with the Girondins, but at this period he was not closely connected with them, and he never attended Madame Roland's salon. He held opinions in many ways resembling theirs, but he always distrusted Brissot, who was their idol, and went quietly along a path of his own, pursuing his own ideas without any reference to them or their projects, and continuing his quiet endeavours to do good without associating himself with any faction. Madame de Condorcet assisted in his labours, and though, as has been said, she did not attempt to keep a salon, there was but one home in Paris which could rival hers for its charming domestic happiness.

The quiet little apartment of Camille and Lucile Desmoulins can hardly be termed a salon. Yet the future leaders of the Revolution, Danton and Robespierre, met there on common ground with the men who were to make their names terrible to all Europe, such as Stanislas Fréron, Robert, Brune, Fabre d'Eglantine, and Merlin de Thionville. Camille, the witty author of the "Discours de la Lanterne," and the "Révolutions de France et de Brabant," had fallen deeply in love, before the beginning of the revolutionary excitement of 1789, with a young girl named Lucile Duplessis. He had married her in the December of 1790, and among the witnesses to the marriage were Pétion, Sillery, Mercier, Brissot, and Robespierre, his old schoolfellow at the Collège Louis le Grand.¹ The marriage had been a very happy one, and, though the young couple were not rich, they could afford to entertain their friends. The conversation did not run, as in the more lofty and political salons of Madame de Staël and Madame Roland, on political subjects. Lucile Desmoulins

¹ *Camille et Lucile Desmoulins*, by Jules Claretie, p. 151. Paris : 1875.

had a gentle woman's horror of riots and bloodshed, and the conversation which took place in her little room was rather of a domestic than a political character. And this it was that made her home such a pleasant one to the men who were preparing the last great effort for the overthrow of the French monarchy. If Madame Roland inspired the Girondins with a love of liberty and a longing to dethrone the proud Marie Antoinette, it was from Lucile Desmoulins that men of strong will and strong hand learned what was the nature of the women for whom they were to fight in what must be a war of life and death with the monarchy. The main feature of the character and ideas of the Enragés Jacobins who met in her house, was their knowledge that things had gone too far for any compromise. The Feuillants hoped that the Constitution would be maintained, and that the unpractical notions of the Constituent Assembly would be allowed a fair trial. The Girondins, indeed, did not wish to overthrow that Constitution, but they wanted to establish a republic of an ideal type upon the basis it afforded. The extreme Jacobins, of whom the typical friends of Lucile Desmoulins were Robespierre and Danton, were too clear-sighted not to see through both of these fallacies. With a people wild for Revolution, with a constitution utterly unpractical in character, and with foreign enemies threatening them from abroad, neither an ideal powerless monarchy nor an ideal republic could by any possibility be maintained. Robespierre, Danton, and all the extreme Jacobins wanted a form of government which would work. They knew that the war with the ancien régime was one of extermination, and that it was impossible, on any basis at which they had yet arrived, for the two parties to sit down and shake hands with each other. These men saw the necessity for the violent measures by which they were to win their fame and establish their power. They were men who did not shrink from shedding blood, and they would have had the candour to confess that they would rather slay other men than be slain themselves. For a moment, after the massacre of July 17, this extreme party had been disheartened. Danton

had returned to his property at Arcis-sur-Aube; Marat escaped to England; Robespierre had sought shelter in the house of Duplay; and Camille had discontinued his journal. But they were not disheartened for long, and the meeting of the Legislative Assembly made them put forth all their efforts to combine Paris for further efforts, and, above all, to organize France as distinguished from Paris for the coming struggle. To such men, who knew that they were playing a desperate game, for they themselves were held up to execration both by Frenchmen and by the foreigners who were threatening to help the king against them, it was a relief to turn from crowded political assemblies and noisy popular clubs, to a quiet home where politics were not regarded as the only end of life, and where a gentle woman could be to them what Sophie de Condorcet was, in a more exalted sphere, to her friends.

The influence of the cafés of Paris in 1789 has been noticed; but by the end of 1791 they obtained a much greater political importance than in 1789. The very diminution in the number of salons increased the importance of cafés as places of rendezvous for politicians. The famous old cafés of the eighteenth century, which had been generally frequented by literary men of influence, still existed, but they never became entirely political. At the Café Procope, kept by the Italian Zoppi, whose name was well known in the pantomimes of the day, there still met some relics of the age which had seen Diderot go there every night after the performance of a new piece at the Théâtre Français on the other side of the street, but the emigration had removed many of the old frequenters of the Café Procope, and Zoppi complained that the new literary men were not so courteous as their predecessors. At the Café des Arts and the Café de Flore literary men still assembled, but the cafés which played a part in the political life of the Revolution were not the same as those which had played so great a part in the literary history of Paris in the eighteenth century. Notable among them were the cafés of the Palais Royal, and, most of all, the Cafés de Valois, de la Régence, and de Foy. At the Café de Valois the Feuillants chiefly

congregated. In it were to be heard praises of the perfect Constitution of 1791, and in it the journals which upheld that Constitution were chiefly studied. There were no such noisy scenes as had taken place in the days when the Vicomte de Mirabeau and his friends got drunk night after night in the Palais Royal; for the young Feuillants, if they did not possess the wit, certainly did not attempt to rival the impudence and debauchery of the old supporters of the Royalist cause. The Café de la Régence had been since 1789 the resort of the friends of Lafayette. The officers of the National Guard of Paris were always welcome, and were in the habit of holding their festival dinners there. Though there had been a time when the Café de la Régence had been surrounded by a cheering crowd, it had now gone by, and the officers of the Parisian National Guard heard the name of their general hooted outside their meeting place. But the most famous of all was the Café de Foy, which had a long and chequered history during the Revolution. It was at this time the chief rendezvous of the many stock-jobbers and speculators who spent the day in the neighbourhood of the Palais Royal depreciating the value of assignats, and their evenings in making a profit by their possession of specie. Large fortunes were to be made by this means, and, like most speculators, the men who made money quickly were ready to spend it lavishly at the Café de Foy,—the more so, as their profits brought upon them the hatred of the people, and there was always a chance that they might be hanged any day an enemy raised a cry against them. For it must never be forgotten that the Palais Royal, which had been in 1789 the meeting-place of the poorer politicians of Paris, was in 1791 the chosen “Bourse” of the speculators in assignats. Besides the most famous cafés of the Palais Royal, there are two or three others which deserve notice at this period. Particularly popular with the men who were to do the dirty work of the Revolution was the Café Corazza, in a back street near the Palais Royal. Here could be seen any day such men as Varlet and Proly, as yet unknown to fame, and drinking with them the men who were

to make use of them in more than one terrible crisis, such as Collot d'Herbois, the actor, and, sometimes, a deputy to the Legislative Assembly, Chabot, the unfrocked priest. On the other side of the Palais Royal, not very far from the Jacobin Club, was the Café de la Victoire, which was kept by the sapper Audouin, editor of the *Journal Universel*, who used to describe himself as the patriot sapper of the Café de la Victoire. Other cafés there were which came into note at a later date, under the Terror and during the struggle with the Girondins, such as Café du Caveau; but mention has now been made of those which were generally frequented during the first months of the Legislative Assembly.

The theatres of Paris had been affected by the revolutionary fervour, and in their pits were to be found earnest politicians, listening to plays which treated of the burning questions of the day. It is curious to notice the different plays which were performed on various occasions during the year 1791. Mention has been made of the "Charles IX." of Marie Joseph Chénier, which was performed at the Français in 1789, and in which allusions to the massacre of St. Bartholomew were so warmly taken up by people in the pit. Equally interesting is the description in the correspondence of Mirabeau with La Marck, of his enthusiastic reception when he was present at the performance of Voltaire's "Brutus" in the December of 1790. At the feast of Federation, in July, 1790, the plays performed were typical of the opinions held at the Théâtre Français and at the Opera house. There was played at the Opera "Louis IX. en Egypte," which recalled the qualities of another Louis, king of France; while at the Français were played, on different nights, "Augustin et Bayard," which treated of loyalty, and which was put on by the wish of the actors themselves, but followed, rather against the feeling of the company, by the "Famille Patriote," of Collot, and at the entry of the fédérés of Marseilles, the anti-Royalist "Charles IX." But the actors of the Théâtre Français did not approve of being made to play Republican plays, and two distinct parties appeared in the company. Grand-

mesnil attempted to steer a middle course; but at last the opposition between the Royalist and the Jacobin actors became so great, that the company broke in half in the April of 1791. At the old theatre of the Théâtre Français, where the Odéon now stands, Mandat, and Dazincourt, the chief actor of kings, with Madame Contat and Mademoiselle Raucourt remained to play pieces which flattered their Royalist proclivities, and which proportionately disgusted their audiences, especially their neighbours, the club of the Cordeliers, who, a couple of years later, secured the arrest of the entire company. On the other hand, the Jacobin actors and actresses, headed by Talma and Dugazon, Madame Sainval and Madame Desgarcins, emigrated to the Théâtre des Variétés Amusantes in the Rue Richelieu, which they called the Théâtre Français de la Rue Richelieu, and which opened with a new play of Chénier's, called "Henri VIII.," under the management of Talma and the veteran actor Grandmesnil. In revolutionary Paris it is easy to imagine which theatre was the most successful pecuniarily, and which most popular with the masses of the people. The "pièces de circonstance" deserve a slight notice, although they had not yet become as universal as they did under the Terror. The performance of the "Famille Patriote" of Collot has been noticed, but most of these "pièces de circonstance" referred to the latest reforms of the Assembly. Thus the "Victimes Cloîtrées" of Monvel was played at the Théâtre de la Nation, and Fiévée's "Rigueurs des Cloîtres" at the Théâtre Italien, but it was not until after the proclamation of the Republic that this sort of piece became popular.

If the theatre reflected the political passions of the time, still more did the journals. It is true that the year 1791 was not signalized by production of so many new journals as the year 1789. But many journals which had been started earlier gained new vitality under the Legislative Assembly, in spite of the restrictive laws passed in the last days of the old Constituent Assembly. The Royalist journals had naturally died out when the king and queen began to have other uses for their money than subsidizing libels on their opponents, and

the *Ami du Roi* of Royou was the only representative of the class of papers which had been disgraced by the obscenity, though illuminated by the wit, of Rivarol and Champcenetz. Panckoucke still continued to carry on his three journals, with their three different political aspects. The old *Gazette* was still conducted by Fontanelle, but was often bankrupt for want of subscribers. The *Mercure* still had a large sale, from Mallet du Pan's wide knowledge of continental politics and numerous correspondents all over Europe. But the *Moniteur* was Panckoucke's most successful venture, for it was conducted with the idea of giving a faithful picture of the Revolution, and abounded in revolutionary sentiments. Of the old journals started in 1789, which still continued to attract subscribers, may be mentioned Feydel's *Observateur Français*, the *Journal des Debats*, Gorsas' *Courrier de Versailles*, and the *Journal de Paris*, now under the editorship of Garat. Two journals started during the year 1790 seemed at once to have sprung into popularity. These were the *Feuille Villageois*—the journal which had been started by Condorcet and Cerutti, to instruct the country districts as to what was going on in Paris,—and the *Annales Patriotiques et Littéraires*, which was under the guidance of two experienced journalists, Mercier and Carra. The *Journal Logographique* of Lehodey,¹ which was established in 1791 to publish an exact shorthand report of the debates of the Constituent Assembly was also continued, but it was hardly intended to have a very large sale, and it is rather useful for its accurate reports than for its political information. Incomparably the most important journal of this time was the *Ami du Peuple* of Marat. The persecution which he had suffered from Lafayette had endeared him to the people, and his denunciation of the folly of the Parisians seemed rather to please them than otherwise. That he libelled many innocent men there can be no doubt; that he encouraged the Parisians to bloodshed there can also be no doubt. The longer he remained a journalist the more clear-sighted he became; and his rôle during the session

¹ Vol. i., chapter iv., p. 103.

of the Legislative Assembly was of such vast importance that it will be necessary to observe his opinion on every subject that arose. Just as he had not feared Lafayette and the National Guard of Paris, he did not fear the new party which was rising into power, and attacked Brissot when the leader of a powerful party as violently as he had attacked him in the days when he was but the unimportant founder of the Société des Amis des Noirs. The events of July 17 had driven him for a short time to England, but he returned at the opening of the Legislative Assembly, and recommenced his journal with fresh vigour. He was summoned back to work by the members of the club of the Cordeliers, who begged him to draw up a "Catéchisme Révolutionnaire," to be taught to every child. The earnestness with which he threw himself into his work as a journalist, and his foresight as a politician, appear particularly on the great question of the war. No account of the journals of 1791 would be complete without an allusion to the *Bouche de Fer*, the recognized organ of the Cercle Sociale, the club which had arisen, in the October of 1790, in imitation of a Freemasons' lodge, and which was the creation of Claude Fauchet, the Constitutional Bishop of Calvados. In its columns was to be found the expression of that longing for social equality which so large a portion of the French people had now joined to its desire for political liberty.

Such was the Paris which saw the opening of the Legislative Assembly; and the position of the royal family in the Tuileries, which was attacked alike by Girondins and Jacobins, deserves a passing notice. The king, on the failure of the flight to Varennes, seems to have lost all heart, and it was only through the queen that the opposition of the court to the Revolution was at all encouraged. She could not believe that the princes of Europe, especially her brother the emperor, would allow matters to go further, and earnestly begged him to interfere at once to rescue herself and her husband from the mob of Paris. Leopold had expressed a strong opinion against the project of flight, and had promised if it was post-

poned that he would get the monarchs of Europe to set their armies on foot, and make a general demonstration in favour of the king and queen of France ;¹ but, nevertheless, when he saw that the queen was determined, he gave all the assistance in his power to her scheme. When it failed, and the royal family was ignominiously conducted back to Paris, Leopold, after an interview with the Comte d'Artois at Mantua, and encouraged by the assurances of Lord Elgin and Bischoffswerder, the special envoys of England and Prussia, issued a circular letter² to the powers from Padua on July 6, declaring the cause of Louis to be the cause of all kings, and requesting them to present an identical note of protest through their ambassadors at Paris. The letter from Padua was followed up by the conference and declaration of Pilnitz, but Leopold was too wise to really desire war, and under the influence of his old counsellors the Prince von Kaunitz and Marshal Lacy, he took the opportunity to retract the Padua letter on the king's acceptance of the Constitution in September, 1791, and again permitted the French ambassador to appear at his court. With her thoughts set upon armed assistance from her brother, it is little wonder that Marie Antoinette paid but scant attention to the numerous politicians, who secretly advised her and the king, among whom the most notable in their different ways were Barnave, Malouet, Dupont de Nemours, and the astute Swiss publicist, Mallet du Pan.

The king had little more reliance on his ministers than he had on his secret advisers, and indeed they were not worthy of very much notice, for the ministers had become, by the policy of the Constituent Assembly, mere executive officers who were responsible when anything went wrong and who received no praise when everything went right. The only man of any

¹ *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe pendant la Révolution Française*, by François de Bourgoing, vol. i. p. 354. Paris : 1865.

² *Quellen zur Geschichte der deutscher Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs während der französischen Revolutionskriege*, by Alfred, Ritter von Vivenot, vol. i. pp. 185-216, Vienna, 1873 ; and *Ursprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege*, by Leopold von Ranke, p. 90. Leipzig : 1875.

distinction or experience who was in office when the Legislative Assembly met was Montmorin, and he had been desirous of leaving the Foreign Office ever since the death of Mirabeau had deprived the court of the one statesman who could really direct the foreign policy of France. He had only retained office at the personal request of the king, but was determined to leave it as soon as his successor could be found. The other ministers, Valdec de Lessart, Duport du Tertre, Duportail, and Tarbé, were men of no weight, and the Legislative Assembly soon showed how small was the respect felt there for the executive power. Rabusson-Lamothe, deputy for the Puy de Dôme, describes the attitude of the Assembly towards the ministers in one of his first letters to his constituents. He writes to them on October 13, "The ministers have appeared in the Assembly three times since the king formally opened it. They have certainly not had to congratulate themselves on the politeness of the legislative body, for they were treated as if they had been criminals placed in the dock to undergo their examination."¹ It was this ferocity of the Assembly towards the ministers, which made Ségur refuse to fill the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mathieu Dumas had good reason to rejoice that he had preferred a seat in the Assembly to the Ministry for War. Before long, however, another attempt was made to strengthen the king's position, through his ministry, by the admission into office, through Madame de Staël's intrigues, of the Comte de Narbonne, when he succeeded Duportail as Minister for War in December, 1791.

The actual debates in the Legislative Assembly were confined almost entirely, during the first three months of its session, to the two great questions of the priests who had not taken the oath, and of the émigrés. It must be remembered that the Constituent Assembly had passed a law that a Convention must be summoned to alter the Constitution, and that therefore no constitutional measure of importance could be

¹ *Lettres sur l'Assemblée Législative (1791-1792) par Rabusson-Lamothe, député du Puy de Dôme, précédées d'une notice biographique*, by Francisque Mège, p. 45. Paris : 1870.

passed by the new Assembly. It was thus obliged to confine its activity to these two administrative questions, but before the debates on them are discussed at length, the opening debate of the Assembly, which treated of questions of ceremony, must be noticed. At its first session on September 30, the oldest deputy present, named Bartauld, took the chair, and, after the verification of powers, Pastoret was elected first president of the Legislative Assembly. As soon as he had taken his seat on October 5, Georges Couthon, who sat among the Jacobins on the extreme left of the Assembly, but who did not play a very great part in the Legislative Assembly, proposed that the royal chair should be brought from its high elevation and placed on a level with that of the president, "For," said the avocat of Clermont-Ferrand, "the king is only the first functionary of the people."¹ The motion was carried with great enthusiasm, and Grangeneuve, who did not wish to be outdone in disrespect for the royal person, moved that all ceremonial titles, such as "Your Majesty" and "Sire," should be dispensed with, which was also carried with enthusiasm. But the next day the Assembly saw that by such motions it merely made itself ridiculous, and the decrees were reversed. It then occupied itself for a few days with the question of San Domingo, and directed the Minister of War, on the motion of Vaublanc, to send three thousand soldiers immediately to the colony. The Girondins and the Jacobins alike sought to discredit the king and his ministers, and thus pave the way for a republic. They occupied themselves at intervals with attacking the ministry, and they had good reason to do so when the news of the massacre at Avignon reached the Assembly. The details of this terrible event deserve a minute description, for they illustrate the incompetence of the ministry and also the disregard of human life which the anarchy of the last two years had fostered in Avignon.

It was noticed that in the month of June, 1791, three commissioners, the Abbé Mulet, M. Lescène-Desmaisons, and

¹ *Correspondance de Georges Couthon*, edited by F. Mège for the Académie of Clermont-Ferrand, pp. 28-30. Paris: 1873.

M. de Verninac, had been sent to Avignon to act as mediators between the various parties in that city.¹ These mediators entirely neglected their duty, and made no attempt to call the attention of the government to the critical state of affairs; while M. de Verninac amused himself with a love affair with the daughter of an officer of the National Guard. But their eyes might have been opened and the attention of the ministry attracted by the violent riot which took place in the city on August 21. This riot was the work of Jourdan and his officers, and resulted in the overthrow of the old municipality and the appointment of five administrators chosen from the revolutionary party, under the influence of Jourdan Coupe-tête, who established himself in the richly furnished apartments, hitherto occupied by the vice-legates, in the Palace of the Popes.² When, upon September 17, the news of the union of the city with France³ arrived, there was a great festival, but the new French commissioners to carry out the union did not arrive, and the ministry, instead of following up this measure by sending a powerful force to maintain order, seem to have forgotten all about Avignon, and allowed the extreme party, who were now supreme in the city, and who felt strengthened by the union with France, to go their own way unmolested. Nevertheless the supremacy of the extreme party was due rather to the audacity and ferocity of their leaders, Jourdan Coupe-tête, Sabin Tournal, Rovère, Lescuyer, the Mainvielles and the Duprats, than to their real power, for the great majority of the bourgeois and of the National Guard, though sincerely rejoiced by the union with France, detested the anarchy, which Jourdan and his "Army of the Vaucluse" wished to perpetuate. The Swiss Guard of the Vice-Legate, which had kept order in former times in cases of emergency, had gone to Carpentras with him, so that there was no armed authority to control either the National Guard or the satellites of Jourdan, who were bound to come to blows. An excuse

¹ See vol. i., chap. xvi., p. 513.

² Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. i. p. 259.

³ Decreed on September 13; vol. i., chap. xvi., p. 513.

was afforded on October 16, by the murder of M. Lescuyer, the secretary of the old municipality, and a leader of the extreme party, who was dragged into the church of the Cordeliers, and murdered in front of the high altar. Before this murder the religious feelings of the devout Catholics of the city had been greatly disturbed by hearing that the face of the statue of the Virgin in the church had turned red in a single night¹ and had wept copious tears, and the advanced revolutionists of the city determined to forestall the coming attack on their authority by the Catholic mob. Still the French troops did not arrive, though one of the mediators, the Abbé Mulot, and eighteen hundred French soldiers, under General La Ferrière, were at Sorgues, only six miles distant. All the afternoon of the day of Lescuyer's murder, Jourdan and his satellites marched up and down the city of Avignon, arresting every respectable aristocrat or bourgeois whom they feared for his influence with the Catholic mob or hated from motives of personal revenge. And when the suspects, as he called them, had all been imprisoned, this terrible leader, whose authority remained unchecked, held an informal court, and one after the other the prisoners were brutally murdered during the night, and their bodies thrown into the tower of the Glacière.² Sixty-one of the most respectable persons of the city, including thirteen women, were thus cruelly massacred; and even then, the French troops would not enter the city, but left it at the mercy of Jourdan. At last, under pressure both from the king and the Assembly, General Choisy, who commanded in the district of the Lyonnais, was ordered to march with the two infantry regiments of Boulonnais and La Marck, together with the Lorraine dragoons, the Chamboran hussars, and four companies of artillery; and with them he entered

¹ See the curious report of an expert, M. Plat, dated October 17, 1791, describing the colouring matter which had been used on the statue, in Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. i. pp. 395, 396.

² On the massacres of October 16, see Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. ii. pp. 1-33; and André's *Histoire de la Révolution Avignonnaise*, vol. ii. pp. 1-75.

the unhappy city on November 7. He was followed the next day by the three commissioners appointed by the Assembly to take over the government of Avignon and the Venaissin, Lescène-Desmaisons, Champion de Villeneuve, and the General d'Albignac. The soldiers and the commissioners were received with transports by the peaceful inhabitants; and their wrath against Jourdan Coupe-tête and his satellites was greatly augmented by the discovery on November 9 of the sixty-one mutilated bodies owing to the terrible stench which issued from the tower of the Glacière. The bodies were solemnly interred, and Jourdan was knocked down by the soldiery in the street, and would have been murdered but for the personal intervention of General Choisy. On the same day, the old municipality, which had been overthrown on August 21, was reinstated by the commissioners, who at once ordered that Jourdan and the leading criminals should be arrested. He attempted to escape from the city, but was pursued and brought back in irons by some dragoons. Shortly afterwards, on the demand of the Legislative Assembly, he was sent to Paris for his case to be tried. So valuable a murderer was not likely to be neglected by the extreme Jacobins of Paris, and after being amnestied he was instrumental in the murders of Versailles. He even returned to Avignon, but, strange to say, was denounced and arrested as a moderate Republican in the beginning of 1794, and was guillotined in July, 1794, to the delight of the people of Avignon, by order of the representative on mission, Bernard of Saintes.

The question of the émigrés was one which affected the provinces more than Paris, and was therefore likely to be soon discussed by deputies who really represented the feeling of the provinces. The absence of the noblesse was severely felt in the provincial districts, because they had taken much of the specie of the kingdom out of it, and though this paved the way for speculations in assignats, it played havoc with the small capitalist. But that was not all. The populace were not satisfied with the bargains they had got in the purchase of Church lands, and now wished to purchase those of the

nobility at the same low price ; and there was, besides, a feeling of shame in the Assembly, and indeed all through France, that so many Frenchmen should be in arms on the eastern frontier, breathing nothing but a desire to fight with and destroy their own countrymen. It was this which had induced Barnave to advise the king to send the Chevalier de Coigny to the Comte d'Artois, in the previous August, to try and persuade him to re-enter the country, with the inevitable result of a blank refusal. On October 20, the question of the émigrés was raised, and for more than a fortnight it was discussed by all the leaders of the Assembly in a long series of debates, in which Brissot, Isnard, Condorcet, Pastoret, and Vergniaud especially distinguished themselves. It was Vergniaud who, in an eloquent speech on October 25, which secured his election to the presidency four days afterwards, pointed out that the émigrés could be classed in three categories : simple citizens, whose property could be affected, if their persons could not be seized ; officers, on whom the penalties for desertion could be invoked ; and the princes of the blood. The attitude of Monsieur, he declared, called for immediate legislation, and on October 31 a decree was passed, that if Monsieur did not return within two months he should be held to have forfeited his right to the regency. The general question was referred to the committee of "surveillance," and on the report of Ducastel, a celebrated lawyer of Rouen, and a member of the right of the Assembly, it was decreed on November 9, that all émigrés who had not returned by January 1, 1792, should be declared conspirators, that their property should be confiscated, and that they should be condemned to death. This motion was carried almost unanimously, because even the most Royalist deputies thought it was time that the émigrés should be forced to return, and that the interval allowed them was sufficiently long. But the king, after confirming the decree against Monsieur, vetoed the decree of November 9, and sent Duport du Tertre down to the Assembly, on November 12, to announce his determination. The minister, after stating the king's veto, attempted to give the king's reasons ; but

25. 1792

2077

Vergniaud, who was president, informed him that the deputies were obliged to hear that the king had vetoed the decree, but that they were not obliged to listen to his reasons. Foiled by the king's veto, the Girondins now changed their tactics, and moved, on November 29, that the king be requested to write to the German princes about their harbouring of the émigrés. Louis consented, and on receiving an answer from the emperor alleging his duty to protect any prince of the empire, who appealed to him, he came down to the Assembly on December 14, and defended Leopold's right to make this answer. The Girondin party now began to show that they hoped for an outbreak of war, caused by the question of the émigrés, which would destroy whatever power the king had left; and they therefore devoted all their eloquence to bring about a declaration of war. This was the aim of the motion about the German princes; and the year closed with a decree, on December 27, that the king should tell his brother-in-law and the other German princes that France would declare war if the émigrés were not at once expelled.

What, then, was the situation and the strength of the émigrés, against whom the Legislative Assembly was directing all these decrees? Was there any chance of their forcing their way into France and re-establishing the authority of the king? From the vehemence with which they were attacked, it might have been thought that they formed a powerful army of seasoned soldiers, instead of a mere handful looked upon with suspicion by the petty German princes around them. The Comte d'Artois had quitted the court of his father-in-law at Turin, in 1791, and after an important interview with the Emperor Leopold, which had influenced that monarch in issuing the circular letter of Padua, had taken up his residence at Coblenz, where he was joined by the crowd of high-born lords and ladies, who had been spending their time gaily at Spa, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Brussels, in daily expectation of a speedy return to France. Here, too, he had been joined by Monsieur, after his successful escape in June, 1791; and the two princes were allowed by the Elector-Archbishop of Trèves to dwell in

VOL. II.

D

his palace of Schönburnlust, near Coblenz, where their mistresses, Madame de Balbi, and Madame de Polastron, held their courts, in spite of the presence of Madame.¹ In this crowd of émigrés there were few individuals who did not believe in the rapid success of their cause, but there was a wide difference of opinion as to the manner in which that success could be best achieved. One party, and it was that favoured by the Comte d'Artois, believed that the French monarchy could only be restored by foreign help, and under that impression, Artois had himself been present at Pilnitz, and kept his agents, Comte Valentine Esterhazy, the Prince de Ligne, the Baron de Roll, and the Duc d'Havré, at the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid. But the more sagacious and patriotic émigrés at Coblenz, as well as the majority of the poorer nobility, who were at Worms with the Prince de Condé, were ashamed at the idea of returning to France with foreign aid, and desired rather to raise a counter-revolution in France itself through the loyal and religious party, and thus restore the king to power. This was not what Artois wanted; he was entirely under the influence of Calonne, and wished to restore the full power of the old French monarchy; and he feared that the result of a civil war would be but a compromise, and that Louis XVI. would be only too glad to be a constitutional king. In his longing for absolutism, he paid no attention to the wishes of the king and queen, and was careless of the danger into which he was thrusting them at Paris; and not satisfied with disobeying the king's openly expressed commands and private entreaties, that he would stop his intrigues, he persisted in his plans, and checked the schemes of the Baron de Breteuil, the king's secret but authorized ambassador at Brussels, and thwarted his agents at Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Madrid, in every possible way. Monsieur looked on at the intrigues of his younger brother and the danger of the king with the utmost tranquillity. He expected no happy result from the intervention of foreign powers, but was content to let things slide, and to wait

¹ Fonneron's *Histoire générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. p. 258.

until Fortune should be pleased to turn her wheel in his favour.

It was not from Coblenz, then—from a network of intrigue, where selfishness reigned—that danger threatened France on the part of the émigrés. The headquarters of the more serious minded among them, who had emigrated, not because it was the fashion, or because they had just reason to fear the anger of the people, but because they were sincerely attached to the monarchy and the Catholic religion, was at Worms. There the Prince de Condé, the only Bourbon who had given evidence of military ability, and a veteran of the Seven Years' War, had established himself in the palace of the Elector-Archbishop of Mayence, who was also Prince-Bishop of Worms, with his mistress, the Princess of Monaco, his son, the Duc de Bourbon, and his grandson, the Duc d'Enghien.¹ Here he set to work to organize an army of émigrés, while the princes at Coblenz were intriguing and dancing; and very hard work he found it. Officers he had in plenty, but soldiers were few. The officers of some regiments had led across the frontier the whole, or nearly the whole of their regiments, and the cavalry regiments, Royal Allemand and Dauphin, the hussars of Berchiny, and the infantry regiment of Berwick, which had deserted *en masse*, formed the nucleus of his army. The Cardinal de Rohan, the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, the Comte de Bussy, and the Vicomte de Mirabeau, had raised regiments, or legions, as they were called, in Germany, and the young nobles, who crossed the frontier in numbers throughout the year 1791, were enrolled either in regiments of guards, taking the titles of the old household corps, or in the regiments of noble cavalry and noble infantry. In all, the Prince de Condé had under his command, by the end of 1791, about twenty-three thousand men, including the flower of the French nobility, who did not want for courage, though not very amenable to discipline. It was this army of Condé's which was the real source of danger to France. The cooler spirits in the Assembly knew this well, and while ful-

¹ Forneron's *Histoire générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. p. 250

minating decrees against the princes at Coblenz, and compelling the king to write letters to the German princes on the Rhine to obtain their expulsion, it was really the army of Condé at which their decrees were aimed, and on which their attention was fixed. The German princes were equally disturbed by the presence of this army, and both disliked it and feared it as much as the French Assembly. The Emperor Leopold highly disapproved of the army, as an obstacle in the way of a peaceful termination of the present state of affairs; and the south German princes, who were all more or less under the influence of the *illuminati*, who, as will appear later, sympathized with the new ideas in France, soon showed their fear and dislike. The Archbishop-Elector of Mayence, though he had not minded lending his palace at Worms to Condé, showed his apprehensions of the presence of his army in every possible way; Charles Eugène, Duke of Wurtemberg, and Charles II., Duke des Deux Ponts, were equally hostile; and Charles Frederick, Margrave of Baden, and Charles Theodore, Elector-Palatine and Duke of Bavaria, went so far as to erect gallows along their frontiers with this inscription: "Émigrés and vagabonds are forbidden to pass this line."¹

In this state of affairs, Condé saw that it was necessary for him to establish himself in France, or else he would be speedily expelled from Germany, and his army would be disbanded; and he also felt the awkwardness of summoning Frenchmen to leave their native land, and believed that if he were once firmly established in France, the whole of the Catholic inhabitants would rally to him, though they hesitated to emigrate. The first city in which he hoped to fix his headquarters, was the great city of Lyons, and an elaborate plot was set on foot to enable him to get there;² but he soon had to recognize that its distance from his present headquarters must prevent a surprise, and that the authorities were too vigilant for him. Then he began to scheme for the possession of Strasbourg, the ideal headquarters for his army, as a strong fortress, and so

¹ *Mémoires de la Comte de Tilly.*

² Balleydier's *Histoire du peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution.*

close to the frontier that he would have no difficulty in receiving succour from Germany. As early as March, 1791, Mercy had written to the queen, "Alsace should be regarded as the central point of the operations, which are to be attempted. In obtaining possession of the city and citadel of Strasbourg, a position will be secured, at once safe and formidable, within reach of the promised assistance, and at the same time with a secure retreat in case of need."¹ Marshal Lückner, who had assumed the command of the city and province, had not more than fifteen thousand men under his command, of whom three-quarters were raw recruits; and it was believed that, as a soldier of fortune, he could be easily won over. The Marquis de Vioménil,² one of the ablest of the émigré chiefs, was sent to Kehl, with an unlimited command of money, and the order of the princes that Strasbourg should be seized in the name of the king; and M. de Thessonnet, a young aide-de-camp, went in and out of the city, at the peril of his life, to make the necessary arrangements. The officers of the garrison, which consisted of the two regiments of Carbineers, the Régiment Royal-Liégeois, the German regiment of Salm-Salm, and the Swiss regiments of Vigier and Pallavicini, were quite ready to co-operate. Lückner seemed careless, and all was ready by December 28. From that day, to January 10, Condé waited for the news of a rising, and kept his troops in hand to enter the city. But the news never came. The officers hesitated to commit themselves; Dietrich, the Mayor of Strasbourg, who was informed of the plot by the Chancellor Ochs, of Bâle, his brother-in-law, was on his guard; and in January, the young Prince de Broglie arrived to take up his post, as chief of the staff to Lückner, and his presence was enough by itself to confirm the old marshal's loyalty to his

¹ *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., und Leopold II. Ihr Briefwechsel herausgegeben*, von Alfred, Ritter von Arneth, pp. 148, 149. Vienna: 1866.

² *Une conspiration royaliste à Strasbourg en 1792*, by Victor de Saint Génis, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, for March 15, 1880; a valuable article, compiled from the papers of Vioménil.

adopted country. Condé's well-laid scheme was thus foiled. Vioménil left Kehl, and in the month of February, the protestations of the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Elector of Mayence were supported by the Emperor Leopold, and Condé's army was ordered to leave Worms, and retire further into Germany. The importance of this plot cannot be overrated; its existence justifies the decrees of the Legislative Assembly against the émigrés, while its failure marked the helplessness of the party which wished to check the progress of the Revolution, but yet did not want to call in foreign aid.

The other burning question was the question of the priests who had not taken the oath. Gensonné and Gallois had been sent by the Constituent to report on the un-constitutional clergy of the western provinces, and they reported to the Legislative that the priests who had taken the oath were not regarded by the peasants as priests at all. It might have been expected that with such knowledge Gensonné would have tried to keep the Assembly from making the mistake of persecuting the clergy who refused to take the oath; but instead of doing so, he assisted, on the advice of Brissot, in the attack made on these unfortunate priests. Hardly had the decree of November 9 been vetoed by the king than the debate on the subject of the priests began, which was known to touch the king yet more nearly, for he himself believed in his heart that the priests who had taken the oath were schismatics. Nevertheless, as if the Girondins had determined to hurt his feelings and make him suspected by the people, they passed the unjust decree of November 29, that if all priests did not take the oath within a week, they should be deprived of their benefices, and expelled by the directories of the different departments. This violent decree was unjust and impolitic in every respect. It was unjust because the Constituent Assembly had taken possession of the Church lands on the distinct grounds that vested interests were to be acknowledged, and that a fair pension should be given to the refractory priests. It was impolitic because, as Gensonné himself admitted, the feeling of the peasants was in favour of

the refractory priests. Nevertheless the motion was carried, and, as was expected, immediately vetoed by the king, on December 19.

As the year closed, it became obvious that the use of the king's veto had had a bad effect upon his popularity, that the people of Paris were more than ever estranged from him, and that he could no longer depend, as formerly, upon the city authorities to defend his person. Lafayette, disgusted at the loss of his popularity, and almost hating the national guards for their expressed distrust of him, resigned his post of commandant in a hurry; and the Assembly, adroitly taking advantage of his resignation, declared that for the future there should be no commandant-general of the National Guard of Paris, but that the six commandants of the legions should each command in chief for a month in turn. Still more important was the change in the mayoralty. Bailly, after more than two years of perpetual worry, resigned his office, and Lafayette had the temerity to propose himself as a candidate for the vacant office. Poor Bailly had done his best, but he had proved utterly incapable as the chief magistrate of a city which demanded above all things a firm ruler in a time of difficulty. Pétion was nominated by the Jacobin Club in opposition to Lafayette, and was elected on November 17 by a triumphant majority. The change was perceptible at once, for while Bailly, with the grace of an old courtier, had gone to the Tuileries on January 1, both in 1790 and in 1791, to offer his congratulations to the king on the new year, Pétion neglected all such formalities, and remained at the Mairie to receive the congratulations of his own friends.

Jérôme Pétion, the successor of Bailly, was the deputy of the extreme left who had shared the popular favour bestowed upon Robespierre at the close of the Constituent Assembly. Yet the character of the two men was utterly different; the one, though possessing faults both of mind and character, was yet from his tenacity of purpose and untiring industry very nearly being a great man, while the other, who was now the

ruler of Paris, was a very ordinary, vain, and incapable statesman. Jérôme Pétion, or as he termed himself Pétion de Villeneuve, was born at Chartres, in 1760, and became an avocat in his native city. He obtained a great reputation there, and, like every ambitious young lawyer, at once wrote for the press, and sent certain articles on the subject of the marriage laws to Brissot's *Bibliothèque de la Législation*. He was elected to the States-General by the tiers état of Chartres, but it was more than eighteen months before his name became known. It was only after the death of Mirabeau that the Radical party gained popularity with the mob, and then it was Pétion rather than Robespierre who was singled out for special admiration. His handsome face and courteous manners won the hearts of the people more than Robespierre's austerity; and while Robespierre was admired, Pétion was adored, until his weakness became manifest. So greatly was he adored, indeed, that in 1792 one Regnault-Warin actually wrote a *Vie de Pétion*, comparing his life and character to that of Christ. A quotation from a contemporary pamphlet will show the opinion held of the Radical leaders in the Constituent Assembly. "Posterity will speak with transport," it says, "of a citizen as incorruptible as Pétion, as inflexible as Robespierre, as loyal as Dubois-Crancé, as philanthropical as Grégoire, as upright as Prieur, as intrepid as Buzot, as firm as Rœderer, as ardent a citizen as Salle, as severe as Camus, as honest as Anthoine, as firm as Rewbell, and excellent legislator as them all."

The authorities of the department of the Seine who had been intended to control the commune of Paris had also been changed by the elections of 1791. The directory remained, however, strongly Constitutional, and on December 5 the whole directory, with the exception of Rœderer, the new procureur-general-syndic, protested against the decree of November 29. But the council-general of the department held very different opinions to the directory, and declared at their next meeting that they had no knowledge of the protest, and the directors then humbly announced that they had only protested as indi-

viduals, not as a corporation. Nevertheless their humility did not save them; the sections of Paris denounced the directory to the Assembly, and this protest cost very many of the signatories their lives. One member, however, of the administration of the department had not signed the protest. This was Pierre Louis Rœderer, who had been elected procureur-general-syndic of the department on November 11, in the place of Pastoret, who had resigned on being chosen a deputy to the Legislative Assembly. Rœderer was the son of a procureur-general of the Parlement of Metz, and was born at Metz in 1754. He had in 1779 become a counsellor of the Parlement of Metz, and then wrote upon political economy, and became a friend of Dupont de Nemours and the physiocrats. In 1788 he published a pamphlet on the States-General, and in 1789 he had insisted that the city of Metz was swamped by the voters from the country district around, and had procured Metz a deputy for itself. As a reward for his exertions he had been elected the deputy for Metz, and had made some mark in the Constituent Assembly. He had been the reporter of the committee of public contributions, in which capacity he had drawn up the new stamp and patent laws, and had expressed very pronounced opinions on the various questions which came before the Assembly, particularly in the debate on the civil constitution of the clergy. He met his reward now by being elected procureur-general-syndic of the department of the Seine, and the part which he played in the year 1792 has made his name of historical importance in the history of Paris and of the Revolution.

The Jacobin Club, which had been greatly weakened by the secession of so many of its earliest members to the Feuillants, had gained renewed vigour after the meeting of the Legislative Assembly. It exerted itself to the utmost to prepare for the coming struggle, and increased the number of its affiliated societies till there was one, not only in every town of importance, but in very many villages as well. In the Jacobins' a distinct rivalry had arisen between Robespierre and Brissot which had immense importance at a later date.

Brissot often managed to get a majority against the extreme members; but as they laboured in the committee of correspondence, and took far more pains than he and his friends did to increase the power of the club, he was bound to be beaten by them eventually. Robespierre, who had been elected public accuser to the tribunal of the Seine, was the real hero of the Jacobin Club; and though occasionally beaten by Brissot and his friends in the evening debates, his wonderful industry maintained his supremacy in the committees.

It will be seen, then, that the year 1791 closed very gloomily for the court and for the king. The new Assembly was more violently hostile to the monarchy, the nobility, and the Catholic religion than the Constituent Assembly had been, and little mercy was to be expected from it in a struggle. The flight to Varennes had been the starting-point of a new epoch in the history of the Revolution. The shortlived vigour of Lafayette, on July 17, had been without effect, because the provinces were still more advanced in ideas of revolution than Paris itself, and had sent up deputies to the new Assembly who would effectually undo the work of the revision of the Constitution and destroy the effect of the example which Lafayette had made with the full approbation of the Constituent Assembly. It is as the expression of the concentrated opinion of the provinces that the Legislative Assembly must at first be regarded; and the fact that its most powerful members had flocked to the Jacobins must be regarded as the most convincing proof of the extended power of the club. New elements had appeared among the Girondins and Jacobins in the provinces; and if the king and his friends had been unable to outwit or overcome the majority of the Constituent Assembly, which was at heart sincerely attached to the principle of monarchy, how could they expect that, weakened by insult and regarded as a traitor for his flight to Varennes, he could have succeeded against the new Assembly? And more important than the attitude of Assembly was the attitude of Paris, for the advanced revolutionists of the city were now entirely in harmony through the Jacobins with the provinces;

and, in its advance towards a republic, Paris felt itself the representative of France. New men had entered on the scene in the place of the old, and it remained to be seen whether the great orators of the Gironde had more political insight than the great orators of the Constituent Assembly

CHAPTER II.

THE GIRONDIN MINISTRY.

The attitude of the Girondins and Jacobins towards the idea of a foreign war—New ministry—The Comte de Narbonne—Narbonne's policy with regard to the war—Professor Koch—The Legislative Assembly menaces the Emperor Leopold—His answer and death—The reign of Leopold and his advice to Marie Antoinette—Dismissal of Narbonne and formation of a Girondin ministry—Dumouriez—Roland—The "bonnet rouge"—Robespierre's and Dumouriez' attitude towards it—Fête given to the released Swiss soldiers of Château-Vieux—War declared against Austria.

WHEN the king had dared to express his own will by vetoing the decree against the émigrés on November 9, the Girondin party determined to wound him yet more nearly by opening an attack on what they called the Austrian Committee at the Tuileries, and more particularly on the king's own brother-in-law, the emperor. This manœuvre was entirely the work of Brissot, who had persuaded Guadet and Gensonné that the best mode of establishing a republic in France, and destroying the monarchy, was to have a great war. He also knew very well that he was the only member of the Girondin party who had any knowledge of foreign affairs, and believed that he would, by showing his knowledge in the debates on the subject, gain a complete ascendancy over the Legislative Assembly. The enthusiastic Girondins were not slow to take up a subject on which they could expend so much eloquence, and began loudly to clamour for war. With the thoughtlessness of young men they hardly understood how serious a thing war is, and of course did not recognize that they themselves were not

strong enough men to rule France during the crisis of a European war. Nevertheless they went gaily on, and soon, not only the people of Paris, but a large proportion of the people of France were clamouring for war. The king, at the bidding of the Assembly, had written to the smaller German princes and to his brother-in-law, the emperor, and had courageously defended the answer of the latter on December 14. But there was about him a party which was quite as anxious for war as the Girondins themselves—a party which believed that in a great war the supreme power would revert to the king. Louis himself hardly sympathized with these advisers, but he felt forced into the line of policy they advocated. It is never a very difficult thing to make the French nation wish for war. No reverses have ever tamed the desire for military glory, and the popularity which the Girondins had hoped to obtain was abundantly showered on them. Only one party systematically opposed the war. That was the party of the extreme Jacobins, the very men who, when the war broke out, had to bear the brunt of it, and to prove their greatness. These extreme leaders opposed the war on two grounds. Danton and Robespierre hated war in itself, though they did not fear it, and Marat cried, in his *Ami du Peuple*, “Who is it that suffers in a war? Not the rich, but the poor; not the high-born officer, but the poor peasant.” But the Jacobin leaders had also a more selfish reason for opposing the war. They knew, as well as the Girondins or the king’s friends, that a successful foreign war would strengthen either its advocates or the executive, and they feared that it would cause the Revolution to pass through a more bitter phase than it had yet experienced. It may be true that they expected war would strengthen the king or the Girondins, and thus overthrow their own party, but still more clearly did they perceive that any attempt to overthrow them would cause most terrible bloodshed. The spirit of Mirabeau seemed to have fallen on Danton when he thundered against the evils of a foreign war. The debates in the Jacobin Club on this subject are extremely instructive and interesting.

On November 28 Robespierre first appeared in the club after a visit to his native place, and began a spirited debate by arguing that, though war might be justified, it was not expedient. Danton and Collot d'Herbois followed him, and expressed their detestation of the idea of war yet more forcibly. On December 12 Carra the journalist, and Dubois-Crancé who was to be the founder of the Revolutionary army, earnestly opposed the war, and Robespierre then declared the same opinion which he had put forth in the Constituent Assembly on Le Chapelier's motion of February, 1791, that the case of the émigrés was not one which called for special legislation, and that such special legislation would weaken the power of the law in general. This noble protest for justice to the émigrés, raised when all France was clamouring for their punishment, of itself proves Robespierre's courage. On December 16 Brissot came down to the Jacobins' to defend his favourite measure, but was opposed and completely vanquished in debate by Danton, and on December 19 even Billaud-Varenne, the most severe Jacobin of all, condemned the war. These sentiments of the extreme Jacobins it is most important to notice at once, for it is generally believed and has often been declared that they were the real authors of the great war which was to change the whole face of Europe.

Under the influence of the country's clamour the king felt bound to surrender his longing for peace, and by a complete change of ministry a new departure appeared in the royal policy. Such a ministerial change to mark a new departure had been a favourite scheme of Mirabeau's, and the first resignation among the ministry was that of his old correspondent, the Comte de Montmorin. On November 29 Valdec de Lessart, who had proved his incompetence in the affair of Avignon, and had not been a success at the Ministry of the Interior, was removed to the Foreign Office after the post had been refused by four diplomatists, De Moustier, Ségur, Choiseul-Gouffier, and Barthélemy, and was himself succeeded by a friend of Duport du Tertre's, Cahier de Gerville, who was deputy procureur-syndic to the commune of Paris, and had

been a commissioner to inquire into the affair of Nancy. Count Bertrand de Moleville, an ardent Royalist, became Minister of the Marine. But the most important change was caused by the resignation of Duportail, who had been discredited by the laxity of the War Office with regard to Avignon, and he was succeeded as Minister of War by the Comte de Narbonne, on December 7.

Louis, Comte de Narbonne-Lara, came of the very old Spanish family of Lara, and had been born at Colorno, near Parma, in 1755, and he was therefore a comparatively young man when he entered office. His mother had been lady of honour to Elizabeth, duchess of Parma, aunt of Louis XVI., and his father was first gentleman of the royal chamber. In 1760 he had been brought to Versailles, where he was educated under the eyes of the king's aunts, Mesdames Adelaide and Victoire, and it is even said that the Dauphin, the father of Louis XVI., taught him Greek. Court favour caused his rapid promotion in the army, and he was successively in the gendarmerie and the dragoons, and then colonel in succession of the regiments Angoumois and Royal Piémont, and chevalier d'honneur to Madame Adelaide. He was very ambitious, and after marrying a rich heiress in 1782, took lessons in international law from Professor Koch of Strasbourg, to fit him for political life. In the year 1790 he was thanked by the Constituent Assembly for the good order which had been maintained in the department of the Doubs by his regiment; and in February, 1791, he reported the arrest of the princesses to the Assembly.¹ He afterwards accompanied them safely to Rome, and on his return was promoted *maréchal-de-camp*. His intimacy with Madame de Staël had been remarked ever since 1789, and a clever *pièce de circonstance* called "*Les Intrigues de Madame de Staël*" attributed the arrest of the royal fugitives to information which Narbonne had given to his beloved.² Madame de Staël had set her heart on her

¹ Vol. i., chap. xiv., p. 424.

² *Les intrigues de Madame de Staël à l'occasion de départ de Mesdames de France*, in B.M.—F. 428. (9).

lover's being in the ministry, and in December, 1791, after great difficulty and many intrigues, he was appointed War Minister. Though Spanish by birth, he had more than the usual French vivacity. Handsome, eloquent, and dashing, he was a model leader of the gay young men of Paris who had not emigrated. Without the real ability of Ségur, or the wit of Boufflers, he had yet clear political insight, and, now that he had got his opportunity, he determined to use it to save the monarchy in spite of itself.

His idea was to beat the Girondins on their own ground, and, by assuming an intense enthusiasm for the war, to attract the popularity which the Girondins hoped for, to the king himself. If it were believed that the king was the real head of the party of war, Narbonne thought that neither he nor the queen would be again accused of intrigues with the emperor, and that they would thus repair the injury done to their popularity by the flight to Varennes. But he also hoped that the monarchy would gain power by the war after it had gained popularity. If the war was successful, King Louis XVI. and his great minister Narbonne would be the victorious heroes of France; and then would not both king and minister be firmly established in authority? and if the war went badly for France, would not the people give more power to the chief of the executive in order to remedy disasters? With such sentiments, Narbonne accompanied the king to the Assembly on December 14; and after his Majesty's defence of his brother-in-law's letter, the minister declared that though the king did not want war he wished to be ready for war, and amidst loud applause from the deputies he stated that the king intended to place one hundred and fifty thousand men in readiness on the frontier, in three armies under the command of Lafayette, Rochambeau, and Lückner respectively; and that he himself was going at once to start on a tour of inspection. The announcement was received with transports by the Assembly, and Narbonne started in high spirits for the frontier. His popularity seemed so firmly established and his patriotism so pure, that not only was he defended by Condorcet and

other Jacobins, but even Robespierre declared that Narbonne "appeared worthy of the confidence of the people," though he disapproved of his warlike intentions. The proclamation of war was hurried on by a motion which Gensonné carried on January 1, and which he begged the Assembly to pass as a new year's gift to the nation. He proposed that Monsieur, the Comte d'Artois, the Prince de Condé, Calonne and all the chief advisers of the princes, the Vicomte de Mirabeau, the Marquis de Laqueille and all the noisy Royalists of Coblenz, should be accused of conspiracy against the Constitution. On January 11 Narbonne returned from his tour of inspection, and announced—which was absolutely false—that the departments of the north were in the best state of defence, and that the greatest credit was due to the generals commanding in chief for their exertions. He persuaded the king to create Lückner and Rochambeau marshals of France, but nothing could obtain the same honour for Lafayette. On the same night, at the Jacobins', Robespierre had to defend himself against the charge of being an aristocrat, which Brissot brought against him. His speech had an enormous success, and on January 20, on the proposal of old Dusaulx, the translator of Juvenal, the rivals embraced each other. In spite of this scene, the chief of the politicians, whom Marat called "the little statesmen," was for the future the open enemy of the favourite tribune of the people. The war parties now spent their time in the Assembly in advocating the proposed war. The words of Marat and of the Jacobins were alike disregarded, and the main subject of contention was, who should have the credit of declaring war,—the king and Narbonne, or Brissot and the Girondins. The diplomatic committee, which had been established in imitation of the Constituent Assembly, was divided into two distinct sections, the one led by Gensonné and Brissot and the other by Professor Koch. Gensonné, was no statesman, and had been easily persuaded by Brissot that the declaration of war would hasten the fall of the king. But unfortunately he possessed an eloquent tongue which the wiser professor of international law could not rival.

Christoph Wilhelm von Koch¹ was born at Bouxwiller, in Alsace, in 1737. His father was financial counsellor to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, and sent his son to the university of Strasbourg, where he eventually became professor of international law. Strasbourg, from its geographical position, was the best place for the education of intending diplomatists, and Schoepflin had raised the reputation of its university for the teaching of history and international law to a very great height. Under Professor Koch were educated most of the statesmen who made their mark in the diplomacy of the end of the revolutionary period; and Metternich, Nesselrode, Oubril, Galitzin, Cobenzl, Ségur, Lord Elgin, Maret, and Narbonne himself were among his pupils. He was an earnest Protestant, and his first appearance in political life was to demand of the Constituent Assembly the preservation of the property of the Protestants of Alsace, which was granted by decree on August 17, 1790. In 1791 he was elected deputy to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Bas-Rhin, and was immediately chosen a member of the diplomatic committee. From his wide learning and his reputation his advice was always listened to with the greatest attention by prudent members of the Assembly; but the Girondins despised him as a pedant, and Brissot conceitedly imagined that he knew far more about foreign politics and international law than the most famous professor in Europe. Koch pointed out, on October 22, his fear that a decree on the question of the émigrés would lead to a breach of treaty obligations, and on November 22 he presented to the Assembly a report on behalf of the diplomatic committee, in which he examined the state of Europe, and showed that if customs of international courtesy were not infringed there was no reason to assume that the monarchs of Europe would declare war against France. During the early months of 1792 he was in a minority in the diplomatic committee, but he gave both the committee and

¹ *Vie de Koch*, by J. G. Schweighoeuser, Strasbourg, 1816, and *Notice biographique sur M. de Koch*, by F. Schoell, prefixed to vol. i. of his edition of Koch's *Histoire abrégée des Traités*. Paris: 1817.

the Assembly no reason to say that they had not been warned of the danger of their proceedings. From the nature of his studies Koch was not an interesting speaker; and though his pupils acknowledged how much they owed him, they were apt to consider themselves far wiser than their teacher.

On January 14 Gensonné, in the name of the committee, moved that the Assembly should request the king to demand from the emperor an explanation of his conduct. Koch pointed out that what the emperor had done was not done from any hostility to France, but from his duty as head of the empire. He had, in fact, informed the elector of Trèves that, if he was attacked by France, he could count on the support of the empire. This behaviour greatly incensed the Girondins, who, though they hoped for the easy conquest of the Rhenish States, felt some hesitation in engaging at once in a war with Prussia and Austria. Narbonne, too, was afraid to have all Europe against him, and persuaded the king to send Ségur, who held the highest reputation as a diplomatist in France, to try to detach the King of Prussia from his alliance with the emperor. Gensonné's motion was followed by one proposed by Guadet, that whoever directly or indirectly proposed to alter the Constitution or to listen to any mediation on behalf of the émigrés should be guilty of "lèse-nation." On January 25 Brissot moved that the king should be invited to state formally to the emperor that, if he did not promise to renounce his attempts against the sovereignty, independence, and unity of the French nation before March 1, his silence would be considered as a declaration of war. In vain did Professor Koch argue that such a declaration was utterly inconsistent with the known principles of international law, or with the rights possessed by the government of any nation; in vain did he say that to insult the emperor was not the best way to secure a strong position for France abroad. Though he was supported with great ability by Mathieu Dumas and Jacques Beugnot, a young Feuillant, who, after failing to be elected to the Constituent Assembly, had been returned for the Aube to the Legislative, the eloquence of Vergniaud and of Hérault de Séchelles secured the adoption of Brissot's motion.

On March 1 the emperor's answer, which had been drawn up by Kaunitz and contained an attack upon the Jacobins,¹ was read by the minister De Lessart to the Legislative Assembly, but hardly was it finished when a rumour arose that the answer had really been drawn up by Barnave and Duport. One deputy then went further, and even accused De Lessart of having himself composed the emperor's answer. The correspondence of Marie Antoinette with her brother shows clearly that in reality she suggested the emperor's answer,² for in his affection for his sister he was ready to do what he could to improve her position, while at the same time he both hated and feared a war with France. Hardly had the excitement caused by his letter grown to its height, when the news suddenly arrived in Paris that the Emperor Leopold had died on that very 1st of March.

The death of the Emperor Leopold was a very serious blow to the cause of monarchy in France. He had become at a very early age Grand Duke of Tuscany, and has already been noticed as one of those benevolent despots whose work was so notable just before the outbreak of the Revolution. He was called the economist king from his physiocratic tendencies, and by his skilful distribution of the weight of taxation had greatly enriched his Italian principality. He had also supported Scipio de Ricci in his Church policy. That bishop had perceived the general disrepute into which the Catholic Church in Tuscany had fallen, and had taken measures to make it more national by decreasing the number of bishoprics and of monks, and by spending a larger proportion of the revenues of the Church on education, hospitals, and charity; and in all his endeavours Leopold had warmly seconded him.³ When, on the death of his brother, the Emperor Joseph, he had succeeded to the imperial throne, he found a difficult task before him.

¹ Vivenot's *Quellen*, vol. ii. pp. 375-379.

² Von Arneth's *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., und Leopold II. Ihr Briefwechsel*. Vienna: 1866.

³ *Mémoires de Scipion de Ricci, reformateur du Catholicisme*, by De Potter. 2 vols., 1826.

Everywhere the thorough-going reforms of Joseph had distracted the empire. The Netherlands were in open rebellion, and were divided into three distinct parties—those who supported the imperial power, the Vandernootists who wished for the old Constitution of the Netherlands, and the Vonckists who hoped for a revolution after the manner of that in France. Leopold had also to deal with revolts in Hungary and discontent in Bohemia, while the position of the Empire in Germany had been seriously damaged by the aggressive policy of Joseph, and a league had been formed against it, headed by Prussia. During his two years' reign Leopold entirely appeased the internal disturbances in his dominions; conciliated the princes of the empire by his prudent conduct; and turned Prussia from a half-concealed enemy into an ally. With such difficult work to do he had not had much time to bestow on the French Revolution and his sister's position. He knew too well the tendency of the movement to underrate its power, and would rather have forestalled the influence of revolutionary ideas by doing as he had done in Tuscany, and freely giving the people their liberties, instead of trying to fight against those liberties either in France or Germany. The loss of such a prudent counsellor was a heavy one for Marie Antoinette. He had always advised her not to depend on foreign help, and above all things to be sincere and not to be suspected of playing a double part; for, as he hinted, many of the misfortunes which she suffered arose from her own double dealing.

At no time did this unfortunate propensity of the queen appear to greater disadvantage than in the dismissal of Narbonne, on March 9. The young minister had done what no other minister had done since the outbreak of the Revolution. He had made a genuine bid, on the king's behalf, for popular favour, as the head of the fighting part of the French nation, and the bid had been made openly and creditably. That Narbonne was personally a very vain and frivolous young man may be granted; but he had certainly not deserved the abrupt dismissal which he received. As a statesman, he had done nothing but make a false report to the Assembly as

to the efficiency of the French army, which was to have a fatal result; but as a politician, he had done much.

The exact course of the complicated intrigues which ended in his fall is difficult to be traced, but Narbonne had never had a majority in the Ministry, and had been steadily opposed by De Lessart and Bertrand de Moleville. His dismissal was delivered in the most insulting manner; but the schemes of his opponents reacted on themselves, for on the very day after his dismissal, De Lessart was not only condemned by the Assembly, but ordered to be impeached, and with him the rest of the Ministers resigned. The Chevalier de Grave, a poetaster¹ and man of no authority, succeeded Narbonne, and on his recommendation, supported by Laporte, the intendant of the Civil List, Dumouriez was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs;² Roland, the "virtuous Roland," and husband of Madame Roland, was on March 17 appointed Minister of the Interior, by the influence of Brissot, in spite of persistent rumours that the post would be given to Dietrich, the able and patriotic mayor of Strasbourg;³ and two days afterwards, Duranthon, a man of no weight, but a friend of the Girondins and procureur to the commune of Bordeaux, succeeded Duport du Tertre as Minister of Justice; Clavière, the assistant of Mirabeau, became Minister of the Finances, and Lacoste Minister of the Marine. This change of ministry was simply throwing the whole power of the kingdom into the hands of the Girondins; and why the king and queen should have

¹ The following passage from the unpublished memoirs of Comte Thomas d'Espinhal, quoted in Mège's edition of Rabusson-Lamothe's *Lettres sur l'Assemblée Legislative*, p. 131, is worth noting: "The Chevalier de Grave is a little pedant, a little philosopher, a little sentimental poet, and a fanatical little Jacobin, and he will most assuredly be a very little minister. It is odd enough to see a little Knight of Malta, only known at Paris by some little verses and the little romance of the *Folle de Saint Joseph*, becoming a minister. . . . He has already been to pay his homage and return thanks to the Jacobin club, and has appeared there in the *bonnet rouge*."

² Rabusson-Lamothe's *Lettres sur l'Assemblée Legislative*, p. 132.

³ Mège's *Correspondance de Georges Couthon*, p. 106; Oscar Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 162.

decided to dismiss Narbonne, and take into office these almost avowed Republicans, has never satisfactorily been explained. Possibly the manœuvre suggested by Mirabeau, in the October of 1790, to form a ministry among the opponents of the king in order to teach them sobriety by giving them responsibility, may have been the motive; but there was a great difference between choosing for office men like Duport and Lameth, who sincerely believed in monarchy, and calling into power these friends of the Girondins. From the moment they were appointed, the slight hope which existed, that the king might have been able to rally warlike France round him, was gone, and it was very soon shown that his new ministers had their own party interests at heart, not his authority. Among the new ministers there were only two, if Clavière be excepted, who ranked above mediocrity; the one by his genuine ability, the other by his perfect self-complacency, Dumouriez and Roland.

Charles François Dupérier, generally known as Dumouriez, who had, after a chequered life, full of adventures, now become Minister for Foreign Affairs, came of a family of *noblesse de la robe*, and was born at Cambrai on January 25, 1739.¹ His father was an officer in the Régiment Royal Piémont, who, after sending his son to the Collège Louis-le-Grand at Paris, obtained his nomination to his own regiment, with which the young man served in Hanover in 1757. He served with the greatest distinction all through the Seven Years' War, and especially at the battle of Klosterkampen, where he lost a finger and was taken prisoner. At the end of the war he was placed on the retired list with the Cross of Saint Louis and a nominal pension, in spite of his twenty-two wounds. He was only twenty-four and had shown himself a brave officer, but as he had no influence his career in the army was closed. He first wandered about Europe on secret missions for the great minister Choiseul, and visited Italy, Spain, and Portugal,

¹ *Das Leben des General Dumouriez*, by A. von Boguslawski. 2 vols, Berlin, 1879; and Dumouriez' own curious but not very trustworthy *Mémoires* in Berville and Barrière's *Collection des Mémoires*.

and was then employed in the campaign in Corsica. But a larger field for his powers of diplomacy soon offered itself, and he became the favourite pupil of Favier, the deep-thinking politician, whose influence appears throughout the foreign policy of the Revolution, who introduced him into that curious network of secret intrigue, which is known as the secret policy of Louis XV.¹ In that policy he played an important part, and in the years 1771 and 1772, in compliance with the secret orders of the king, he organized the resistance of the Poles against the partition of Poland. But however well his work was done, it was not authorized by the French Ministry, and in 1772 he was thrown into the Bastille, where he remained until the accession of Louis XVI. in 1774. After his release he was made a colonel in the army, and eventually became commandant at Cherbourg, where he won great popularity by accepting the post of colonel of the National Guard at the beginning of the Revolution. But his thoughts were fixed on Paris, and his great desire was for political employment. Montmorin knew of his ability and sent him on a secret mission to Belgium, and he afterwards became commandant at Niorf, where he made the acquaintance of Gensonné, when on his mission in the departments of the west. He had conciliated so many people that there is no cause for surprise at De Grave's offering him the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had served under Montmorin, was a schoolfellow of De Lessart, and an intimate friend of Laporte, the intendant of the Civil List, so that the king and the courtiers believed him to be a true Royalist, while, owing to his friendship with Gensonné, the Girondins trusted that he was of their opinions. Yet he really cared for neither party. Though enough of a statesman to see the necessity for strengthening the executive, he had no sentiment of attachment to royalty in itself, or to the person of Louis XVI., and he had seen too much of the world to be seduced by the brilliant dreams of the Girondins. His passion was the management of foreign policy. He had served

¹ Broglie's *Le Secret du Roi*, vol. ii. p. 112; *Un Général diplomate au temps de la Révolution*, by Albert Sorel, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

long in subordinate diplomatic positions, and now at last he was to direct the whole foreign policy of France, and the pupil of Favier was to show to the world the truth of his master's conceptions! His great political fault was in underrating the influence of revolutionary feeling in France and entirely neglecting home affairs. This carelessness kept him from being a great statesman, and proved his inferiority to Mirabeau. Yet Dumouriez was by far the ablest man who had taken office since the Revolution began. He had clearly defined ideas about foreign policy, perspicacity, courage, and energy, and, had he possessed a great colleague as Minister of the Interior, must have made for himself an even greater name as a Foreign Minister than the victories of Valmy and Jemmappes made for him as a general. But he had not a great colleague, for it was the "virtuous" Roland who assumed the Ministry of the Interior when Dumouriez went to the Foreign Office.

Jean Marie Roland de la Platiere, the most important colleague of Dumouriez, belonged, as he did, to the *noblesse de la robe*, and was born at Villefranche, near Lyons, in 1752. He entered the civil service in the department of manufactures and commerce at an early age, and by his inquiries into foreign manufactories and his able reports soon obtained a distinguished reputation as an industrious public servant. He held the office of inspector-general of factories at Amiens, when Mademoiselle Cannel introduced him to Manon Jeanne Philipon, and he at once fell in love with her. He loved her far more ardently than she loved him, but she believed that she could be of use to him in his work, and could thus do good to humanity, and so, after a courtship of five years, she married him. In 1786 he was promoted to the inspector-generalship at Lyons, and when the Revolution broke out he took a keen interest in local politics and was a candidate for the post of mayor. Though defeated in this attempt, he was in 1791 deputed by the city of Lyons to represent its condition to the Constituent Assembly, and on his return he founded a branch of the Jacobin Club there. His post at Lyons was soon suppressed, and then he took up his residence at Paris, where his wife's drawing-room

became the meeting-place of the young Girondins. It was through his wife that he became a man of importance, for she was never tired of insisting on his fitness for office, and her friends at last secured his nomination, in March, 1792, to the Ministry of the Interior. Roland was really the virtuous and honest man he prided himself upon being, but he was nothing more. An able and industrious clerk was not likely to become a great minister. He performed the actual duties of his office admirably, drew up his reports laboriously, and was punctual and methodical, but he had no grasp of affairs, and, contented to do his day's work, he did not look ahead. Such a man was not the colleague Dumouriez needed; no statesmanlike ideas were to be expected from him, and the husband of Madame Roland allowed matters at home to drift, while Dumouriez made a vigorous effort to strike out a successful policy abroad.

A curious incident which succeeded Dumouriez' appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs must be remarked, as it not only illustrates his character, and that of Robespierre, but also the change for the worse in popular opinion which had been introduced by the sentiments of the more enthusiastic revolutionists. It also forms an instructive commentary on Dumouriez' famous sarcasm, "Then all is lost," when a horror-struck master of the ceremonies called his attention to the fact that the new Minister of the Interior was wearing ribbons in his shoes instead of buckles. These young enthusiasts had declared that all true patriots should wear on their heads the red cap of liberty. Why this should be done, they themselves could not say. It is most likely that it was an attempt to win the affections of the lowest class of draymen and porters, who were accustomed to work in the streets of Paris with such red caps on their heads. And further, it became fashionable to allude to the lowest classes as the *sans-culottes*. The gentlemen of the eighteenth century, who always appeared in silk stockings and knee-breeches, had conferred this name of contempt on the blouse and trouser-wearing populace; but by 1792 it was the interest of both the Girondins and the Enragé Jacobins in every way to flatter and strive for the favour of

these very sans-culottes; and they not only praised their costume, but themselves adopted it. Dumouriez had been named minister on March 15, and on the 19th he entered the Jacobin Club, placed a red cap on his head, in imitation of De Grave, and swore in everything to obey the will of the nation. He was loudly cheered. And when Robespierre entered the club, and was walking up to the tribune to speak after Dumouriez, with his neat dress and powdered hair, some rough member of the club thrust a red cap on his head. Robespierre threw the cap from him, and trampled on it, and then told Dumouriez, in a stern voice, that as long as he showed himself the defender of the people the associated friends of the Constitution would help him, but that he had better beware that he did not play with them. Robespierre, in refusing to yield to the fancies of the mob, showed himself above them, as Marat had shown himself above them in his violent abuse of the Parisians. The two men had their faults, and both have been frequently accused of the basest cowardice; yet it may be doubted whether there were two other men in Paris who dared thus openly to insult the vanity of the Parisians. All this childish nonsense of wearing a "bonnet rouge," of abolishing powder on the hair, of letting the beard grow, and of adopting trousers instead of breeches, was due to sentimentalism encouraged by the Girondin party. With a bigoted enthusiasm they longed to throw off all trappings of the old régime, and to exalt everywhere the belongings and customs of the lowest classes as badges of their opinions. But in all this they proved themselves sentimentalists, not statesmen. The question so rapidly approaching was how to rule a great people at a great crisis; and the Girondins might be quite sure that the people, both of Paris and the provinces, would not accept red caps and trousers in the place of bread, any more than they had accepted the royal promises.

But some of the extreme Jacobins outdid the Girondins, and not only tried to please the people by adopting their dress, but strove to please their eyes by giving them a great fête; and the Fête de la Liberté, which took place on April 15, in

honour of the Swiss soldiers of the regiment of Château Vieux, which had been cut to pieces by Bouillé at Nancy, was the first exhibition of a kind which afterwards became very popular in Paris. The question whether the forty-one Swiss soldiers who were now serving their time at the galleys at Brest could benefit by the amnesty of September 30 or not was greatly debated in the Legislative Assembly. On November 1 Goupilleau de Fontenay moved that the Swiss soldiers were political prisoners, and should therefore be amnestied. Montmorin opposed the motion, but public interest was at once roused by the Jacobin Club. Collot d'Herbois, on October 31, had offered one half of the six hundred livres, which had been awarded to him as a prize by the Jacobin Club for his *Almanac du Père Gérard*, to the cause, and to him is chiefly due the credit, if it be credit, of securing the release of the Swiss prisoners, after lengthy debates in the Assembly, in which even Pastoret and some of the Feuillants supported the motion. The amnesty was held to cover the Swiss prisoners on December 31, 1791. No effort had been left untried by the Jacobins to excite the Parisians on behalf of these prisoners, and a play called "*Les Suisses du Château Vieux*," with its sequel "*La Marche de Bouillé, ou la suite des Suisses du Château Vieux*," was produced with great success at the Théâtre Molière. As soon as the motion had been carried, the Jacobins determined to have a great fête in honour of the released mutineers, and the two chief members of the committee appointed to arrange this fête were Collot d'Herbois and Tallien. The original proposal of the dramatic author and the young journalist was that two women should represent the city of Paris and the city of Brest, and that the city of Paris should welcome the city of Brest at the barrier, and lead her into Paris, followed by the forty-one soldiers of Château Vieux. But unfortunately Collot and Tallien found it difficult to get leave to hold their fête. The municipality, headed by Pétion, the mayor, were willing to do anything for popularity. But the directors of the department of the Seine set their faces sternly against it. Point by point Pétion

managed to get the better of the directory, and at last the two authors managed to carry out something like their original scheme. On April 11 the released galley-slaves reached Versailles, where they were entertained by the Jacobins of that city in the famous tennis-court. On the next day the Swiss, accompanied by Collot d'Herbois, came to Paris, and presented themselves before the Legislative Assembly. The Comte de Jaucourt, who had been colonel of the Condé dragoons at Metz, under Bouillé, protested against the released galley-slaves being welcomed by the Assembly. But Couthon, deputy for the Puy de Dôme, warmly supported their demand, and they were admitted by 546 to 265—a vote which of itself proves how greatly the voting power of the Feuillants had decreased since the previous October. On April 15 took place the famous fête. On the Champ de Mars was erected a colossal statue of Liberty, and the Swiss soldiers, after being received by the mayor at the Hôtel de Ville, and entertained at the Opera House where the theatre of the Porte Saint Martin now stands, marched solemnly down the Champ de Mars, surrounded by a crowd of Jacobins and by eighty-three sans-culottes, each bearing a banner with the name of a department upon it. To the statue of Liberty a galley, as if to remind the people that the fêted heroes were but galley-slaves, was borne, surrounded by forty virgins headed by young Tallien and followed by the soldiers of Château Vieux, who were escorted by the Gardes Françaises, in their old uniforms, and carrying the keys of the Bastille. When the procession reached the Champ de Mars the declaration of the rights of man and the various flags and emblems were solemnly laid before the statue, and then the people present, including the galley-slaves, burst into the Carmagnole dance.¹ Though the Girondins were not the originators or chief participators in the Fête de la Liberté, it was their party which had set the example of sentimentalizing on the subject of liberty, and the Jacobins had cleverly twisted the weapon to their own use,

¹ See the elaborate account in Mortimer-Ternaux's *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. i., pp. 87-95.

and exaggerated it so as to startle even the Girondins themselves. It must never be forgotten that the Jacobin statesmen took no share in these amusing performances. Both Robespierre and Danton were absent, and Billaud-Varenne did not appear, while Collot d'Herbois exhibited himself rather in his character of dramatic author and fête deviser, than as a serious politician and a statesman.

But while all this child's play was going on, a very serious danger was looming over the people of France. The Girondins had cried out so much for war, that they were half startled when they found themselves on the eve of a more serious war than they had expected. Dumouriez lost no time in telling his friends that the French nation could not be trusted while it ignored all treaty obligations, and the words of Mirabeau must have often recurred to those who saw the terrible complications which were arising. On April 14 Dumouriez announced to the Assembly that the Marquis de Noailles, French ambassador at Vienna, had resigned, and that Louis XVI. was going to send a letter to the youthful nephew of his wife, protesting against the protection given to the émigrés. Francis was not so wise as the Emperor Leopold, and on the 19th the Assembly was informed that the King of Hungary and Bohemia demanded that satisfaction should be given at once to the princes of the empire, whose territories and rights in Alsace had been violated, and also that the Pope should be compensated for the seizure of Avignon and the Venaissin. Such demands were mocked at by the deputies, who knew they had gone too far to recede, and that if any individual or any party dared to propose that such compensation should be given, their political ruin was certain and their lives unsafe. On the morning of the 20th the king appeared, surrounded by his ministers, and listened to a long report from Dumouriez, in which he declared there must be war with Austria. The king said a few words, and then proposed formally that war should be declared against the King of Hungary and Bohemia, for Francis was not yet crowned emperor. On the evening of that memorable day which was to begin a ten-years' war for

France, but one voice was heard in opposition—that of Becquey, deputy for the Haute Marne,¹ and the resolution was carried against a minority of only seven votes. The chief speakers who strengthened their position during this struggle for war and who distinguished themselves in this debate, were Condorcet, Vergniaud, and Merlin of Thionville. And they well illustrate the different types of men who hoped for war. Condorcet wished for it from philosophical motives, believing that as England had fought the American colonies so Europe would fight France, and that it was to the advantage of France to take the initiative. Vergniaud had been inspired by his sentimental feelings; and believing that the establishment of a republic could only be attained by a European war, cried, at the end of his speech, “Vive la liberté, ou la mort!” Merlin of Thionville made a yet more famous remark. He said that war with Austria meant a war against all kings and liberty to all nations. Had it been so, it would have lasted just as long, for nations are not more disposed than kings to be driven into any course of action, and do not care to have to pay with the horrors of war for political liberty. Freedom may be a grand thing, but freedom, when enforced by the sword, greatly resembles tyranny.

¹ *Vie de Becquey*, by Comte Beugnot, pp. 31-36. Paris : 1852.

CHAPTER III.

THE TWENTIETH OF JUNE.

The Jacobins oppose the war—Robespierre and Marat—Jacobin journalism—"The Fête de la Loi"—The policy of Dumouriez—Austria—England—Prussia—Why it failed?—The state of Belgium—Commencement of the war—Murder of Dillon—Servan's recommendation of a camp of fédérés near Paris—The king vetoes the recommendation and a measure against the priests "insermentés"—Roland's letter to the king—Dismissal of the Girondin ministry—A demonstration plotted for June 20—Santerre, the brewer of Saint Antoine—Conduct of the local authorities—Behaviour of the National Guard—The petitioners assemble, and defile before the Assembly—The mob passes the Tuileries, enters the Place du Carrousel, and finally breaks into the Tuileries and insults the king—Santerre protects the queen—Feeling in the Legislative Assembly—The king's interview with Pétion—Lafayette in Paris—Vergniaud's speech of July 3—The country declared in danger—Suspension of Pétion and Manuel—The "Baiser Lamourette"—The Federation—The enrolment of volunteers—Prussia declares war—The Duke of Brunswick's manifesto.

JOYFULLY did the leaders of French popular opinion enter upon the war. Not only the Royalist journals, of which the chief was now the *Journal de Paris*, but also the Girondin journals, which were largely subsidized by Roland as Minister of the Interior, devoted their pages to proving that it would promote the true glory of France. Mention has been made of the opposition made from the first by the leading Jacobins, not only by Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, but also by men who were afterwards regarded as the most extreme Jacobins of all, such as Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne. From

the tribune of the Jacobins' both parties had their say; and though for the time the eloquence of the Girondin orators, and especially of the youthful Isnard, who had won at the Jacobins' the far higher reputation for eloquence than Vergniaud and his friends, had a great effect, the influence of Robespierre was not really diminished by his opposition to the popular feeling.

But the more statesmanlike Jacobin leaders felt it necessary to address their sentiments to a wider audience than that assembled in the Jacobin Club, and they therefore devoted themselves to active journalism. Decidedly the poorest writer among them was Robespierre, yet on April 15 he resigned his post of public accuser to the Tribunal of the Seine, and established a journal called *Le Défenseur de la Constitution*. But real political work, not newspaper writing, was Robespierre's strong point; and though in the long complicated paragraphs which abound in his articles there can be seen the logical consistency which made the journalist a very great man up to a certain point, yet the pages of Camille Desmoulins and of Marat far surpass in interest and in power those of Robespierre. Marat worked himself into a perfect rage on the subject of the war, and regarded it as an infamous conspiracy on the part of the bourgeois Constitutionalists and the Royalists to oppress the poor of the country. The numbers of the *Ami du Peuple* which treat of the question of the war are the most statesmanlike of Marat's writings, and deserve to be analyzed at some length. The effect of his objurgations was that, if it was necessary for the people to suspect all men in power and office in time of peace, still more necessary was it to suspect them in time of war. "Keep your eyes on Lafayette," he once remarked, "for he is more dangerous without than within Paris." Like all men of statesmanlike mind, he clearly perceived the course which events would take. He prophesied that disasters on the part of the French army would be followed by the overthrow of royalty and the destruction of those who hoped for foreign help in Paris. He also declared that an unsuccessful war—and how could it be otherwise than

unsuccessful with an army in a state of disorganization?—would cause disasters, and afterwards the formation of a strong government. He echoed the cry of Mirabeau and of Danton, "Strength is what we want, not a governor." And he proposed that a dictator should be appointed with supreme power for a few days, in which to destroy all traitors at home and vigorously carry on the war abroad. At this bold yet statesmanlike idea the other journalists cried out that Marat wished to make himself, or at other times wished to make one of his friends, Robespierre or Danton, a tyrant or a king. But Marat answered, "Men who are freely given sovereignty are not the men who become tyrants, but the men who seize sovereignty for themselves." If the words of Jean Paul Marat were full of the wisdom of the statesman, Camille Desmoulins in a most witty pamphlet powerfully assailed the war party in the person of their chosen leader. His mind and style were not formed for political dissertations, but he possessed the biting wit which could make itself felt on individuals. In his "*Jean Pierre Brissot demasqué*," Camille Desmoulins is at his best. Everything doubtful in the strange varied life of the innkeeper's son was hinted at in innuendoes which were bound to have their effect on the most unprejudiced mind, while the better actions of his life lost their value by the unworthy motives imputed to them. Seldom has a politician's reputation been entirely destroyed by a single pamphlet, and perhaps the only other instance in modern literary history is the overthrow of the popularity of the first Lord Shaftesbury, in the reign of Charles II., by the publication of Dryden's "*Absalom and Achitophel*."

The effect was immediate. Robespierre and Brissot had many a fierce battle in the Jacobin Club; and after the publication of Camille's pamphlet, the Girondins gradually began to break away from the Jacobin Club. This attack of Camille's the more exasperated the Girondin party because, although they possessed almost a monopoly of eloquence in the Assembly, their journals were distinctly dull. Mirabeau used, with a smile, to remark that Condorcet's articles would

be sufficient to ruin any journal; and truly neither Condorcet's *Chronique de Paris*, Brissot's *Patriote Français*, Mercier's *Annales Patriotiques*, nor Gorsas' *Courrier des Départements* exhibit any of the literary ability which remains to be seen in the *Journal de Paris*, the *Ami du Peuple*, and the *Révolutions de Paris*. Feeling their inability to rival the Jacobins in the press, they carried a decree on May 2, with the help of the Feuillants, that both the *Ami du Roi* of Royou and the *Ami du Peuple* of Marat should be prosecuted. Not satisfied with this attempt to suppress the chief Jacobin writer, the Feuillants decided that they also would have a great fête which should charm the people of Paris, and win their attention and their applause as the Fête de la Liberté had done. At first the theatrical spirit found it difficult to find a hero. But at last they pitched upon one, Simonneau, mayor of Étampes, who had been murdered in that town for refusing to levy a tax upon bread. This was the man whom the opponents of the Jacobins chose as their hero; their fête was called the Fête de la Loi, and it was under the direct superintendence of Quatremère de Quincy, the poet Roucher, and the economist Dupont de Nemours. But these Feuillants were not able to hit the taste of the people as Tallien and Collot d'Herbois, David, and Joseph Chénier had hit it, and the Fête de la Loi on June 1 was a melancholy failure. It was largely attended by officials and moody discontented politicians; but there was no popular enthusiasm, no wild dancing of the Carmagnole, and no hearty applause for the promoters of the festival.¹ This failure might of itself have proved to the Feuillants that they had not the power to win the hearts of the people of Paris.

Meanwhile the war promised better than might have been expected for the French nation. Dumouriez was an able foreign minister, and he formed a great plan by which France might rise triumphant from the dangers which beset her. Unfortunately for the success of his schemes, Dumouriez failed to take into calculation the influence of the revolutionary

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. i. pp. 108-112.

spirit. To him the Revolution was not the commencement of the regeneration of humanity, but the opening of a career for his personal ambition, and, as M. Sorel says, he played with it as De Retz, at a former period, had played with the revolutionary spirit at the time of the Fronde.¹ In spite of his intriguing spirit, he was a sincere opponent of anarchy and disorder, and an advocate for a strong government. Good government and order could only, he believed, be restored by means of the army. But the army was itself undermined by the spirit of the Revolution, and its efficiency and order could only be restored by a successful war. Against what nation, then, could a successful and a popular war be waged? Against Austria, and against Austria without allies. It is in this last point that the influence of his great teacher Favier could be seen. Dumouriez had brought back from his campaigns in the Seven Years' War a sincere admiration for Frederick the Great and his army, and a thorough detestation for Austria and the Austrian alliance. It was this which had recommended him to Favier and the small group of thinkers and actors, who played a part in the secret policy of Louis XV., and this also which had kept him from power and employment as long as Marie Antoinette, by whose marriage the Austrian alliance was perpetuated, retained her influence. But now at last he was in office, and he determined to carry his ideas into practice and to attack Austria. In doing so he believed he was returning to the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, which had made France a great nation; and it is of the greatest importance to lay weight upon his belief and his policy, for it was universally adopted by the statesmen of the Revolution, and lies at the heart of the transactions, which ended in the treaties of Basle in 1794. But that France should fight Austria successfully, Austria must be isolated, and to isolate her was the first aim which Dumouriez set before himself.

¹ *Un Général diplomate au temps de la Révolution*, by Albert Sorel, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 15, 1884, p. 307. This article, which was continued in August 1 and 15, contains the most lucid description of the character and policy of Dumouriez.

To isolate Austria it was practically only necessary to secure the neutrality of two powers, England and Prussia. Dumouriez paid little heed to the attitude of Catherine of Russia. She was too far off to be able to exert any direct influence upon a war between France and Austria, and the French diplomatist, after his experience of eastern European politics, had little doubt but that the Prussian statesmen must see as clearly as he did, that Catherine was only urging the German powers to attack France, in order that she might quietly absorb Poland without interference. Sweden again, which had under Gustavus III. been the most violent of all the nations of Europe against the Revolution, did not trouble the calculations of Dumouriez, for the gallant young Swedish king, who openly declared his intention to rescue Louis XVI. and his queen, was assassinated by Captain Ankerström of the Guards at a masquerade in Stockholm on March 29, and his successor was a boy of thirteen. To Italy also he paid but little attention; Marie Caroline, Queen of Naples and sister of Marie Antoinette, had failed to form an Italian league against France, owing to the opposition of Venice,¹ and Dumouriez expected to obtain the neutrality of the King of Sardinia by promising him the Milanese after France had conquered Austria in exchange for Savoy and Nice. The smaller states of Germany were always afraid of a coalition between Austria and Prussia, and though the war was nominally to be waged on behalf of the rights of the princes of the empire in Alsace, yet Dumouriez knew that these princes would all gladly accept compensation in money, as three of them, the Princes of Lowenstein, Wertheim, and Salm-Salm, had already done. The South German and Rhenish princes were also warmly in favour of the Revolution for its own sake, and had shown that they were so by their treatment of the army of the émigrés under Condé, and they were encouraged in their opinions by the influence of the illuminati, who were all powerful among them, and who believed that

¹ Bourgoing's *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe pendant la Révolution Française*, vol. ii. p. 140.

the French Revolution would be the first step towards the universal acceptance of their ideas, and that it was really the work of members of their own secret societies working through the French freemasons. Holland was sure to obey England and follow its policy, and Spain was bound to France by an identity of interests, which was stronger even than the *Pacte de Famille*. The neutrality, and even the sympathy, of Spain was further secured by the accession to power in the previous February of the old Count d'Aranda, the former minister of the benevolent and reforming Charles III. and the friend of Condorcet, in the place of Count Florida Blanca.

From this sketch it is obvious that the difficulty of Dumouriez' policy for the isolation of Austria was to secure the neutrality of England and Prussia. The attitude of the English people was still distinctly favourable to the Revolution, as it had been from the first, but the eloquent pamphlets of Burke were influencing the landed and wealthy classes, who were beginning to fear that the infection of the new ideas would reach England. The policy of Pitt was one of pure neutrality; he knew his own greatness as a financial minister; England was getting more and more wealthy and prosperous under his wise administration, and the progress of her material prosperity, owing to the introduction of machinery, was unexampled in the history of the world. All this prosperity would be checked by a war, and Pitt therefore strenuously desired to avoid war. Besides, up to the present, the Revolution had been favourable to the trade and commerce of England; France had been too much engaged with its political changes to busy itself in the production of wealth, and the events in the French colonies in the West Indies had ruined their trade in colonial produce and proportionately increased the wealth of the English West Indies. Under these circumstances Dumouriez believed he would have no difficulty in securing the neutrality of England, which meant also the neutrality of Holland and Hanover, and the acquisition in favour of non-interference of the great influence which George III. exercised as Elector of Hanover over the smaller

princes of Germany. Could he even hope for the alliance of England? Talleyrand, the ex-bishop of Autun, believed so,¹ and, as he had just returned from a visit to London, his opinion had some weight. Dumouriez distrusted Talleyrand, as being a self-seeking adventurer like himself, yet he could not deny his ability for diplomacy and intrigue, and when Brissot, to whom Talleyrand had been introduced by Siéyès, urged his nomination for a diplomatic mission to England, Dumouriez felt obliged to accept him. To Talleyrand was joined M. de Chauvelin, an ex-marquis and a vain and empty-headed young man, as nominal minister, Duroveray, the collaborateur of Mirabeau, who knew England well, and Garat, as secretary of the mission. Dumouriez was ready to bid high for an alliance with England. Talleyrand was instructed to promise that France would not annex Belgium, and would not encourage the revolutionary party in Holland; that the commercial treaty between the two countries should be confirmed; and finally that, in return for leave to raise a loan of three or four millions, the island of Tobago, which had been ceded to France to the intense mortification of all Englishman in 1783, should be given back to England.² Earl Gower, the English ambassador in Paris, announces the nomination of the mission to his government in his despatch of March 30, 1792. "I understand it is in contemplation to send immediately to England, with the character of Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. de Chauvelin, one of the *Maitres de la Garde Robe du Roy*, a young man of anti-aristocratical principles and a friend of Mr. de Narbonne, and Mr. de Périgord. The latter is to accompany him, in order that his abilities for negotiating may be employed without infringing the self-denying decree of the late Assembly."³ Yet Dumouriez did not find his English scheme easy to initiate; the members of the mission delayed their departure, and it was not until he had threatened, by Étienne Dumont, the nomination of a fresh mission, that Chauvelin left for London on April 21, the day after the

¹ Sorel, *Un Général diplomate*, p. 314.

² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 167.

declaration of war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Dumouriez also had his troubles in the Assembly, and Lord Gower writes on April 11: "It is evident that the Ministry here have a most earnest desire to be upon the best possible terms with England, which is a sufficient reason for inclining the *Coté droit* (the deputies of the Right) to be otherwise."¹

Even more important than the attitude of England was the attitude of Prussia. Dumouriez could not believe that the alliance between Austria and Prussia would last; he regarded Prussia as the natural ally of France, and believed that the successor of Frederick the Great would be only too glad to attack Austria while she was at war with France, as his uncle would most certainly have done. He further thought it impossible that any Prussian statesman could be hoodwinked by Russia's pretended ardour for the war against the Revolution, or fail to see that Catherine's policy was to finally absorb Poland while Prussia and Austria were engaged in the west. He knew, too, that there was a strong Prussian party at Berlin, headed by the Duke of Brunswick and Prince Henri, who looked upon Austria with the eyes of Frederick the Great, as the great enemy of the Prussian nationality, and who would regard an alliance with France with favour. But Dumouriez did not take the passions of men into his calculations. He saw which policy it was for the interest of Prussia to adopt, and therefore could not understand her failing to seize the opportunity, and he did not sufficiently consider the character of the king. Frederick William II. was a monarch of a very different type to Frederick the Great; he was completely under the influence of his mistresses. His heart was stronger than his head, and though not wanting in intellectual power, he was governed always by sentimental considerations, and was at this time charmed by the mystic ideas of the theosophists, a secret sect of the nature of the illuminati, though diametrically opposed to the latter in political opinions, whose chief supporter, Bischoffswerder, was his confidential

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 170.

minister. The intrigues of the émigrés had been particularly successful at Berlin, and the favourite mistress, Madame Doenhoff, had been won to their side. As long as the Emperor Leopold lived, the policy of Prussia had been subordinated to that of Austria, but the accession of the youthful Archduke Francis had made Frederick William the leading monarch of the alliance, and Catherine of Russia, who had succeeded to much of Leopold's influence over the mind of the King of Prussia, urged him to immediate war. Dumouriez, then, counting on the interests of Prussia and not upon the disposition of the king, sought to detach Frederick William from his alliance with Austria. In doing so he only followed the example of De Lessart, who had sent Ségur to Berlin in December, 1791, to win over the King of Prussia. Ségur, in spite of his abilities, had failed to accomplish anything, and it was reported in Paris that, in consequence of this failure, he had attempted to commit suicide.¹ When Dumouriez assumed office, Ségur had already left Berlin, and had left as chargé d'affaires there François de Custines, only son of the Comte de Custines, who had sat in the Constituent Assembly as a liberal deputy of the noblesse, a smart young diplomatist and former pupil of Professor Koch. This young man Dumouriez appointed minister plenipotentiary to the court of Prussia, and boldly instructed him not to propose that Prussia should remain neutral, but that she should become the ally of France and help in despoiling Austria.

These were the schemes of Dumouriez, yet, well founded though they were in the old principles of state-craft, they failed because of the new element which the Revolution had brought into existence—the headstrong enthusiasm of a nation, which would not take into consideration the calculations of statesmen. Even without this his schemes might have failed, for not only did the ambassadors of the émigrés oppose his policy, but the secret agents of the imprisoned court at the Tuileries also; for example, on the very same day, March 30, when his courier started with his ultimatum to Vienna, a

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 153.

secret emissary of the queen, the Baron de Goguelat, one of the accomplices in the flight to Varennes, departed with a declaration of the king that he was obliged to yield in appearance to the Revolution.¹ Neither Spain nor Sardinia entered into his plans; Spain received his special ambassador, M. de Bourgoing, coldly, and Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, who expected to get the Milanese from Austria without having to sacrifice Savoy and Nice, as the price of his assistance, refused to receive Sémonville, whom Dumouriez had directed to go to Turin, and when he tried to enter the kingdom arrested him at Alessandria on April 19. With the German princes Dumouriez was more successful; the Elector of Saxony and George III. of England, as Elector of Hanover, declared their neutrality, the South German princes openly showed their sympathy, and only William IX., Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, who coveted the title and rank of an elector, expressed his willingness to send his fine little army to the assistance of Austria. In London the agents of Dumouriez had no success; Lord Grenville, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received Chauvelin very coldly, the king was equally reserved, and only the opposition and its leaders, Fox and Sheridan, were at all cordial. Talleyrand, however, was not to be deceived by the specious talk of the opposition, and he wrote to Dumouriez on May 23 that nothing was to be expected from them.² On May 24, Lord Grenville sent Chauvelin a proclamation, in which he expressed the regret of the English government at the war, its desire to remain at peace, its promise to respect treaties, and its hope that France would respect the allies of England. In this last clause lay the reason for Grenville's coldness. England always kept a jealous eye on the Netherlands. Belgium in the hands of Austria with the Scheldt closed offered no rivalry to English commerce, but it would be otherwise if it were annexed to France, and fiery speakers in the Legislative Assembly and the Jacobin Club

¹ *Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France*, par A. von Klinkowström, vol. ii. p. 14.

² Sorel, *Un Général diplomate*, p. 321.

were already declaring that the Vonckists were to be assisted, and that Belgium was to be revolutionized, if not annexed. Still more suspicious was the treatment of the Dutch refugees by the revolutionary leaders in Paris. One of Pitt's greatest strokes of statesmanship had been the overthrow of the Dutch republican party by means of the diplomacy of Lord Malmesbury and the soldiers of Prussia, and the Dutch republicans had always looked to France for countenance and help, while the Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange, had looked to England. The news, therefore, sent by Lord Gower on April 22, that it was in contemplation to raise a corps of Dutch patriots for service on the frontier,¹ with the further intelligence on June 8 that it was to consist of between four and five thousand men,² was quite enough to rouse the jealous suspicions of the English ministry. At Berlin the failure of the schemes of Dumouriez was even more complete. Custines was deserted even by the Duke of Brunswick and Prince Henri, and Bischoffswerder became supreme. Custines reported to Dumouriez that any proposition for an alliance would only irritate the Prussians, and advised that they should be allowed to try just one campaign with the Austrians, after which the coalition of such ill-suited allies would be bound to break up.³ When Custines alluded to the interests of Prussia, Schulemburg, the minister deputed to see him, promptly answered that "if interest ought to be counted, so also ought the honour of crowns;" when the French envoy went on to say that "France did not want to make conquests," he was immediately asked, "How about Avignon?" and Schulemburg concluded, "The King of Prussia does not care about you or your Constitution, but he must repulse your desire to make proselytes."⁴ On April 6 Schulemburg told Custines that the king had no more to say to him than he had had to Ségur, and refused him an audience; and on April 10 the young French diplomatist wrote despairingly from Berlin, "The amnesty granted to the Avignon murderers has lost us all our friends here." On April 29 Frederick

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 175.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

³ Sorel, *Un Général diplomate*, p. 423.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

William knew of the declaration of war, and immediately began to make preparations for joining in it, and on May 18 Lord Gower wrote to his government: "The Comte de Goltz (the Prussian ambassador) has received orders to quit this court without taking leave, and he intends to accompany M. de Blumendorf (the Austrian chargé d'affaires left behind by Mercy-Argenteau) out of France in the beginning of the next week."¹ This of itself was almost tantamount to declaring war. With regard to Austria itself, Dumouriez found that the sentiment of the court of Vienna had quite changed since the death of Leopold. The young Archduke Francis, who had succeeded his uncle as King of Hungary and Bohemia, was too much occupied with his approaching election and coronation as emperor to trouble himself much about the war, but he expressed himself warmly in favour of it, and showed his disposition by paying less attention to the prudent counsels of the old Chancellor Kaunitz, and more to those of the Vice-Chancellor Count Philip von Cobenzl, and the Privy Councillor Baron von Thugut. "If France did not attack, Austria would," said Thugut to the Baron de Breteuil, the secret agent of Louis XVI. at Vienna, on April 17; and in these words he spoke the sentiments both of the youthful monarch and of the younger generation of statesmen and soldiers at the court of Vienna.

There was yet a further reason, besides the lessons which Dumouriez had learnt from Favier, why he had determined to wage war against Austria, and against Austria alone, if possible. Austria was the only nation which offered France an easy conquest. It was part of that hereditary policy, in which Dumouriez believed, that the whole of Flanders should belong to France. Louis XIV. had annexed the wealthy province known as French Flanders, and Dumouriez thought it would be equally easy to assimilate the rest. The result of the policy of Joseph II. had shown clearly the disinclination of the Belgians to become an integral part of the Austrian dominions, and though the Vandernootists had been satisfied

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 184.

with the policy of Leopold, who had restored the old form of government in the Belgian provinces, the Vonckists, who had imagined more radical reforms, and who had risen in rebellion to establish a democratic form of government, were by no means satisfied. Dumouriez had been sent on a secret mission into Belgium by Montmorin in 1790, and he was sure that the doctrines of these insurgents had sunk deep into the hearts of the people, and that at the advance of the French armies the people of Belgium would welcome them as deliverers. When, therefore, he came into office, his first step was to enter into intimate relations with the Vonckist committee which sat at Lille, and to send Maret, the young diplomatist, who had made himself famous by his reports of the debates in the Constituent Assembly, on a secret mission to stir up discontent among the Belgians, and to tell them that the French were coming to their help.¹ It was in this conviction of the readiness of the Belgians to rise that he arranged the plan of the first campaign against Austria. He directed Marshal Lückner to remain quiet in Alsace, with his headquarters at Strasbourg, and to watch events. General Lafayette, with ten thousand picked men of the army of the Centre, was ordered to advance from his camp at Givet upon Namur, and was thence to move upon Brussels or Liège. He was to be supported by three divisions of the army of the North, commanded by the Maréchal de Rochambeau: one under General Biron, the *cidevant* Duc de Biron, ten thousand strong, which was to advance from Valenciennes upon Mons; one under General Theobald Dillon, four thousand strong, which was to march from Lille to make a demonstration against Tournay; and one under General Carle, only fifteen hundred strong, which was to move from Dunkirk upon Furnes. As there were only thirty thousand Austrian soldiers in Belgium, Dumouriez counted upon success. But he had not taken into consideration the utter disorganization of the French army. His plan failed entirely. Dillon's division was suddenly seized with a panic before it had even seen the enemy, and, with cries that

¹ Ernouf's *Le Duc de Bassano*, pp. 48-72.

they were betrayed, all his soldiers rushed back into Lille, and brutally murdered Dillon in the streets on April 29.¹ Biron's division had a slight success at Quièvrain, but on arriving before Mons on April 30 it was charged by a few of the Austrian cavalry, and the whole division immediately fled back to Valenciennes, with the loss of all its baggage. Lafayette suffered no such disaster, but these reverses made it necessary for him to fall back at once and give up the idea of reaching Namur.

The news from the frontier created a great sensation at Paris. Rochambeau resigned his command in disgust at Dumouriez' having directed the employment of his divisions, and was succeeded by Lückner, but Marat confessed himself very pleased, for he said the murder of Dillon showed that the French soldiery would not allow their officers to lead them to Paris. But the Girondins expressed no pleasure. They knew that on the success or failure of the war not only their reputation but their very lives rested, and at the instance of Roland they procured the resignation of De Grave, the incapable "little" war minister, who had in March succeeded Narbonne. In his stead there was appointed to the ministry of war Colonel Servan, a stern, inflexible old officer, descended from an old Jansenist and legal family in Dauphiné, who had learnt in war to defend the stern creed he had been taught in youth.

Like many other Jansenists Servan was a sincere Republican, and he was also an upright and honest man and a very hard worker. He proceeded at once to the reorganization of the army, and soon proposed that the national guards of the departments upon the frontier should be mobilized and placed under the command of the generals of division—a step which at a single blow doubled the French armies in the field of action. Servan was assisted by the military committee of the Legislative Assembly. Here there met on common ground Royalists, Feuillants, and Girondins, moved only by a love of the French army. Its leading members were Mathieu

¹ See *Relation de l'assassinat de M. Th. Dillon, Maréchal de Camp, commis à Lille le 29 Avril, 1792*, in B.M.—F. 833. (2).

Dumas and Daverhoul among the deputies of the right, and Lacuée de Cessac and Carnot of the left. In the Assembly the checks upon the frontier had the effect of strengthening the interest of the deputies in the proposals of the military committee and of Colonel Servan. On May 29 the ardour for military reform, and it is to be feared the desire to leave the king defenceless, urged Basire to move that the King's Constitutional Guard should be at once abolished. This guard consisted of three young men elected from every district of France, and was commanded by the Duc de Brissac who had formerly been colonel of the Cent Suisses. Among the King's Constitutional Guard might be seen the youthful faces of many who were to make themselves a great name in the military history of France. Among them were Joachim Murat and Jean Baptiste Bessières, who had both been elected from the department of the Lot. Both of them had served as privates in the old army, and both had proved themselves such turbulent soldiers that they had been dismissed to their homes. But with their turbulence they possessed a passionate love for their profession, and gladly entered the ranks of the King's Constitutional Guard. Little did Joachim Murat think that after seventeen years he would be King of Naples, and knight of nearly all the orders of chivalry in Europe. Nor did Bessières foresee that, after many a command and many a victory, he would be shot on the eve of a great battle, by mistake, while walking round to inspect the outposts. Basire's motion was supported by Guadet and Vergniaud, and on May 30 the Constitutional Guard was dismissed, and the Duc de Brissac sent to Orleans to be tried by the high court. The king had willingly consented to this dissolution of his guard; but a more insidious proposal was to be made to him. On June 4 Servan came down to the Assembly, and without having given either the king or his fellow-ministers any notice of his intention, proposed that a camp of twenty thousand fédérés from the different departments of France should be formed outside the walls of Paris, as a reserve for the armies on the frontier. The Girondins, who were not over popular in Paris, were

delighted with the proposition, and the camp was ordered on June 8. But neither the king nor the Jacobins at all approved of Servan's camp. The king still hoped that from the armies of the frontier he would gain the power to subdue the recalcitrant capital; while the Jacobins, who knew that the populace of Paris were devoted to them, were loth that such a weapon should be placed in the hands of the Girondins. Whether the king would veto this decree or not, was the question which weighed upon every member of the Assembly; for perhaps he was being pressed too far.

But much as the king disliked the camp of the fédérés, he was still more disgusted with the tyrannical and unjust decree on the subject of the priests who had not taken the oath, which was carried on May 27. It will be remembered that the decree, on November 29, against the priests had been vetoed by the king; but the Girondins and the Jacobins were determined not to be thus foiled. Therefore a yet more unjust decree was proposed by Vergniaud against the unconstitutional priests. François de Neufchâteau, the biographer of Voltaire, had reported to the Assembly that there was no doubt that very great disturbances were being caused in the south and west of France by the presence of the unconstitutional clergy. Vergniaud then had the injustice to move that, on the request of any twenty citizens of a canton, the directory of any department was immediately to exile the unconstitutional priests from their department. It is hardly necessary to point out the injustice of such a measure against men who, though they did not obey the law in one particular respect, were yet French citizens. Torné, bishop of Bourges, well argued the question when he said, "Will you persuade these priests to take the oath by starvation and persecution? Know, you not that persecution will only increase their strength, and that their starvation will only discredit you?" The unjust decree, however, was carried, and the king had to consider it as well as that of the camp of fédérés. There was almost a suspension of legislative activity during this period of waiting, and on both sides attempts were made to influence the king's mind.

On the one hand, a petition signed by eight thousand Parisians, known as the "Huit mille," was drawn up to protest against the formation of the camp, and was graciously received by the king. On the other hand, Roland, who considered that Dumouriez took too much on himself, and that he was not paid sufficient respect, consented to send the king a letter which his wife obligingly wrote for him, exhorting and almost ordering him to consent to both decrees at once. Madame Roland was very much disgusted that Madame Veto, or Mesalina, as she alternately called the queen, had not yet departed out of the way, to make room for the social equality which would leave Madame Roland as the leader of society. She therefore wrote in her husband's name a most impertinent letter—impertinent, politically and personally,—which naturally irritated the king, who had through all his tribulations preserved only the privilege of receiving some little personal respect.

Dumouriez was by the queen's side when Roland's letter was read. "What shall we do with these insolents?" said the queen, with flashing eyes. "Kick them out," said Dumouriez, laconically; and on the same day, June 12, the Minister for Foreign Affairs brought letters of dismissal to his three colleagues, Servan, Clavière, and Roland. Dumouriez received the portfolio of the War Department, and recommended Mourgues, whom he had known at Cherbourg, to be Minister of the Interior, and Naillac to succeed himself at the Foreign Office, and upon Dumouriez poured out the rage of the Girondin party, as the traitor who had actually instigated the king to dismiss the virtuous Roland. But Dumouriez had acted with perfect consistency. He had intended, ever since he had entered the ministry, to become prime minister; and the conceit of Roland and his friends prevented him from assuming the proud position he desired. Personally he cared very little for Louis XVI. or Marie Antoinette, but he intended to obtain power for himself, and would have used that power to repress anarchy. He was not a man who would have sacrificed himself, like Mirabeau, to send advice by notes to the court, day by day, which would

not be followed, but intended that he should be minister in deed as well as in name, and that he should be practically ruler of France. He therefore accepted the War Office, and requested the king to destroy the effect of the dismissal of the ministers by assenting to the two decrees. To his surprise the king would not give in. He positively refused to sanction either decree. Dumouriez failed to understand how any one could object to a camp near Paris because it would cause some rioting, or to a few old priests being hurried to an untimely grave. But he knew very well that, unless he could propitiate the people with some such concessions from the king, he would lose much of his popularity by his recent behaviour; and he therefore haughtily resigned on June 15, and declared that Louis XVI. had broken his word to him. In his perplexity the king once more turned to Lafayette, and decided to admit some of his friends into the ministry, and on June 19 several individuals of very little weight or political importance, but all known as friends of Lafayette, MM. de Chambonas, Lajard, Terrier de Monciel, Beaulieu, and Dejoly, were admitted into the ministry, and on the same day the king's veto on the two decrees was announced to the Assembly. The dismissal of the Girondin ministers had somewhat the same effect upon the populace of Paris as the dismissal of Necker had on July 12, 1789. But there was no enthusiasm for Roland as there had been for Necker. There was something about the virtuous Roland which could not possibly attract the mob; but that their ministers should have been dismissed was discussed in every sectional club in Paris, and it was loudly declared that the capture of the Tuileries would be the sequel to the dismissal of Roland and his friends. But the prophets were not quite right. June 20 was not signalized by the capture of the Tuileries, and in one respect it stands nobly apart from the other great days of the Revolution, for during it not one drop of blood was shed.

The events of June 20 are very significant of the power of the Jacobins, and without the success of June 20 it may be doubted at what particular period the actual capture of the

Tuileries, which took place on August 10, would have occurred. To distinguish it from the taking of the Bastille, or the events of October 5 and 6, it should be at once remarked that the demonstration of June 20 was premeditated and carefully planned, though matters fell out very differently from what had been anticipated; and something resembling an invasion of the Tuileries may have passed through the minds of some of the organizers, who assembled at Santerre's house to drink his beer and discuss how the anniversary of the great day of the Tennis Court was to be celebrated. It must also be noticed that, although the movement of June 20 was planned for many days beforehand, neither the Girondin nor the Jacobin leaders had any share in its preparation. Danton and Robespierre alike discouraged any demonstration of the sort. The time was not yet come, they said. Failure would lead to a massacre far more bloody than that of July 17, 1791, while a success which did not seem justified in the eyes of the nation would only ruin Paris in the opinion of the departments. The contrivers of the movement of June 20 were all subaltern actors, who worked in direct opposition to the will of those whom they boasted to be their leaders, and many of them on this day proved themselves fit to be trusted with yet more important matters on a yet greater Revolutionary day, August 10.

Antoine Joseph Santerre was the son of a prosperous brewer of Paris, and was born in 1752. He had a college education, and after leaving college bought a large brewery of M. Acloque, for the sum of sixty-five thousand francs.¹ He had always been very fond of chemistry, and it occurred to him to analyze the popular English beer. He discovered its constituent parts, brewed it himself in Paris, and soon made an enormous fortune. He lived close to his brewery, in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, and his kindness to his numerous workmen and draymen, and even drayhorses, made him quite the most popular man in the poorest faubourg of the capital. Before the Revolution, his chief characteristic, besides his

¹ *Santerre, général de la République*, by A. E. Carro. Paris: 1847.

generosity, had been his love for horses. He was famous as a horseman throughout Paris, and was one of the warmest supporters of the turf, the mysteries of which had been imported into France from England by the Duke of Orleans. He had been an elector in 1789, and had tried to stop the Réveillon riot. He had played an important part in the attack on the Bastille, and was severely wounded when endeavouring to secure respect for a white flag. He was next elected commandant of the national guards of Saint Antoine, and took part with his battalion in the events of October 5 and 6. His influence had considerably increased during the two years of Revolution, and as in his liberality he gave away immense quantities of beer, he possessed all the popularity which might be expected to belong to a charitable brewer. This was the man in whose house the events of June 20 were prepared. The friends whom he assembled round him on this occasion were men of very different ranks in life. Foremost among them was Alexandre, the jeweller, who had been elected commandant of the national guards of the other poor faubourg, the Faubourg Saint Marceau. Besides these officers there was the ci-devant Marquis de St. Huruge, the intimate friend of Santerre, who lent him money because of their old acquaintance at the house of the Duke of Orleans and at other places. There was Fournier, called the American, because he had long lived in San Domingo; Lazouski, a Polish gentleman of high birth, who had moved in the best salons of Paris in 1789, and had been there well known and well liked by the English farmer, Arthur Young. With these gentlemen of birth there met, in Santerre's inner room, Rossignol, another jeweller and a very advanced Republican, who was afterwards to be made a general in La Vendée, and the butcher Legendre, a man with violent revolutionary notions and great popular eloquence, who had also the power of attracting sympathy and inspiring it in others. And in the group in Santerre's room neither the roué marquis nor the popular exile had one tithe of that seething consuming passion for liberty and equality which of itself made Legendre, though an ignorant, ill-educated man, a

power, not only in Paris, but in after days in the Convention itself.

In Santerre's house it was decided that an attempt should be made to terrify the king into recalling his late ministers. They said, M. Veto has things too much his own way, and ought to see whom the people really love; but since such designs could not be openly avowed, it was decided that leave for a demonstration should be asked of the municipality of Paris, on the ground that the citizens of the Faubourgs Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau wished to present a petition to the Legislative Assembly and to the king on the day of the oath of the Tennis Court; and afterwards to plant a tree of liberty on the Terrace of the Feuillants, in memory of the famous oath. The council-general of the municipality refused their consent and referred the request to the directory of the department and to the government. But the council-general only met once a fortnight, and in the interim Santerre and his friends hoped to obtain the consent which they sought from the mayor and the procureur of the commune, who held power when the council-general was not sitting. Pétion was terribly embarrassed. He feared to lose his popularity by insisting on the refusal which the council-general had given to the citizens of Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau, and at the same time he feared that if the executive got the better of an armed assembly, which he expected would end by a riot, he would be called to a strict account. Therefore, on the advice of Manuel, the procureur of the commune, he determined to summon together the administrators of the police and the commandants of the national guards of the excited faubourgs, in order to throw the responsibility on them. The administrators of police were Paris, the brother-in-law of Santerre, and an indifferent poet; Sergeant, a well-known engraver; Vigner, and Perron; and the four commandants were Santerre, Alexandre, the sergeant Bonneau, who commanded the battalion of Sainte Marguerite, and the actor Saint Prix, who commanded the battalion of Val de Grace. Saint Prix afforded Pétion a means of escape from his embarrassment, and suggested that the national guards of

the disturbed districts should accompany the people to present their petition, in order to maintain the peace; and Pétion acquiesced in this suggestion. This meeting took place at nine o'clock on the evening of June 19, and as those summoned to it returned to their homes they found that all the assemblies of the sections of the revolutionary quarters, and particularly those of the sections of *Quinze-Vingts*, *Popincourt*, and *Gobelins*, were having an all-night sitting, and were working themselves up for the great manifestation of the next day. Pétion was slightly annoyed, and at once sent news of his decision to Roederer, the *procureur-general-syndic* of the department of the *Seine* and an old member of the left in the *Constituent* like himself, and told the administrators of the police to write to the commandant-general for the month, *Ramainvilliers*. Roederer acknowledged his letter, and Pétion went quietly home to bed.

Roederer at once assembled the directory of the department, who at five o'clock cancelled the mayor's decision of the night before. Pétion then sent off certain administrators of police to announce this both to *Ramainvilliers* and to the commandants of the different battalions of national guards. Naturally both the commandant-general and the commandants of the different battalions were in a state of hopeless confusion on account of the numerous contradictory orders which they had received; and, as was often the case on these great Revolutionary days, the progress of events was left to chance. To analyze the conduct of the several commandants would take too long, but notice may be given to the behaviour of *Bonneau* and *Saint Prix*. *Bonneau* had collected his battalion on June 20, in accordance with Pétion's original order, and had afterwards refused to march with it to join *Santerre* when he received the second order of the mayor cancelling the first; but, soon after, certain men came from the section of *Quinze-Vingts*, and declared that this second order had also been cancelled. *Bonneau* himself wished to dismiss his men, but they forced him to accompany them to *Santerre*, saying that they wished to prevent bloodshed; and he did accompany them,


protesting as they went. Still more violent was the scene in the Faubourg Saint Marceau. When Saint Prix arrived at the headquarters of the battalion of the Val de Grace, he found his men surrounded by a number of workmen who asked the national guards to follow them. Saint Prix ordered his men to fall in, and the gunners to stand to their guns. But the gunners flatly refused to stand to their guns, for the gunners who were attached to the sixty battalions which formed the National Guard of Paris were in nearly every case selected from those old Gardes Françaises who had taken the Bastille, and had then become the Garde Soldée of the National Guard, or else from the mutineers of the artillery regiment of Toul. All these men were violent Revolutionists, and played an important part in every famous riot of the Revolution in Paris. Saint Prix was soon deserted by his gunners and most of his men, and at last consented to accompany his battalion, in order, as he declared, to do his best to prevent them from using violence.

When the news of the excitement in the faubourgs again reached Rétion, he determined once more to disregard the authority of the department, and to legalize the movement which was on foot. He summoned to him his personal friends in the municipality, and they drew up a decree, that the municipality ordered the commandant-general of the National Guard to assemble under his banners all citizens who wished to petition, and that they were to march under the command of officers of the battalions. The municipality then pretended to believe that Paris was saved, because the mob would obey the officers of the National Guard. Meanwhile the directory of the department remained "en permanence," and sent Rœderer to report to the Legislative Assembly. Rœderer reported that a riot was at hand, and that a very large number of armed citizens were advancing to present a petition to the Assembly. The president, Français of Nantes, replied that the Assembly would consider the matter. Vergniaud then moved that the armed petitioners should be permitted to defile through the hall of the Assembly; and while the motion was being discussed

a letter arrived from Santerre, announcing that the petitioners were already at the doors. The two great streams of men from the Faubourg Saint Antoine and the Faubourg Saint Marceau had moved, the one from the Place de la Salpêtrière and the other from the Place de la Bastille, and had met at the end of the present Rue de Rivoli. The actual petitioners, their battalions of national guards no longer accompanying them, were not more than seven thousand in number at the very outside; but the news of this colossal petition had caused other battalions of the National Guard to fall in, in order to keep the peace, and had also collected a vast number of those who rejoice to see anything new, including, as usual, many women and children. The petitioners, accompanied by this crowd, marched down the Rue Saint Honoré to the Place Vendôme, and there waited while Santerre was admitted to the Assembly in order to request that the petitioners might be heard. A violent debate took place. Ramond and Dumolard on behalf of the right, and Vergniaud and Lasource on behalf of the left, discussed the question at length. For many minutes the Assembly was in utter confusion, and for two hours the debate continued, while Santerre looked calmly on. But meanwhile Santerre's followers were being terribly crushed in the Rue Saint Honoré and the Place Vendôme. Every moment the throng swelled in numbers, until the pressure became intense; and the excitement of the crowd increased. Fortunately the gate of the old Capucin monastery in the Rue Saint Honoré was open, and several thousands of the national guards and of the mob broke into the old convent garden, and planted their tree of liberty among the monks' cabbages, and drank to the oath of the Tennis Court. But, though partly relieved, the crush still continued, and the mass of women and children was nearly forced into the hall of the Assembly, and were so crushed in the narrow passage between the convents of the Feuillants and the Capucins, which formed the only access to the Manège from the Rue Saint Honoré, and which is now replaced by the Rue Castiglione, that three municipal officers came to the king, and requested him to allow the

garden of the Tuileries to be opened, so that the people might get a moment's relief there. The king consented, and the fearful crush which had lasted two hours in the Place Vendôme, the Rue Saint Honoré, and the narrow passage was now over, and the weary and hot petitioners and their friends wandered up and down the beautiful royal gardens. The Assembly at last decided that the petitioners should be heard, and the orator of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, Huguenin, gave utterance to a seditious and feeble speech in the Assembly itself. But the speech was hardly listened to. The important moment was now come, when the women of the markets, and all the petitioners, followed by their friends, were to march through the Assembly. At the foot of the tribune stood Santerre and Saint Huruge, two old friends of Orleans, who directed the petitioners as they marched through the hall. They came along, with arms and without arms, drunk and sober, laughing and weeping; but the only genuine insult which was offered to the Assembly, was when a sans-culotte brought in a calf's heart, with an inscription, "The heart of an aristocrat," upon it, fixed upon his pike. He was promptly induced to leave the hall, and by half-past three the whole of the petitioners and their friends had defiled through the Assembly.

The petitioners, when they had moved through the hall of the Assembly, came down into the court of the riding-school; for it will be remembered that the Legislative Assembly, like the Constituent, sat in the old riding-school of the Tuileries. From the court of the riding-school it was possible for the people to enter the Rue Saint Honoré by turning to the left, up the Rue de Dauphin; but by some chance, probably at the direction of a very officious little architect named Mouchet, who was a municipal officer, the mob turned from the court of the riding-school to the right, and passed along the terrace of the Tuileries, in front of the palace, to the quays opposite the Pont Royal, whence they could move up the quays and disperse on the different sides of the river. The people marched quietly along at first. The national guards on duty stood drawn up along the terrace of the palace, and though the king



might have heard from his windows cries of "À bas Monsieur et Madame Veto!" there was no attempt to attack the national guards or to break into the Tuileries. Indeed, any such idea as breaking into the Tuileries did not seem to have occurred to the directors of the popular movement. They were to present their petition to the Assembly, and they were to terrify the king by their numbers, and by the influence for evil they could have exerted; but Santerre, who afterwards saved the queen's life, did not contemplate an invasion of the Tuileries. The crowd had got safely to the quays, but, unfortunately, when the head of the crowd reached the wicket-gate from the Place du Carrousel to the quays, it occurred to certain leaders of the Faubourg Saint Antoine that their shortest way home would be through the Place du Carrousel. A strange and inexplicable order had been left at the wicket of the Place du Carrousel to admit only armed men, but all alike burst merrily into the Place du Carrousel, believing that it would be a very nice way home. Like sheep the crowd had been pressed together in the Rue Saint Honoré and Place Vendôme while the Assembly was debating about them, and now like sheep they followed each other through the gate into the Place du Carrousel, until the square was crammed as tightly as the Rue Saint Honoré had been; but now Santerre and Saint Huruge were no longer with the people to turn them quietly back. Without officers and without directions the crowd soon became overpowering.

In the Place du Carrousel the commandant-general of the National Guard, Romainvilliers, had drawn up five of his battalions, and within the court of the Tuileries itself there were stationed one battalion and a hundred gendarmes on horseback. He had posted ten battalions along the front of the palace in the gardens, two on the river-side, and four in the Place Louis XV.; and with such a force at his disposal Romainvilliers might very easily have prevented the crowd from turning into the Place du Carrousel. But unfortunately the people did get in, and the question was how they were to be got out again. In the midst of the crush certain people

were jammed close up to the entrance of the central court of the Tuileries, known as the Cour Royale, and desired to go in, but not, they declared, to do any harm to the king. The gendarmes forbade them to enter, and when the crowd attempted to force its way in to relieve the terrible pressure the gates were closed. Within this court was posted one battalion of national guards and some gendarmes, as has been said; but nobody to give them any orders. With the gendarmes had assembled some personal friends of the king, and many officers of monarchical ideas had been there ever since the morning, in order to protect his person in case of a riot. One of these officers was Acloque, a son of the Acloque from whom Santerre had bought his brewery; and he persuaded the king to receive twenty of the crowd in the Place du Carrousel, without arms, if they only wished to present a petition: and he then proclaimed at the gate that he would introduce twenty petitioners to his Majesty, who would be well received by him. At this announcement some thirty individuals were admitted into the palace. But now a new and very serious feature appeared in the Place du Carrousel. The gunners of the Faubourg Saint Marceau flatly refused to keep the peace and maintain order, and dragged their guns along the great square, and declared they would blow down the gate which led into the court of the palace. At this threat of the gunners the populace and national guards rushed upon the door; and with a cry, "Don't fire,—it shall be opened," the great gate opened wide. Nobody knew who gave the order to open the gate. There can be no doubt that, if it had not been opened, the events of August 10 would have been anticipated, for the gunners of Saint Marceau would undoubtedly have fired, and however the national guards within the Tuileries might have behaved, the gendarmes would have insisted on fighting.

Through room after room the people thronged in search of "M. Veto," and found him in the hall which was known as the "Œil de Bœuf," with three of his ministers, Beaulieu, Lajard, and Terrier de Monciel, the Maréchal de Mouchy, and a few other personal friends. As the voice of the mob was

heard, Acloque burst into the hall of the Œil de Bœuf with a few national guards, and begged them to perish rather than see their monarch insulted. "Do not be afraid, sire," said one of his attendants. "No," replied the king. "Put your hand on my heart; it is calm." There he remained, while the mob rushed into the hall and shouted, "À bas M. Veto!" "Au diable M. Veto!" Among many speeches it is necessary to note one of the butcher Legendre. He cried out to him, "Ah, monsieur, listen to us,—you are made to hear us; you are a traitor; you have always deceived us; you are deceiving us still. Take care of yourself; your measure is full, and the people are tired of being your plaything!" And in these words Legendre spoke but too truly the belief of those about him. Though they had no mind to murder the king, though they had not intended to force themselves into his presence, yet they believed him to be a traitor, and wished to warn him that the people were tired of treachery. The scene lasted a terribly long time. For nearly two hours the Œil de Bœuf was full of a crowd pressed tightly together, and uttering their favourite war-cries. There were incidents enough. Louis, the sacred king, put on the bonnet rouge,—the bonnet rouge which Robespierre had spurned. The king waved his sword with a cry of "Vive la Nation!" The king drank to the health of the people, and stood pressed in the window until his purgatory should be over. At last a disturbance was heard without, and there burst through the crowd some leading deputies of the Legislative Assembly. Side by side rushed on Vergniaud and Isnard, Dauterive and Blanc-Gilly, and all begged the mob to retire in the name of the people and of the Assembly. But the arrival of the deputies could not disperse the crowd, and more and more crowded did the Place du Carrousel, the rooms of the Tuileries, and the Cour Royale become. At length, at six o'clock, Pétion, nicely dressed and in no hurry, ordered his carriage, and drove as far as he could towards the Tuileries. He had done nothing since eleven o'clock in the morning, when he had legalized the march of the national guards; but now he declared he had even left

his dinner unfinished in order to go at once to the Tuileries. Welcomed by certain loud cries of "Vive Pétion!" he said, "Sire, I have only just learned what was your situation." "That is very astonishing," said the king, "for it has lasted two hours." Pétion felt rebuked; but when he was told that he should be held responsible for everything that happened, he decided to address the crowd. He begged them in the name of the law to retire; and such was his popularity at that particular epoch, that the crowd did begin to pass through the great interior apartments of the palace just as they had passed through the hall of the Assembly, and Pétion took the place of Santerre, and directed the course of the crowd.

There was one other scene in the palace of the Tuileries that day, which is even more touching than the humiliation of the king. When the queen heard the noise in the Place du Carrousel, she had wished at once to join her husband, but too soon she heard that the crowd was already filling the *Ceil de Bœuf*. The minister of foreign affairs, Chambonas, led her, with a few grenadiers, to the council chamber, and she remained there with Madame de Tourzel and Madame de Lamballe, while her little child, the Dauphin, played upon the table. For her, indeed, there was great danger. If the populace wished to terrify the king, they could not terrify the queen, and her life had been endangered by many an article in many a journal. Santerre, who, whatever his faults may have been, was at least a chivalrous man, hurried to the spot where she stood. He took his place by her side, and said that the people would do the queen no harm. There he stood throughout the afternoon, while the terrible crowd filled the council chamber with cries against the queen, till at last, through the influence of Pétion and Santerre, the last of the mob, at half-past eight in the evening, left the palace of the Tuileries. Then husband and wife fell into each other's arms. Those present were deeply moved; but Merlin of Thionville, the young Jacobin deputy, felt that he ought to explain his tears. "I weep, madame," he said, "I weep for the misfortunes of a beautiful and sensitive woman, and for the

sufferings of a mother; I do not weep for the queen. I hate queens and kings; to hate them is my religion."¹

The Legislative Assembly had informally met again at five o'clock, on hearing of the excitement in the Place du Carrousel; Guyton-Morveau, the chemist, as an ex-president, took the chair; and it was decreed that twenty-four members should go to the Tuileries to protect the king. A violent debate commenced; Matheu Dumas and Chabot fiercely attacked each other; and finally, on the motion of Lacroix, a fresh deputation was directed to be sent to the Tuileries every half-hour, in order that the Assembly might be kept informed of the state of affairs. Before this evening session closed, Pétion appeared in the Assembly, and with great emotion made a speech, in which he said that the municipality had done its duty and could never be reproached; that the citizens had done only what was right, and that the citizens would never break the law. The words of the agitated mayor were loudly cheered, and it was obvious that, if it should be attempted to call him to account, the Assembly as well as the people would be on his side.

That the course of events which had so greatly humiliated him, and caused him so many insults, appeared to the king no carefully planned demonstration, but only a series of unpremeditated insults, is shown by the fact that he showed no resentment against the leaders of the rising, but only against Pétion and the municipality for not having prevented it. That the actual invasion of the Tuileries was a consequence of the petition of the faubourgs, there can be no real doubt. It is true that it had been rumoured that the people were going to present their petition for the recall of the dismissed ministers, both to the Assembly and to the king; but had not the gate

¹ By far the best account of the events of June 20, 1792, which has been carefully followed, is that given by Mortimer-Ternaux, in his *Histoire de la Terreur*, Paris, 1862-1881, vol. i. bk. ii. pp. 129-223; with a bibliography, vol. i. p. 392. See also Roederer's *Chronique de cinquante jours du 20 Juin jusqu'au 10 Août*, 1792, Paris, 1832; and, for Santerre's part, Carro's *Vie de Santerre*, pp. 111, 112.

of the Place du Carrousel been opened at the critical moment there can be no doubt that the people were going quietly home, tired by their long crush in the Rue Saint Honoré, excited by their defiling through the Assembly, and rejoicing at having seen the beautiful gardens of the Tuileries, and at having shouted "A bas M. Veto!" before the palace windows. No hint of a wish to kill the king has been reported; there was no sign of it in the eyes or mouths of these petitioners,—still less in the gay crowd which accompanied the petitioners now, as they accompanied them on July 17, 1791, merely to see or hear some new thing. In truth a movement organized by men of the type of Santerre and Saint Huruge, Alexandre and Lazouski, was not likely to be a very terrible manifestation. At a later date, these conspirators had at their councils men of stronger will, who did not fear to shed blood,—Danton, Marat, Billaud-Varenne, Anthoine, Carra, and Westermann. Just as the flight to Varennes had failed because of a series of accidents, so was the king's humiliation upon June 20 due to a series of accidents. Had there been some one in authority, such as Santerre, at the further side of the Place du Carrousel when the people entered it, in order to take care that there should be free circulation in the crowd, there would have been no cry to enter the royal palace; and when the royal palace was entered, had there been a Santerre by the side of the king, as there was by the side of the queen, the petitioners might have defiled slowly off. The mob showed its good humour and amenability to authority; and though such violent revolutionists as Legendre dared openly to insult the king, yet most of the petitioners liked looking at him, and feeling that they were saying something rude to one who had been considered for so many years to be made of better clay than themselves, without intending to harm him. The king and queen both seem to have felt this, and therefore no arrests are heard of among the petitioners; but the royal anger showed itself in the treatment of Pétion. On the 21st the mayor, accompanied by Panis and Sergent, entered the council chamber. "How is Paris to-day, Mr. Mayor?" said the king. "Sire," said the

mayor, with a smile, "the people have made their representations to you, and are perfectly satisfied." "Acknowledge, sir, that a great scandal took place yesterday, and that the municipality did not do all that could have been done to prevent it." "Sire, the municipality did all it could, and ought to do. Public opinion will judge it; the municipality does not fear the judgment of the whole nation." "In what situation is the capital at this moment?" continued the king. "Sire, it is calm." "That is not true." The mayor began to reply to this insult, "Sire——" "Be silent," said Louis XVI., and turned his back upon Jérôme Pétion.¹ On the 22nd the king issued a proclamation, in which he severely blamed the commune of the city of Paris. That he was greatly pitied is proved by the innumerable congratulations on his escape which came up from the departments,² and perhaps still more by the promptitude with which the directory of the department of the Seine suspended Pétion himself, and Manuel, the procureur of the commune, who had acquiesced in the proceedings of the mayor.

But sympathy could not help the king to regain his authority. There was but one man who could do that, and that man both king and queen would not entirely trust. Lafayette, from his camp, wrote that he was at once coming to Paris to see what he could do about this unfortunate affair of June 20. There is no doubt that if he had succeeded in restoring the king's power he would himself have become a sort of mayor of the palace, for he would never have given his services for nothing; yet in such extremity as they were, the king and queen might well have accepted the general's services, and trusted to fortune to relieve them of his presence afterwards. Even previous to June 20 considerable excitement had been created in the Assembly by the reading of a letter of Lafayette's on June 16, dated from his camp at Maubeuge. In this letter he condemned in no sparing terms the society of the Jacobins, as a corporation distinct within itself, and

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. ii. pp. 25-36.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. pp. 234, 235.

separated in opinion and feeling from the rest of the country, and he especially denounced Dumouriez and the rest of the Girondin ministers. The letter was impolitic, for it was calculated to arouse irritation, and still more impolitic in that its statements were not correct. The Jacobin Club, instead of forming a corporation distinct from the rest of the country, exactly represented the feeling of the country. That a time came at last when the Jacobin Club did not represent public opinion there can be no doubt; but at present there was no wish for reaction, and the idea of the most energetic men in the country was to press forward. The Jacobin Club could not have obtained its power had it not at one period represented the real, genuine feeling of the country; and when was that period if not now? The letter of Lafayette gave rise to a violent debate, and was finally referred to the committee of twelve—a committee which had been appointed to watch the state of affairs on June 17, and which foreshadowed the great Committee of Public Safety. But the events of June 20 had altered Lafayette's position. It was not that the events of that day had weakened the Jacobins, but they had increased the sympathy of that large mass of the people which goes to no extremes for the king, and which had been fairly won by his brave attitude in a situation of great difficulty. Lafayette perceived this sympathy as clearly as if he had read all the letters from the provinces showing it, and at once determined to go himself to Paris. On June 28 he arrived in the capital, and left his carriage at the house of the president of the directory of the department, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld. He went at once to the Legislative Assembly to offer it "the homage of his respects."¹ He was admitted to the bar, and spoke at length of the letter he had written on the 10th, after which he commented on the events of June 20, and declared that he himself, his officers, and his soldiers formed but one force, with one single thought, that of love for the Constitution and hatred of all factions. He begged the Assembly to pursue and punish the ringleaders of the affair of June 20, and said

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. i. p. 282.

that he would then report to the army his satisfaction with the deputies. "Monsieur," replied the president, who at that time was Stanislas de Girardin, a ci-devant marquis, and the favourite pupil of Rousseau, "the Legislative Assembly has sworn to maintain the Constitution, and will examine your petition." Great was the effect which the arrival of the former commander of the National Guard caused in the Assembly; and the members of the left felt that, unless in some way his popularity with those who sympathized with the king could be destroyed, their power in the Assembly might be seriously weakened. Guadet, with his usual ability, perceived the weak point of Lafayette's proceedings, and at once attacked him for having left his army without leave. No defence could clear the general of this terrible breach of military discipline; and though, on a vote, Guadet's motion was lost by 234 to 339, his reputation received a severe blow from the eloquence of the Girondins. Flushed with his victory, he left the Assembly and drove to the Tuileries. Round his carriage crowded the national guards, who had been utterly disgusted by the behaviour of Ramainvilliers on the previous day, and who, though they had been discontented with Lafayette, and had grumbled at him, yet felt that their position had always been more creditable when under the command of a single general than when the command-in-chief changed from month to month. At the palace the king and queen treated Lafayette politely, but coldly; and to Madame Elisabeth the queen said, "Rather would I perish than be saved by Lafayette and the Constitutionals." Lafayette felt the coldness of his reception, and deliberately threw away the opportunity which was afforded him. A large proportion of the National Guard of Paris, notably the wealthy bourgeois of the Rue Richelieu and the Rue Vivienne and the reactionary journalists, were desirous of closing the Jacobin Club by force, and they collected outside the palace with cries of "Marchons aux Jacobins!" But Lafayette coldly dismissed them,¹ and though the report

¹ *Die Années d'Épreuves pendant la Révolution*, by C. Lacretelle, p. 90. Paris: 1842.

was spread the next day among the National Guard that Lafayette would be happy to close the Jacobins, this was not sufficient to bring the men who had crowded round him on the night of the 28th to his side; and on the 30th, after having been in Paris but forty-eight hours, Lafayette returned to his camp. Once more had he had the power of doing something which might have made his name great; once more his own conceit and vanity induced him not to take advantage of the opportunity afforded him. Truly Lafayette might be called the evil spirit of the dynasty of the Bourbons. By his services in America he had established that union between France and America which necessarily tended to decrease the feeling of attachment to the monarchy in France. With the day of the Bastille his name was associated by his nomination as commandant of the national guards of Paris; and the terrible scenes of October 5 and 6 might have been prevented had he determined to prevent them. The flight to Varennes was probably known by him to be in contemplation; yet he made no effort to stop it. And now he appeared during the last struggle that the monarchical idea was to make in France just before its fall, and from wounded vanity failed to strike a blow. Well indeed might the queen feel that he was the cause of all her evils. It is better to have an avowed enemy than a friend who acts in every way for his own glory, and not for the honour or even the safety of those he professes to serve.

Lafayette had not taken effective advantage of the sympathy which had been won for the king by his courageous attitude; and it is now necessary to trace the gradual evaporation of that sympathy during the famous fifty days which elapsed between June 20 and August 10. The history of these fifty days is one of the most interesting in the whole of the Revolution, for in it every current of feeling grew to its height. During those fifty days the greatest loyalty to the king, the truest fidelity to the Constitution, the most enthusiastic love of France, the most uncompromising hatred to the king, and the most determined opposition to his maintenance of power, all appeared at their very highest; and the progress

of public opinion is marked by three or four days of intense excitement.

It was reserved for Vergniaud, the greatest orator of the Revolutionary period, to strike the first great blow at the passing popularity of the king, by recalling to the minds of the deputies of the Assembly, and, through the publication of his speech, to the minds of all Frenchmen, the suspicion that Louis XVI. was in league with the enemies of France. On July 3 Jean Debry opened a debate upon the state of France, and Vergniaud succeeded him at the tribune. His long speech was devoted to an elaborate attack upon the unfortunate monarch, and the following passage will give some idea of his eloquence: "It is in the *name of the king*," he said, "that the French princes have tried to raise all the courts of Europe against France; it is to vindicate the *dignity of the king* that the treaty of Pillnitz was signed, and the monstrous alliance made between the courts of Vienna and Berlin; it is to *defend the king* that the former companies of the Body-Guard have hurried to Germany to serve beneath the standards of rebellion; it is to come to the *help of the king* that the *émigrés* ask for and obtain employment in the Austrian armies, and get ready to tear the bosom of their fatherland; it is to join these gallant defenders of the *royal prerogative* that other gallants, of the most scrupulous honour, are abandoning their posts in the presence of the enemy, are breaking their oaths, are stealing the military chests, are labouring to corrupt their soldiers, and are thus setting their glory in cowardice, perjury, bribery, theft, and assassination; it is against the nation or the National Assembly alone, and for the maintenance of the *splendour of the throne*, that the King of Hungary and Bohemia is making war upon us, and the King of Prussia marching towards our frontiers; it is in the *name of the king* that liberty is being attacked, and if it should be overthrown, the empire would soon be dismembered to indemnify the allied powers for their expenses; for the generosity of kings is well known, as well as the disinterestedness with which they send their armies to desolate a foreign land, and the extent to which it can be

believed that they would exhaust their treasures to sustain a war which should not be profitable to them. In fine, it is the *name of the king* alone which is the pretext or the cause of all the evils which are being heaped upon our heads, and of all which we have to dread."¹ This is not such an eloquent passage of Vergniaud's great speech as the one in which he attacks the king personally, as the "man whom the generosity of the French people could not move," but it shows clearly how the Girondins strove to destroy the effect of the sympathy felt by the nation for the king, by associating him with the idea of treachery, and making him out to be the cause of the war. The result of the debates in which Vergniaud made this great speech, was the declaration on July 11, upon the motion of Hérault de Séchelles, that "the country was in danger," and the demand for the enrolment of eighty-five thousand volunteers to rush to the frontier.

Though Lafayette had failed to persuade the Assembly to prosecute the ringleaders of the events of June 20, his earnest solicitations to the Duc de la Rochefoucauld had encouraged the directory of the department of the Seine to inquire into the conduct of the mayor and of the procureur of the commune. The question was minutely gone into, and it is from the evidence given before the directory of the department alone that the true history of June 20 can be learned. Unfortunately the directory spent too much time in taking this evidence, and it was not until the evening of July 7, more than a fortnight after the conduct complained of, that the council-general of the department of the Seine announced that it had suspended Pétion and Manuel. At the moment when this news reached the Assembly it had just passed through a peculiar phase which illustrates the tension of men's minds at this particular crisis of the Revolution. In the midst of a serious debate, Lamourette, the author of Mirabeau's speeches on the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, who had been elected Constitutional Bishop of Lyons, suddenly proposed that those

¹ *Les Orateurs de la Legislative et de la Convention*, by F. A. Aulard, vol. i. pp. 326, 327. Paris: 1886.

"who loathe and hate the idea of a republic, and of two chambers, should rise." "Let us swear," he said, "to have but one spirit and one sentiment; let us form ourselves into one and the same mass of free men, equally terrible to the spirit of anarchy and the spirit of feudalism. The moment in which the foreigner sees that we in this Assembly wish for one thing only, and that we wish it unanimously, will be the moment when liberty will triumph and France will be saved." The young deputies were seized with indescribable enthusiasm. Deputies of the right and of the left rose from their seats; and those who had before opposed each other, now kissed each other with the kiss of Lamourette. Dumas sat by Merlin, Jaucourt by Basire, Albitte by Ramond; Gensonné shook hands with Calvet, Chabot with Genty; while Pastoret and Condorcet, who that very morning had been abusing each other in their respective journals, fell into each other's arms. The king then arrived, and amidst cries of "Vive le Roi!" the Assembly appeared to be seized with a fever of loyalty.¹ After this theatrical performance, arrived the news of the suspension of Pétion and Manuel. It must not be forgotten, whether in looking at the pathetic or the laughable side of this demonstration, that the Assembly consisted chiefly of very young men, and that the strong men of each party did not possess seats there. Certainly it is impossible to imagine Robespierre embracing the Vicomte de Mirabeau, or Danton shaking hands with D'Esprémesnil. But these men of fixed principles were either at Coblenz, cursing the Revolution, or sitting at the Jacobins' and the Soleil d'Or, preparing for the final onslaught on the monarchy. The king declared his determination to maintain the suspension of the mayor of Paris, whom he considered, and rightly, as accountable for the insults he had received on June 20. Thuriot defended Pétion; and during the debate, on July 10, the news arrived that the unfortunate king had been deserted by the friends of Lafayette, and that the ministers in a body had resigned, and only consented to hold office till their successors were appointed. On July 13

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, vol. ii. p. 34.

the Assembly had the audacity to decree that the suspension of the mayor and the procureur-syndic of Paris was null and void by its own authority, and the king, abandoned by his ministers, actually consented to sign the decree of the Assembly.

On another question the Assembly had practically annulled the veto of the king. He had resolved that the camp of twenty thousand fédérés should not be assembled beneath the walls of Paris; but the Assembly decreed that there should be a Feast of Federation as usual on July 14, in honour of the capture of the Bastille, and the king was obliged to consent. All sides alike felt that the conduct of these fédérés would decide which party would for the present gain the upper hand. The king tried to prevent them from coming up in any number;¹ the Girondins hoped to excite their patriotism; while the Jacobins, who knew men better than the king or the Girondins, made great preparations for entertaining them. On July 14 the Feast of the Federation took place, but it cannot be compared in importance with the great Federation of 1790, for the deputations from Marseilles and the south had not arrived, and not more than three thousand fédérés were present in all. The official ceremony showed the decline of loyalty. The king sat alone and neglected on the left of the president of the Assembly, quiet prevailed, and not a cry of "Vive le Roi!" was to be heard.² The declaration that the country was in danger had not caused much excitement; but on the 22nd and 23rd of July, a week after the assembling of the fédérés, its results were to be seen in Paris. In every square in the city a platform was raised, with a municipal officer seated at the head of a table; and, amidst the sound of artillery and the cheering of the people, young men—aye, and fathers of families—rushed to offer themselves as soldiers, and to swear that they would go to the front. As each volunteer took the oath

¹ See particularly Pollio and Marcel's *Bataillon du 10 Août*, pp. 139 and 159.

² See the account in the *Annales patriotiques* of Carra and Mercier, quoted in an article "*Le 14 Juillet, 1792*," by J. C. Colfavru in the *Révolution Française* for July, 1883.

he moved out to the Champ de Mars, where a large camp was established, which was soon filled with young Parisians. Then men waited. Sympathy with the king was fast disappearing. The Girondins were undecided, and the Jacobins planned openly and without concealment a final blow, involving the capture of the Tuileries, and the deposition of the king.

For the moment everything was quiet. But Paris knew that it was dancing on a volcano. The fédérés were still lounging in the streets, or drinking in the cafés, waiting for the arrival of the Marseillais; the Parisian volunteers in the Champ de Mars were murmuring that they would not leave the capital until they knew that the traitors behind them would not take advantage of their absence. Amidst all this excitement the king had no one on whom he could rely. He could with difficulty find new ministers, and they were men of no weight or importance. But their loyalty was unquestioned, and for that reason their names deserve to be mentioned. They were Bigot de Sainte Croix, Champion de Villeneuve, Leroux de Laville, De Joly, D'Abancourt, and Dubouchage. The directory of the department of the Seine had been discredited by the supersession of the suspension of Pétion. The mayor was not only not trying to check the revolutionary meetings which were taking place, but actually encouraging them; and lastly, the national guards, who should have controlled the revolutionary spirit, were walking about in disconsolate groups, not trusting their monthly commander-in-chief, disgusted with the behaviour of Lafayette, and determined, like the bourgeois they represented, to allow any movement of revolution to go on as long as it threatened only the king or certain individuals, and seemed likely to spare themselves, their wives, their children, and their shops. Upon this waiting Paris, the news of the declaration of war by the King of Prussia on July 25, and the text of the Duke of Brunswick's proclamation, came like a thunderbolt. The war with Prussia was not unexpected, but the severe terms of Brunswick's manifesto caused the greatest indignation. That prince was well known for his enlightened rule of his prin-

ciality and as a favourite of Frederick the Great, and had been supposed to be friendly to France—so much so that the journalist Carra had proposed him, as he afterwards suggested the Duke of York, as a fitting successor to Louis XVI. The manifesto was not, however, the work of Brunswick, and he afterwards declared that the most violent passage in it was added after he had affixed his signature. The youthful Francis had been crowned Emperor at Frankfort on July 14, the very day of the Federation, and after an interview with Mallet du Pan, the accredited envoy of the Tuileries, had joined Frederick William at Mayence four days afterwards to draw up the plan of campaign against France. Mallet du Pan had advised the issue of a proclamation to the French people, and one drawn up by an émigré, named De Limon, a friend of Calonne, was accepted, and, after some revision by the Prussian and Austrian ministers, was issued in the name of the Duke of Brunswick, as general commanding the allied armies. The manifesto was most violent in its terms, threatening any city which resisted with the fullest rigours of war, and declaring that Paris should be totally destroyed if any harm happened to the king or queen. This impolitic manifesto sealed the fate of the royal family, and made the bourgeois and the National Guard of Paris ready to acquiesce in the overthrow of the monarchy, which the Jacobin leaders were busily preparing.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TENTH OF AUGUST, AND THE MASSACRES OF SEPTEMBER.

Preparations for insurrection—The Girondins make overtures to the court—The King rejects plans of escape—The Jacobins win over the fédérés—The directory of insurrection—Arrival of the Marseillais—The song of the “Marseillaise”—Preparations for the insurrection—The petitions of the sections—The sections at the Hôtel de Ville—Final arrangements for the defence of the Tuileries—Mandat murdered at the Hôtel de Ville—Santerre marches on the Tuileries—The king goes to the Assembly—Attack on the Tuileries—Murder of the Swiss Guards—The debate in the Assembly—The king at the convent of the Feuillants—A national convention summoned—Lafayette protests and deserts—Girondins and Jacobins—The state of Paris—The elections in Paris—The massacres in the prisons of Paris—Massacres in the provinces—The massacre at Versailles.

It is impossible to discover on what precise day, during the interval of the fifty days between June 20 and August 10, 1792, the Jacobins decided that an attack should be made on the Tuileries and the royalty finally overthrown, but the first meeting of the “Secret Directory of Insurrection,” in which the measures to be adopted were discussed, did not take place till July 26. What, then, was the king doing, and still more, what was the Assembly doing, during this period? The two chief questions which agitated them were, as has been said, the behaviour of Lafayette and the federation of July; and the sequel of the history of these two subjects will throw much light on the organization of the most important day of the Revolution. Lafayette’s hasty return to his camp had

greatly weakened the power of the National Guard in Paris, and from that time his friends in the Assembly felt that in defending the general they were defending a man who had politically destroyed himself. The question as to what right he had to leave his camp had been referred, on the motion of Guadet, to the committee which was charged to watch over the public safety. This committee had been increased from twelve to eighteen, and finally to twenty-one members, and distinctly foreshadowed the Committee of Public Safety. The majority of the committee, like the majority of the Assembly, was really Feillant in sentiment; but those members who were perfectly willing to vote with the Feillants when the voting was secret,¹ were generally induced by fear not to openly oppose the measures of the Jacobins. The report was brought up on July 19 by a Feillant, Muraire, who was afterwards President of the Court of Appeal under the empire, and completely absolved Lafayette, on the ground that there was no law in the Constitution forbidding a general to leave his camp, and that therefore Lafayette had broken no law. But the left of the Assembly were not likely to be satisfied with this excuse, and on July 21 the general was again attacked by Lasource and Torné, the constitutional bishop of Bourges, and he was afterwards publicly denounced by Guadet, who declared that he had heard Lückner say that Lafayette had wished him to move his troops upon Paris. To this accusation Bureaux de Pusy, the ex-Constituant, and now an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, replied on July 28, and the general on the 30th sent a letter to the Assembly utterly denying the charge. The feeling on the part both of Girondins and Jacobins, which made them attack Lafayette so unsparingly, was that they thought he had sufficient reputation to unite the bourgeois in opposition to the progress of the Revolution; and that they were right in their opinion is shown by the fact that on August 8, after Debry had declared there were grounds for accusing Lafayette, the Assembly refused to condemn him by 406 votes to 224, showing a majority of nearly two to one in

¹ Mathieu Dumas' *Souvenirs*, vol. ii. p. 399.

his favour. Though the majority were thus evidently willing to make every allowance for the general, and to excuse his behaviour, the leaders of the right in the Assembly began to resign their seats and desert their friend. Jaucourt, for instance, the former colonel of the dragoons of Condé, and Daverhoults resigned their seats in the Assembly on July 24 and 26. The leaders of the right, therefore, showed no confidence in their own power or their own cause, and left those deputies who would have supported them to be dragged against their will into consenting to the measures, not only of the Girondins, but of the more extreme Jacobins.

The Girondins felt that it was necessary to make a strenuous effort if power was to fall into their hands; and they tried to strengthen themselves in two distinct directions. On the one side the Girondin leaders hoped to deserve well of France by hurrying on all the preparations for war; and it was on the motion of Vergniaud that, on July 24, volunteers were summoned from all parts of France and directed towards the frontier. These volunteers were not to be subjected to the ordinary rules of martial discipline, and were to elect the whole of their officers; and amongst them were many men who were to win their greatest fame in the military history of the Republic. Moreau was elected commandant of the first battalion of the volunteers of the Ille et Vilaine, Jourdan commandant of the second battalion of the Haute Vienne, Davout commandant of the third battalion of the Yonne, Soult instructor to the first battalion of the Haut-Rhin, Pichegru commandant of the first battalion of the Gard, and Masséna commandant of the second battalion of the Var. But besides trying to increase their popularity by patriotic energy, the leading Girondins bethought them of trying to make their influence felt in the Tuileries itself, and on July 29 a memoir was drawn up and signed by the chief Girondin leaders, Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud, which was sent in to the king by the painter Boze, who was an intimate friend of the king's valet Thierry.

This memoir was drawn up by the great orator Vergniaud,

whose eloquence had done so much to weaken the position of the king, and deserves to be compared, from its perspicuity and its statesmanlike power, to the state papers of Mirabeau. "The king is surrounded," he wrote in the spirit of his speech of July 3, "by persons whose affections are all centred on Coblenz; must it not be believed that he shares their feelings? . . . All the faults of his agents are disastrous to liberty; is it not natural to attribute them to a secret combination with our foreign enemies? Our means of defence are weak; they might be all-powerful; our battalions are numerous but scattered, and with plenty of soldiers we have no army. Who is the natural subject of all fears and murmurs? Surely it is the man in whose name war is being waged against us, and who nevertheless disposes our military forces as he likes best; the man, to whose authority our defeats would be profitable, and who for that very reason is presumed to be more interested in our reverses than our successes. He has been cruelly deceived, if he has been made to believe that all his duty is to obey the laws of the Constitution. Not to violate the Constitution is nothing. His oaths impose upon him also the obligation to defend it; and he would betray it none the less by a system of inaction than by a formal understanding with the allied powers. These would be equal crimes in the eyes of the nation, and would be judged with the same rigour. Perhaps the king thinks there is courage in braving these suspicions, and dignity in shutting himself up in profound silence. When these accusations are the cry of the people, it is neither great nor magnanimous to keep silence; silence is rather an acknowledgment of the faults of which he is accused, or an evidence of most insolent pride towards the supreme accuser. True glory, then, demands that he should justify himself by conspicuous deeds, or solemn proceedings. I would add that it is not only the security and the crown of the king which is my subject here, but the safety of the country, and that the country has the right to exact that Louis XVI. should do for it what a sentiment of false dignity might prevent him from doing for his own sake." Vergniaud then recommends that

the king should declare that he would never separate from the Assembly, that he should select well-known patriots to be his ministers instead of nonentities, and that he should summon some of the best-known of the ex-Constituants, such as Roederer and Pétion, to his council, though without office. "I do not know," wrote he in conclusion, "if I am deluding myself, but I am persuaded that at the moment in which the king's council should be thus reinforced, the fears of treason would decrease, a hope that the ministry would show some vigour would be developed, the constitutional throne would rise above the cloud of accusations which throw a shade upon its glory, and that the general approval would be the prelude of a sincere agreement between the executive power and the citizens, which alone can, in my opinion, enable us to carry on the war with some success, and save France from perhaps a half-century of calamities. I close my letter; it is only too long, since it will be useless. My heart is oppressed with the deepest sorrow."¹ This letter shows clearly enough the incapacity of the leading Girondins for practical politics; for it was at the hands of Vergniaud,* Guadet and Gensonné that the monarchy had received its heaviest blows, and yet Vergniaud, who by his speech of July 3 had destroyed the sympathy felt for the king, now showed a desire to keep him in power. It is hardly necessary to add that the king paid no attention to his advice, and that the Girondin leaders remained helplessly watching the growth of the movement which was to overthrow the constitutional monarchy.

Meanwhile what were the prisoners in the Tuileries doing? The king, discouraged by the failure of the flight to Varennes, was passively waiting for martyrdom, and showing all the virtues of a martyr. Plans innumerable were concocted for his escape, but the queen would accept none of them. Madame de Staël proposed a similar scheme to the flight to Varennes, in which she was to play the chief part, but was coldly refused; and Gouverneur Morris, who succeeded Jefferson as Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at Paris in

¹ Vatel's *Vergniaud*, pp. 121-125.

May, 1792, received large sums of money¹ from the court to carry out a plan of Terrier de Monciel and Bertrand de Moleville to buy up some of the Jacobin fédérés, and especially the Marseillais, to manage the king's escape. Better devised was the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt's scheme. He was governor of Rouen, and popular there; the city of Rouen was in a prosperous state, and hated the Jacobins, and was but ten hours' journey from Paris; the Swiss regiment of Salis-Samade in garrison there was loyal, and the cavalry regiment of Royal Cravate, when appealed to, was eager to save the king, and shouted "À Paris!"² The king, who was always fond of Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, looked with favour on this scheme, and three hundred of the Swiss Guards were cantoned along the road to Rouen to cover his escape.³ But the queen opposed this scheme, because she hated the duke, and remarked to Bertrand de Moleville that she would never place herself in the hands of the Constitutionalists.⁴ Lafayette hoped also to become once more the saviour of the king, and wished him to escape to Compiègne, where Alexandre de Lameth was in command of two regiments of chasseurs, within easy distance of Lafayette's army. The Marquis de Puysegur's answer to Mathieu Dumas, who had made himself very active in this scheme of Lafayette's, gives the keynote to the refusal of the royal family to leave Paris. "Never, never," he said, "shall Lafayette become High Constable, and the royal family and the fate of France be placed in his hands. The queen is obstinately opposed to the scheme, and Madame Elisabeth advises against it from religious motives. The Baron de Vioménil, whose assurance and intrepidity you know well, undertakes, with the Swiss Guards alone, not only to defend the palace, but to drive back to their faubourgs all that canaille in insurrection, which could have been so easily dissipated, if

¹ *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, by Jared Sparks, p. 378. Boston: 1832.

² Lacretelle, *Deux Années d'Épreuves pendant la Révolution*, pp. 95-102.

³ Pfyffer d'Altishofen's *Récit de la conduite des Gardes Suisses*, p. 7.

⁴ Bertrand de Moleville's *Mémoires particulières*, vol. ii. p. 132. Paris: 1816.

it had been once decided to act with vigour.”¹ This is the reason why the plans not only of Vergniaud, but of Rochefoucauld-Liancourt and Lafayette, had been rejected; the queen had determined to fight, and the royalist courtiers about her had convinced her that armed resistance to the populace in Paris might be successful.

The last struggle with royalty was now distinctly decided upon. Jacobins of all sorts, Danton, Marat, and Robespierre, felt that until the king fell the country would be divided and order could not be re-established; and very steadily and determinedly did the leading Jacobins set about their work of organizing a revolt which should terminate in the destruction of royalty. A “Secret Directory of Insurrection” was formed from among the subordinate Jacobins, in which, however, none of the leaders just mentioned sat, though they were cognizant of all the plans. This directory had developed from the central committee of the fédérés then in Paris, who had appointed five of their number to formulate a plan of insurrection, and these five had added to their number ten of the informal committee which had prepared the rising of June 20. Saint Huruge was in prison at Péronne for abusing old Marshal Lückner.² But his place was ably filled. Prominent among the members of the secret directory were Jean Louis Carra, the journalist, Santerre, Alexandre, Antoine, the ex-Constituant, Lazouski, the commandant of the gunners of Saint-Marceau, and Westermann—a man of great personal strength, and an ex-dragoon, who had been a clerk in the courts of Haguenau, and was now a very intimate friend of Danton. Danton himself made no further objection to a great day in Paris for the overthrow of royalty. The excitement of men’s minds, both in Paris and in France, was hindering due attention being paid to what was, according to him, the great question of the Revolution, how to make head against the enemies of France on the frontier. The first attempt at insurrection was in connec-

¹ Mathieu Dumas’ *Souvenirs*, vol. ii. p. 351.

² *Sainte-Huruge*, by Victor Fournel, in *Revue de la Révolution* for December, 1865, p. 423.

tion with a civic banquet which was given on the Place de la Bastille, to the fédérés on July 26. Many citizens of the poorer classes brought their own suppers to the banquet; and, after a big feast, it was proposed that an advance on the Tuileries should be made, and the tocsin was rung. But the time was not yet ripe. The national guards had not yet recognized that, for their own safety, and to maintain a reputation for patriotism, they must not interfere with the progress of the revolt, enthusiasm was not aroused, the Marseillais had not arrived, and therefore the festival concluded without any demonstration.

Far more important was the scheme fixed for July 30. On that day the battalion of Marseillais which had been so long expected entered Paris. This battalion has been described by every historian as a collection of the vagabonds who are always to be found in a great seaport town, and particularly in one like Marseilles, where food was cheap and lodging unnecessary. But their character has lately been vindicated,¹ and it has been shown that these Marseillais were picked men from the national guards of Marseilles, like the other fédérés, and contained the most hardy as well as the most revolutionary men of the city. This battalion had been raised at Marseilles by the voluntary enrolment of national guards, in consequence of a letter received from Charles Barbaroux, asking for the despatch of 500 men, who "knew how to die," to form part of the reserve of 20,000 men proposed by Servan. They left Marseilles 513 strong, with two guns, on July 2, and had been marching slowly across France, singing the immortal war-song to which they gave their name. On their arrival at Charenton on July 29 they were met by Barbaroux, the old secretary-general of the National Guard of Marseilles, who was now a frequenter of the salon of Madame Roland; and under his conduct the battalion marched into Paris on July 30. The very words of their famous song might serve to show the king that the men who were about to fight "the accomplices of

¹ *La Bataillon du 10 Août. Recherches pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution française*, by Joseph Pollio and Adrien Marcel. Paris: 1881.

Bouillé," as they termed the enemy on the frontier, were equally determined to attack him whom they regarded as the most dangerous accomplice of them all. The day of their entrance had been fixed by the secret directory for the great attempt, but Santerre, who had promised to meet the Marseillais with all the men of Saint-Antoine, and to march at once on the Tuileries, only brought 250 men with him, and the first singing of the "Marseillaise" in Paris was not immediately followed by the overthrow of the king.

The "Marseillaise" had in itself no very radical history. On April 24, 1792, just after the declaration of war, the mayor of Strasbourg, Dietrich, who was himself no advanced republican, but a constitutionalist, remarked at a great banquet that it was very sad that all the national war songs of France could not be sung by her present defenders, because they all treated of loyalty to the king and not to the nation as well. One of the guests was a young captain of engineers, Rouget de Lisle, who had in 1791 composed a successful *Hymne à la Liberté*, and Dietrich appealed to him to compose something suitable. The young man was struck by the notion, and during the night he was suddenly inspired with both words and air, and on the following day he sang over to Dietrich's guests the famous song which was to be the war-song of the French Republic. Madame Dietrich arranged the air for the orchestra; Rouget de Lisle dedicated it to Marshal Lückner, as the *Chant de guerre pour l'armée du Rhin*, and it at once became popular in Strasbourg. Neither Dietrich nor Rouget were advanced republicans. The watchword of the famous song was not "Sauvons la République," but "Sauvons la Patrie." The air was a taking one. From Strasbourg it quickly spread over the south of France, and particularly attracted the patriots of Marseilles.¹

¹ There are many legends on the origin of the "Marseillaise;" the account here followed is that given by Amedée Rouget de Lisle, the author's nephew, in his *La vérité sur la paternité de la Marseillaise*, Paris, 1865, which is confirmed by a letter of Madame Dietrich's, written at the time, and first published in *Souvenirs d'Alsace—Rouget de Lisle à Strasbourg et à Huningue*, by Adolphe Morpain.

Singing this song, then, which of itself breathed no hatred to the king, the Marseillais marched into the city of Paris. After going to the Hôtel de Ville to cheer Pétion, they were conducted by some of the leading Jacobins to the Champs Elysées, where a banquet had been prepared for them. Not far off, some grenadiers and officers of the battalion of the national guards of the Filles Saint Thomas were having a festival, and as both parties left the Champs Elysées a dispute arose between them, and the adjutant of the battalion, named Duhamel, was murdered by the people. The whole battalion instantly pursued their enemies, and there was danger of a violent combat in the streets of Paris, which might have ended in an attack on the Tuileries itself. Fortunately the Marseillais were separated from their opponents; Merlin de Thionville prevented them from hurting two ex-Constituants, Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely and Moreau de Saint Mery, who had fallen into their hands; Santerre stopped the pursuit; and all that came of the riot were deputations from both parties to the National Assembly, to maintain their own blamelessness. Pétion, at the bidding both of the Assembly and of the directory of the department, hurried to where the Marseillais were standing excited after their dispute, and got them safely away to their barracks in the Chaussée d'Antin, where they finished their banquet under the presidency of Santerre.¹

These riots only proved that, to be effectual, the day which was to overthrow the monarchy must be more carefully organized, and to this effect Camille Desmoulins, Carra, and certain others of the directory of insurrection prepared a plan of revolt on August 4 which should be successful; and Westermann, the friend of Danton, was entrusted with the arrangement of the details of the actual fighting. There was no disguise about the meetings of the directory at the Soleil d'Or, the Cadran Bleu, and in Antoine's lodgings in the Rue Saint Honoré. Every one in Paris, from the king to the poorest street-boy, knew that a great revolt was being planned. To be effectual,

¹ Pollio and Marcel's *Bataillon du 10 Août*, chap. viii. pp. 192-217.

good reasons must be given for the outbreak of the revolt; every attempt must be made to secure the neutrality of the National Guard, and success must be made a certainty. To accomplish this, two chief measures were adopted by the Jacobins. It has been said that it was the duty of the primary assembly of the sections of Paris to break up as soon as their elections were completed; but on July 25, on the motion of Thuriot, leave was given to them to sit *en permanence* to regulate the enrolment of volunteers, and any section might draw up a petition on any subject it pleased. The more Jacobin sections of Paris took advantage of this, and on July 31 the section Mauconseil drew up a petition to the Assembly, praying for the immediate dethronement of the king as a traitor to the country. This was not the first mention of dethronement in the Assembly, for, on the 23rd, Choudieu, a Radical deputy, had read a petition from Angers, dated the 18th, in these few words, "Legislators, Louis XVI. has betrayed the nation, the law, and his oath. The people is sovereign; you are its representatives. Pronounce his dethronement, and France will be saved."¹ Even in the Assembly the same idea was under discussion, and on July 26 Brissot carried a motion that the committee of twenty-one should examine and report what acts should lead to dethronement, and whether the king was not guilty of committing them. The section Mauconseil sent its decree round to the other forty-seven sections of Paris, asking them their opinion. Fourteen of the sections out of the thirty-nine whose records are extant agreed to the petition, while sixteen rejected it. The others made no reply, and it may well be believed that they were willing to watch the course of events, and to be on the side of the majority. If the king's confidence could be augmented by the number of sections which showed a respect for royalty, he must have been undeceived by studying their names, for, without exception, all the most populous districts of Paris agreed to the petition of Mauconseil, and those which adhered to the principle of royalty

¹ Bougler, *Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire en Anjou*, compiled chiefly from the unpublished memoirs of Choudieu.

were those of the wealthy bourgeois, who were not likely to be able to do much if they tried to stem a popular revolution. Among those who agreed might be noted the sections of Quinze-Vingts and Lombards, both in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, and of Gravilliers, Théâtre Français, Luxembourg, and Gobelins on the other side of the river; while among those nearest the Tuileries itself, the sections of the Louvre and of the Place Vendôme adhered to it. The sections which still maintained the principle of monarchy were those of Central Paris, such as the Isle Saint Louis and Henri IV.; those of the Champs Elysées and the Arsenal, representing the wealthy residents of Paris; and those of the Place Louis XIV. and Montreuil, containing the richest shops. Only one poor district can be noted, that of Popincourt in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, and the conduct of the national guards and inhabitants of this section on August 10 belied their rejection of the decree of Mauconseil. The Jacobins of Paris saw pretty well how far they could expect support. Since the municipality, which had been elected in the previous year, did not show any tendency to fresh progress in revolution, it was determined to extinguish its authority by uniting the commissioners of the different sections at the Hôtel de Ville. Among these commissioners were many of the most advanced Revolutionists of the period, and they were permitted, by the weakness of the municipality and the countenance of Pétion, to sit in the hall of the Hôtel de Ville, close to the chamber in which the municipality itself used to meet. Though none of the chief leaders who afterwards figured in the Revolutionary commune of Paris sat at first among these commissioners, there were enough extreme men to do the work which was set for them. Santerre and the members of the insurrectionary directory had too serious work on their hands to waste their time at the Hôtel de Ville, but they felt sure that it would go well, as Huguenin, the orator of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, was president, and Tallien secretary of the united commissioners. Lhuillier, who was afterwards procureur-general-syndic of the department of the Seine, Bernard, the first priest who married,

Rossignol, the future general, and Leonard Bourdon, an usher in a school, who was afterwards to play a great part in the Convention, met and discussed the state of affairs in the Hôtel de Ville with much fervour; but their time was not yet come; and before they did anything of importance it was necessary for them to be certain of the capture of the Tuileries, and to wait for further orders.

Having provided a meeting-place for the representatives of the twenty-eight sections which were most inclined to violent measures, and which had sent their commissioners to the Hôtel de Ville, the directory of insurrection now turned its attention to the National Guard. The conduct of the National Guard on June 20 encouraged them with the hope that they would not fire on the people; but the behaviour of certain battalions was doubtful. It must be remembered in discussing the conduct of the National Guard on August 10 that, although there had been since 1790 only forty-eight sections in Paris, many of which had adopted strange names, the National Guard was still formed of sixty battalions, which bore the title of their old districts. The sections had often protested against this arrangement, but the Constituent Assembly had maintained it in order that each section should not have an organized battalion at its command. The conduct of the most bourgeois battalions of the National Guard, and especially of those of the Filles Saint Thomas and the Petits Pères, was very doubtful, and the leading Jacobins therefore managed to strengthen those of the populous sections on which they could depend, by a decree passed on August 1 on the motion of Carnot. By this decree it was resolved that, since France was at war, no distinction should be made among those who wished to serve their country, and that all citizens, passive as well as active, might enter the ranks of the National Guard, and that the new members were to be armed with pikes, until arms could be served out to them. The result of this decree was that the battalions in the Faubourgs Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau were largely reinforced by members of the mob, armed with pikes, who made a formidable addition to the strength

of the corps. Having, then, provided for a central power at the Hôtel de Ville, and for the weakening of the National Guard, the secret directory of insurrection set to work on the actual preparations for the outbreak.

First of all it was publicly announced by the sections of Quinze-Vingts and Mauconseil that if on August 9 the Assembly did not agree to the petition of Mauconseil, the tocsin should be rung at midnight, the alarm gun fired, and that on August 10 a new petition would be presented to the Assembly, backed up by the armed force of the sections demanding the dethronement of the king. As upon June 20 the two chief bands of petitioners were to come from the Faubourg Saint Marceau and the Faubourg Saint Antoine, were to meet upon the quays, and march down to the Assembly. To support these columns the Marseillais were moved to the church of the Cordeliers in the Faubourg Saint Marceau on August 4, and some Brestois to the Faubourg Saint Antoine. But they were not only to present the petition, but to overthrow the king; and the commissioners of the Hôtel de Ville were to be ready to take all responsibility on themselves, while Pétion was to be prevented from interfering by a guard of six hundred men. Pétion was quite willing to be prevented, and anxiously looked out on the morning of the 10th for the arrival of his guard. Sergent and Panis, the commissioners of the police of Paris, then ordered five thousand ball cartridges to be served out to the Marseillais, while they refused the request of Mandat to serve out ball cartridges to the royalist battalions of the National Guard, and all was ready. The Assembly, as was expected, adjourned the question of dethronement, and the last meeting of the secret directory was held at Santerre's on the evening of August 9, at which Danton and Camille Desmoulins, assisted, and final arrangements were made, after which beer was served out to the inhabitants of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, who were ordered to illuminate their houses, and who greatly enjoyed themselves with dancing and singing in the streets of the faubourg. At midnight the tocsin was rung; and at eight in the morning, after a visit to the Hôtel de Ville, where

Pétion, to his great delight, was made a prisoner, Westermann prepared to lead the main columns to the Place du Carrousel.

All these measures were perfectly well known¹ to every one in Paris, and the king himself was aware that at midnight on August 9 the tocsin would be rung, and that his palace would be attacked early next morning. He therefore summoned to him his ministers, together with the procureur-general-syndic Roederer and the other members of the directory of the department of the Seine, Mandat, the commandant-general of the National Guard for the month, and, finally, Pétion the mayor of Paris. With smiling face, Pétion declared that the rising would all end in smoke, and that there was no need for alarm. The king was disgusted at his behaviour, and the mayor was soon glad of an excuse to go down to the gardens of the Tuileries, where he walked up and down with Roederer and Mandat, discussing the coming events. Roederer, on the evening of the 9th, entered the Assembly, and reported to the members what they all knew, that since the question of dethronement was adjourned the tocsin was to be rung at midnight, and that a serious riot was expected in Paris. Pétion was then summoned by some friendly deputies, and asked if due preparation had been made to control the coming insurrection. He answered that everything was in most perfect order, and slipped quietly home to the mairie. His escape was only announced to the king and queen when his empty carriage rolled out of the court of the Tuileries. Far more important were the military dispositions which were made by Mandat for the defence of the Tuileries, with the assistance of the Baron de Vioménil and M. d'Hervilly.

Their measures were well and ably taken. They relied chiefly upon the known fidelity of the King's Swiss Guards. These faithful soldiers had been ordered to leave Paris by a decree of the Assembly on July 17, but they had not been sent

¹ For the events of August 10, the account given by Mortimer-Ternaux in his *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. ii. pp. 213-269, has been mainly followed, but corrected in many details by the narrative given in Pollio and Marcel's most valuable *Bataillon du 10 Août*.

further than to their barracks at Rueil and Courbevoie, and on August 8, in expectation of the revolt, the Minister of War, Franqueville d'Abancourt, had ordered the whole of them, to the number of nearly eight hundred,¹ to march to the Tuileries. Round the king also had assembled many of his personal friends, some two hundred in all; and a battalion of national guards was, as usual, on duty in the palace. Mandat's special preparations had been to concentrate in the gardens of the Tuileries twelve of his most faithful battalions, to whom, however, he was unable to serve out more than one round of ball cartridge, and even these picked battalions did not, according to Durler, turn out more than two thousand strong. But his chief attention had been turned to the manœuvre by which the rioters of June 20 had been successful. He determined to separate the two great insurrectionary faubourgs by strongly occupying the bridges; and had, in addition, stationed a reserve of gunners of the National Guard at the Pont Neuf, where the alarm gun was, under the command of Captain Robert, who was given strict orders on no account to leave his guns, or to allow the men of Saint Marceau to cross the river. Mandat had also ordered five battalions of the National Guard to concentrate at the Hôtel de Ville, in order that they might fall upon the rear of the column advancing from the Faubourg Saint Antoine at the same time that the Swiss charged it in front. Mandat had been, previous to the Revolution, a captain in the Gardes Françaises, and now gave proof by these dispositions of distinct military ability. His measures having been well taken, Mandat remained quietly with the king and his ministers and awaited the course of events; while the Assembly met as usual and began discussing indifferent topics, though the minds of the members present were occupied with thoughts of the coming insurrection.

At one o'clock in the dead of night, Danton and Camille

¹ The number of the Swiss at the Tuileries on August 10 has been variously stated, but the MS. *Relation* of Captain de Durler settles the question, and fixes the amount at "à peu près 800 hommes y compris la Garde Ordinaire du Roi."

Desmoulins, who lived in the same house in the Place Théâtre Français, came home. Madame Danton and Lucile Desmoulins had been waiting up for them, and perceived they were quite exhausted. Danton, who had been vigorously haranguing the Marseillais in the neighbouring church of the Cordeliers, at once threw himself upon his bed, while Camille slept on Lucile's shoulder.¹ Everything was now in readiness on both sides; every one knew the struggle was coming, but only one side was confident of success. Danton, in particular, could do no more. He was no soldier, and had left the military arrangements in the hands of Westermann, but he was to be called early in the morning, in order that he might go down to the commissioners of the sections at the Hôtel de Ville, and take the lead with Robespierre in establishing the new authorities which were to succeed the monarchy. Many a time have these chief leaders been accused of cowardice on August 10, but it was not for them to mix in the actual fighting, and they were bound to keep themselves fresh for the discussions of the next day, which would give the direction to the future course of the Revolution.

It is now necessary to turn to the session of the commissioners of the sections at the Hôtel de Ville, for it was their task to destroy the effects of Mandat's arrangements, and to make the conquest of the Tuileries as far as possible an easy achievement. Their first aim was to upset Mandat's scheme for preventing the junction of the rioters of the two faubourgs by the occupation of the bridges. For this purpose, at one o'clock in the morning, Osselin, accompanied by two other members of the municipality, went down to the Pont Neuf with an order from the municipality, which had been extracted by the representatives of the sections, that the guns should be removed from their threatening position. Captain Robert refused to obey, and exhorted his men to stand by their guns. But these gunners were old Gardes Françaises, and at a few words from Osselin they disobeyed their officers and drew their guns to one side, and the alarm gun was then fired. In spite

¹ *Camille et Lucile Desmoulins*, p. 199, by Jules Claretie.

of the certainty of insurrection the king remained quiet till past daybreak in the palace, and at six o'clock, at the instance of Mandat, he went down to the gardens of the Tuileries and addressed the national guards, who shouted "Vive le Roi!" and seemed inclined to be faithful to him. But the gunners even of these faithful battalions cried instead "Vive la Nation!" and there were indications of a violent dispute between them and the infantry, which was only appeased by their being told that the king and the nation were one.¹ The queen and the royal family began to recover some of their equanimity when the night passed and no sign of the insurgents appeared. At half-past six they became so confident in their safety that when an order came from the municipality, signed by Pétion, requesting the immediate presence of Mandat, the king told that officer to do his duty and to go down to the Hôtel de Ville.

When he arrived there, he entered the hall of the council-general, where he was ordered to say why he had placed the guns on the Pont Neuf instead of allowing them to remain with the different sections, and further, why he had taken such measures for the preservation of the peace. After various other useless questions he was dismissed, but as he was going quietly from the Hôtel de Ville, he was seized by two commissioners of the sections and dragged into their midst. His reception by this informal committee was very different. He was asked why he had ordered up the whole of the Swiss Guards, and was then told to sign an order immediately for their removal to barracks, which he nobly refused to do. He was asked how many troops there were in the Tuileries, and alleging his duty as a soldier he refused to say. After similar questions the informal committee suspended him from his functions, and appointed Santerre provisional commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Paris, and he left the Hôtel de Ville a disgraced man. As he came down the steps some one in the crowd shouted, "A bas Mandat! Vive Santerre!" A

¹ Durler's *MS. Relation*; Pfyffer d'Altishofen, in his *Récit*, says that it was Durler himself who appeased this dispute with this remark; but Durler attributes it to "*leurs chefs*."

shot was fired at him, and he was immediately cut down and murdered by a crowd of noisy ruffians who were hanging about on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville. With Mandat's death any slight hope there might have been of the successful defence of the Tuileries disappeared, and this murder was already committed when Santerre arrived at the Hôtel de Ville, at the head of an immense mob of the men of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, among whom were perceived, marching in order, the national guards of Quinze-Vingts, supported by the whole of the national guards of some other districts, and various members of the other battalions, commanded by Westermann, and with three hundred fédérés from Brest in their midst. In accordance with the preconceived arrangements, Santerre sent off six hundred of the National Guard, who were extremely glad to be thus freed from responsibility, to guard Pétion, and, after thanking the commissioners for his appointment, he waited for the men of Saint Marceau. They soon came up, with the Marseillais at their head, and the whole force moved off to attack the Tuileries. Santerre's harangue and other causes prevented his reaching the Place du Carrousel before half-past nine o'clock, and by that time the king had left the palace.

After the departure of Mandat the king and queen became seriously alarmed at the large crowd which began to assemble in the Place du Carrousel; but it must be remembered that this crowd which collected there at half-past seven was in no way the insurrectionary army, which had not yet concentrated at the Hôtel de Ville, but consisted of a rabble of those men who in Paris had been accustomed to hang on the outskirts of every military movement, and who, though they yelled, "À bas M. Veto!" with great noise, were not prepared to back up their yells by action. Then it was that Roederer, who had never left the king's side, proposed that his Majesty, accompanied by the royal family, should leave the Tuileries, and trust himself to the care of the National Assembly. This idea had been broached on June 20, when Stanislas de Girardin cried out in the Legislative Assembly, "Why does not the king come to us? He will be safe with us!" Roederer now took

advantage of this suggestion, and begged the king to accompany him. He declared to the queen he would be responsible, on his own life, that the king should be safe and have free passage to the Legislative Assembly; and between eight and nine o'clock, though sadly and as if distrusting his own act, Louis XVI. slowly left the palace he was never again to enter. Roederer then assembled the ministers, and the royal family, and the members of the directory of the department who were present, in a procession, with the grenadiers of the battalions of the Filles Saint Thomas and Petits Pères and the company of the Swiss Guards on duty, to act as an escort across the garden of the Tuileries. At the head of the procession moved Roederer; he was followed by the king, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bigot de Sainte Croix, and the queen, with the prince royal, leaning on the arm of Dubouchage, the Minister of Marine. De Joly, Minister of Justice, conducted Madame Elisabeth and Madame Royale. Madame de Lamballe was on the arm of the Minister of War, D'Abancourt; and the Ministers of the Interior and of the Finances, Champion de Villeneuve and Leroux de Laville, closed the procession. Roederer has reported a few words of the king's, spoken by him in his passage across the garden, which indeed might be taken for an evil omen: "See, there are plenty of leaves," said Louis to his little son, who was kicking them in front of him—"plenty of leaves; they are falling earlier than usual this year." As they passed through the garden, they could see upon the terrace of the Feuillants that a scene of great excitement was being enacted there. Some advanced Royalist prisoners had been taken, with Suleau the witty but dissolute journalist¹ at their head, disguised as national guards, and trying to make their way to the Tuileries. The Assembly had tried to protect them, but the people rushed upon the unfortunate prisoners.

¹ M. Auguste Vitu published in 1854 a curious little book on this old schoolfellow of Camille Desmoulins, who boasted of 16 quarters of *roture*, and who was in turn hussar, avocat, speculator, and royalist journalist, under the title of *Études littéraires sur la Révolution française—François Suleau*.

One of them had a bitter enemy on that terrace. Théroigne de Méricourt, who had played so great a part upon October 5 and 6, was now waiting on that terrace, to see accomplished the overthrow of the monarchy which she hated, and the old régime which had ruined her; and the sight of Suleau, who had abused her in all the most infamous terms which can be applied to a woman—perhaps with justice—excited in her the fury of revenge, and she rushed upon him and cut him down with her sabre in cold blood. The murder might have been seen by the king himself, but he was probably more occupied in wondering what sort of reception he should meet with in the Legislative Assembly. When the deputies heard that the king was approaching they sent out a deputation to receive him, which led the royal family, amidst some excitement, into the hall of the Assembly. After a speech from Louis, the royal family, with a few faithful friends round them, among whom may be noticed the Duc de Choiseul and the Baron de Goguelat, who had so great a share in marring the success of the flight to Varennes, were conducted to a small room, or rather reporters' box, some twelve feet square, behind the president's chair, which was occupied by the reporters of the *Journal Logographique*, which prided itself on giving the most accurate report of the speeches of the Assembly. There they remained forty-eight hours: forty-eight hours which destroyed the monarchy and practically established the Republic.

From their prison—for it was little better—the king and queen heard the sound of shots from the Tuileries, and the king at once wrote an order for his faithful Swiss Guards to lay down their arms and return to their barracks.¹ When the king left the palace, the rest of the Swiss, the national guards, and the noblemen and gentlemen, were at first uncertain what

¹ The chief published authority for the defence of the Tuileries is the *Récit de la Conduite des Gardes Suisses à la journée du 10 Août, 1792*, by Colonel Pfyffer d'Altishofen, Lucerne, 1824; but use has also been made of the MS. *Relation de Monsieur de Dürer*, now in the British Museum Add. MSS. 32, 168, which is published in the *English Historical Review* for 1887.

to do, for they had no orders, in spite of the boasting of Vioménil; and the other inhabitants of the palace were equally distressed at seeing the crowd in the Place du Carrousel. The whole garrison consisted of 650 Swiss—for 150 had accompanied the king across the garden—with two hundred gentlemen and about a hundred national guards. The crowd in the Place du Carrousel must have numbered some thousands, and through it Westermann, followed by the Marseillais and the Brestois, and the most determined of his own men forced their way to the gate of the Tuileries. By some mistake the gate was thrown open, and these daring men crossed the court of the Tuileries and entered the palace. Upon the grand staircase he found the Swiss drawn up under Captain Durler and General De Boissieu. Durler's only orders, which had been given him the previous evening by Major Bachman, were not to allow himself to be forced, and the Maréchal De Mailly, who now took command, gave him no others. Westermann, as an Alsatian, could speak German, and he begged the soldiers to leave their officers and come and fraternize with the crowd. Some of them did so, but the Swiss officers quickly brought them back to their duty. General De Boissieu, who was in command of the military division of Paris, spoke to the crowd, but his voice was hardly heard, and he was insulted by the people. At last a shot was heard, but who fired it nobody has ever known. It was probably fired by one of the Swiss who was disgusted, or it might be frightened, by the cries of the mob. It was immediately followed by a volley from the Swiss stationed at the windows of the palace, and by a charge of the Swiss upon the staircase, under the command of Durler, in which they seized two guns belonging to the sections and cleared the court of the Tuileries. The king, on hearing the firing, at once sent M. d'Hervilly to order his Swiss Guards to leave the Chateau; but when d'Hervilly arrived he did not at once deliver his message and the fight was still continued, and lasted nearly three-quarters of an hour. Westermann, whose men had been at first driven back by the onslaught of the Swiss, had again come up to the gates, and was forcing his

way into the court amid the thick smoke which almost prevented those engaged from seeing each other. Hardly any of the Swiss had been killed, but on the other side about a hundred of the assailants, including twenty Marseillais and two Bretois,¹ had been killed and many wounded. Then d'Hervilly delivered his message when he saw further fighting was useless;² the drums were beaten, the Swiss soldiers fell in, and by the king's direct orders retreated slowly across the gardens of the Tuileries. The insurgents continued firing for some minutes after the Swiss had left the palace, and advantage was taken of the favourable moment by the national guards and the king's private friends to escape quietly by the Pavillon de Flore to the quays.

A minute or two afterwards the people rushed into the palace, and, finding no opposition, at once murdered, in the most cowardly manner, a few wounded men who had been left behind when the Swiss retreated. It may well be believed that Westermann and his brave companions did not take part in these murders; but the cowardly crowd, which always accompanies a revolutionary movement, was seized with a fury for killing every one it met. Not only were the hall-porters murdered, but the very cooks in the kitchen were cut to pieces. Yet these servants need not have been murdered had they preserved their equanimity. For instance, as they rushed through the Tuileries the mob came across the old physician of the king, sitting quietly in his room. "Who are you?" they said. "The king's physician." "Are you not afraid?" "Why? I have done no harm. Would anybody do harm to those who do none?" "Come, you are a good fellow, but this is not the place for you. Where do you want to go?" "To the Luxembourg." "Comrades, let this man pass," was the cry. "He is the king's physician, but he is not afraid. He is a good fellow." In a similar manner the ladies of the court, who had collected in one of the queen's rooms, received no violence, and were told that they were pardoned by the

¹ Pollio and Marcel's *Bataillon du 10 Août*, pp. 354, 355.

² Bertrand de Moleville's *Mémoires*, ed. 1797, vol. iii. p. 52.

Assembly had become a mere instrument in the hands of the Committee of Twenty-one. The majority of the deputies either left Paris, or, if they belonged to the right, hid themselves, while those of the left had to obey every order of their leaders, and left the transaction of temporary business to the Committee of Twenty-one. This committee practically ruled France for forty days, until the meeting of the Convention; the Assembly always accepted its propositions and sent the deputies it nominated on important missions; its only rival was the insurrectionary commune, and the internecine warfare between the Jacobins and the Girondins was foreshadowed in the struggle between this Commune and the Committee of Twenty-one. For, while the extreme Jacobins filled the new Commune of Paris, the Committee of Twenty-one consisted of Girondins and Feuillants; Brissot was its president, Vergniaud its reporter, and Gensonné, Condorcet, Lasource, Guadet, Lacépède, Lacuée, Pastoret, Murair, Delmas, and Guyton-Morveau were amongst its members.¹ On the evening of August 10 the Assembly decreed that the difference between active and passive citizens should be abolished, and that every Frenchman of the age of twenty-five should have a vote for the Convention.

The day of August 10 ought not to be passed over without remarking the gallant conduct of many who saved lives instead of taking them. No Jacobin was more advanced in his opinions, more in league with the new insurrectionary commune of Paris, or more violent in his republicanism than Basire, and yet it was Basire, at the peril of his own life, who protected the Swiss who had been disarmed, in the church of the Feuillants, and thus undoubtedly saved their lives. It was another deputy of the left, Bruat, who saved the lives of the Swiss officers in the Salle des Inspecteurs, and got them disguises, and eventually sent them off to England,² where they received commissions in Roll's regiment, in which they did gallant service, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, in Egypt. A poor tailor saved the life of

¹ On the work and composition of this committee, see Vatel's *Vergniaud*, pp. 130-141.

² Durler's *Relation* in the *English Historical Review*.

M. de Reding, who, however, was massacred in the following month, and an upholsterer, named Aigremont, saved the lives of four Swiss officers.¹

One very melancholy event of the evening of August 10 ought not to be passed over. Stanislas, duc de Clermont-Tonnerre, had been one of the chief orators of the Constituent Assembly. He had been one of the first deputies of the noblesse to take his place with the Tiers État, and one of the leading members of the original Constitutional Committee. No man had been more popular after the taking of the Bastille, but he had become discredited, with Lally-Tollendal and Mounier, after the rejection of the first scheme of a Constitution. Nevertheless he remained a very active member of the Assembly, and had been a member of the Monarchical Club and at one time its president, and had expressed with both force and truth the doctrines held by the members of the right centre. After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly he had continued to live in Paris, and was suspected of being one of the secret advisers of the king during the session of the Legislative Assembly. On this evening, as he was walking quietly down the streets, a cry arose that he was an aristocrat and a traitor. The people at once fell upon him. He demanded to be taken to his section to be judged, but was murdered in the gutter before his request could be complied with.

The last sight the king might have seen on the night of August 10 was his palace of the Tuileries in flames, where, for mischief, fire had been set to the stables. It spread from building to building, and the Assembly only took steps to check it when it threatened to spread to the houses of the Rue Saint Honoré. In vain did the firemen attempt to extinguish the fire. The mob would not allow it, and threatened to throw them into the fire if they continued; and it was only when, on the motion of Chabot, Palloy, the well-known contractor for the destruction of the Bastille, was appointed to superintend the putting out of the fire, that the people permitted the water to play. On the day after this terrible night the king

¹ Pfyffer d'Altishofen's *Récit*.

was informed that rooms had been found for him in the Convent of the Feuillants; and to four monastic cells, which had not been inhabited since the dissolution of the monastery two years before, the royal family were led, and round them was placed a strong guard. Yet they were no more prisoners in the Convent of the Feuillants than they had been in the splendid palace of the Tuileries.

The capture of the Tuileries had as its first result the supremacy of the insurrectionary commune of Paris. The king's nominal authority was annihilated; but though the course of events left him a prisoner, it cannot be said that his influence was diminished, for he had none left to diminish. It was to the Girondins, rather than to the king, that the results of August 10 brought unpleasant surprises. Their leaders had been clear-sighted enough to perceive that they might make use of the insurrection, but the mass of the party had by no means encouraged it. Brissot had made no attempt to check it, and the preparations for it were openly discussed at Madame Roland's salon, and the good behaviour of the Marseillais guaranteed there by Barbaroux. No one in France seems to have rejoiced more at the issue of that day than Madame Roland herself, and she believed that it had justified all her hopes when she heard that her husband was once more Minister of the Interior, and found herself again the mistress of his official residence in the Rue Vivienne. But the ministers of the Assembly were not stronger than the ministers of the king had been. The idea that a minister should have power had been destroyed by the policy of the Constituent Assembly; and the Legislative Assembly had shared its distrust of the executive. All business of importance had for a long time been done directly by the Assembly itself, and the ministers had been merely agents; and it will be seen that the ministers of the Convention were looked on as agents just as those of the king had been. The real power had gone to the Commune of Paris, and this was very clearly perceived by Robespierre and by Marat.

The "Ami du Peuple" was received with joy by the informal

insurrectionary commune, and he now felt at last that he had the power to do more than write for the cause of the people. The first use he made of this newly acquired power was to beg the Assembly for the use of the royal printing press and type, with which to print his journal. The Assembly passed over this request, but the insurrectionary commune granted it. The new journal which Marat was revolving in his mind, under the name of the *Journal de la République*, was magnificently printed with the royal type, in great contrast to the poor little *Ami du Peuple* which bears on every page traces of haste and poverty, being printed on any scrap of paper that could be found, of many different colours and many varieties. But though Marat was received with the loudest cheers by the insurrectionary commune, Robespierre was the man who really became its leader. He had long expected the shock which had just taken place, and had prepared himself for the crisis. The first requisition was, of course, for a Convention. This had been granted on the very first day. The second demand of the Commune was the safe custody of the king, so that he should not be able to escape to the army. This was conceded by the Assembly on August 12, when they ordered that the king and royal family should be taken to the old tower of the Temple, and there strictly guarded under the superintendence of the insurrectionary commune, which took great care that their prisoner should not escape them. But Robespierre felt that this was not quite enough. There were three quarters from which dangers might come to the new order of affairs if they were not provided against—Lafayette and the army, the provinces headed by some of the popular Feuillants, and, last of all, the wealthy inhabitants of Paris, who feared that matters were going too far.

His fear of the bourgeois of Paris was the first to be expressed, and he himself, as representative of the revolutionary commune, appeared at the bar of the Assembly on August 17, and imperiously demanded a strong police law, by which the municipality might arrest whomsoever they would as a suspect, and the establishment of a new tribunal in Paris, which should

try quickly such prisoners as the municipality should arrest. In this police proposal of Robespierre's, and in the tribunal to try cases promptly which was established at his demand, may be seen the two first steps towards the establishment of the Terror. Thus early had Robespierre recognized that the only mode by which the wealthier classes in France could be kept from open opposition to the course of the Revolution was by establishing a system of terror. He knew as well as anybody else that such a system of terror could only exist as long as it was permitted by the majority, and by the very great majority of the people. If a minority of any size protested against the terror, much more if a majority protested against it, it must fall; and he looked to the frontier for the reason which would make the majority of the law-abiding people of France submit to such lawless law and such cruel tyranny as the establishment of a special court, bound by no restrictions, and exercising unlimited authority. Such a system was quite in accordance with Marat's political ideas, for he, too, knew that if some such system of terror was not established, a reaction would soon take place after August 10, such as appeared after June 20. Next, it was necessary to inform the provinces of the events of August 10, and to take care that France should not rise against Paris. To effect this, the Commune of Paris, acting like a sovereign power, sent off messengers and emissaries to every city and district, to tell the inhabitants that Louis XVI. was overthrown, and that there was no more fear of treachery at home, because the Commune of Paris was watching over the Assembly.

But the greatest fear in the minds of Robespierre and his friends in the Commune was that Lafayette would march on Paris. This was exactly what Lafayette intended to do. He had moved his headquarters to Sédan, where he was grandly entertained by the rich manufacturers, but where the Jacobin Club was hotly opposed to him, and where the old nobility, and especially M. de Vissecq-Latude, an old royalist, who had refused to emigrate, openly insulted him. He heard of the capture of the Tuileries on August 12, and on the 13th

he held a grand review, at which he adjured his soldiers to swear fidelity to the king and the nation. A few of the old regiments obeyed with enthusiasm, but the new regiments of volunteers were more doubtful, and one of the Maine et Loire shouted, "To the nation, fidelity, yes; to the king, no!" This reception disconcerted Lafayette, but nevertheless he caused the municipality of Sedan to arrest three deputies sent on mission to the army, Kersaint, Antonelle, and Peraldi, on August 14, and made the directory of the department of the Ardennes approve his action. Yet he felt the people were not in sympathy with him, in spite of the obedience of the authorities, and he determined to appeal from his own corps d'armée to all the soldiers under his command. To them he published a general order, telling them to rally like good citizens and brave soldiers round the standard they had sworn to defend to the death. To all his generals of division, notably to Arthur Dillon, who commanded at Pont-sur-Sambre, and Dumouriez, who commanded the camp at Maulde, he sent his general order, in the hope that they would join him. This news, as well as the intelligence of the arrest of the deputies at Sedan, soon reached the Assembly, and the municipality of Paris immediately sent a deputation to demand that Lafayette should be arrested; and on August 19, on the motion of Jean Debry, Gilbert Motier de Lafayette, ci-devant general of the army of the north, was formally declared guilty of the crimes of rebellion against the law, conspiracy against liberty, and treason against the nation; and all authorities were ordered to lend their assistance in arresting him, on pain of being considered accomplices in his rebellion. Lafayette found no help on any side when he turned to his soldiers. Dillon issued his order of the day indeed, but Lückner only grumbled, and Dumouriez openly declared his adherence to the new state of things. On August 19 he heard from his staff that his soldiers were themselves at issue, and that many of them openly declared that they would bind him hand and foot and send him off to the Assembly. He knew he was not popular in the army, and therefore, on August 20, accompanied by his staff,

which included the ex-Constituants, Latour-Maubourg, Bureaux de Pusy, and Alexandre de Lameth, he galloped quietly across the frontier into the Netherlands, and was immediately arrested by the Austrian general in command. All except the former members of the Constituent Assembly were released, and ordered to leave the country; but Lafayette and his three friends were imprisoned in the citadel of Antwerp, whence they were transferred by the Austrians to the great prison of Glatz, and finally to Olmütz, where they remained in strict confinement until Napoleon demanded their release in the Treaty of Campo-Formio, in 1797. Daverhoul, the intrepid young orator of the right in the Legislative Assembly, had also tried to escape across into Belgium with General Lafayette, but a league from the frontier he was perceived and pursued by the custom-house officers, and he blew out his brains rather than fall into their power.

Lafayette's sudden flight greatly strengthened the position of the Commune of Paris, and Robespierre in particular felt that the greatest cause of fear for France and the Revolution was gone. The Assembly appointed Dumouriez to the command of Lafayette's army, and nobly did he fulfil his charge. Relieved from the fear of Lafayette's turning against them, both the Girondins in the Legislative Assembly and the Jacobins in the insurrectionary commune turned to the pursuit of their own special plans, and naturally soon came into violent collision. The distinct difference between the leaders of the Girondins and the Jacobins has already been insisted on. The Girondins were, above all things, men of ideas; the Jacobins, above all things, practical men: and of the issue of a struggle between them there could be little doubt, though, at this period the Girondins had the advantage of the best position. On August 15 the final blow was struck at the unfortunate Feuillants, or Constitutionlists. The last ministers of the king, as well as Duport du Tertre, Bertrand de Moleville, and Duportail, were all ordered to be arrested, with Barnave and Charles de Lameth. The Assembly followed up this action by establishing the special tribunal of August 17, which held

its first sitting on the same evening at the Hôtel de Ville. Robespierre was elected president, and refused the office; but among the judges was to be seen the name of Coffinhal; and the public accusers were Lhuillier and Réal. But the new tribunal was too slow to satisfy the leaders of the Commune of Paris, for its first prisoner, Laporte, the old intendant of the civil list, was not judged until August 21, and then acquitted. This news made the Commune lose all patience, and they determined to urge the Assembly to more energetic measures. Under the pressure of the Commune the Assembly took vigorous measures indeed. All the lands of the émigrés were sequestrated; all ecclesiastics who would not take the oath were to be transported to French Guiana, and it was decreed that the National Guard should enlist every man, whether an active or a passive citizen.

Much of this vigour on the part of the Assembly was due, not only to the pressure of the Commune, but to the rapid advance of the Prussians. On August 25 arrived the news that Longwy had surrendered, and Kersaint, who had been released after the flight of Lafayette on the evening of the 20th, returned from Sedan, with the news that the Prussians would be in Paris in a fortnight. The Assembly, on this, decreed that an army of thirty thousand men should be raised in Paris, and that every man who had a musket issued to him should be punished with death if he did not march at once. On August 27 the funeral of the combatants who had been killed in the Place du Carrousel further excited men's minds; and on August 28, on the motion of Danton, now Minister of Justice, a general search for arms and suspects was ordered. The gates of the city were closed on August 30; every street was ordered to be illuminated; bodies of national guards entered each house and searched it from top to bottom. Barely a thousand muskets were seized, but more than three thousand prisoners were taken and shut up, not only in the prisons, but in all the largest convents of Paris, which were turned into houses of detention. Who should be arrested as a suspect depended entirely on the municipal officer who

happened to examine the house, and these men acted under the orders of a special committee established by the Commune, at the head of which sat Marat. Often, it is to be feared, individuals were arrested for personal reasons, but on the whole it may be said that the prisoners arrested on August 30 were men who, from their position, naturally disliked the progress of the Revolution, and had matters ceased with their arrest, no one would have blamed the Assembly or the Commune for taking such strong measures to secure the peace of the capital. The residents in Paris at the time of the Revolution seem to have been more struck by this house-to-house visitation than by many other events which were far more horrible. The massacres of September were only seen by very few. Even the riots and fighting of June 20 and August 10 were witnessed by a comparatively small proportion of the people of Paris; but the house-to-house visitation spared none of any class or any degree. Many noble deeds of self-devotion were done. Grace Elliot, for instance, an English lady, who had been mistress of the Duke of Orleans, and happened to have a house by the walls, sheltered and assisted the escape of many of her personal friends, and especially of the Comte de Champcenetz, Governor of the Tuileries and brother of the witty Royalist journalist.

On that very day, August 30, the feeling of dissatisfaction which possessed the Assembly at the conduct of the Commune showed itself in open opposition. Girey-Dupré, a young Girondin journalist, had attacked the Commune in the *Patriote Français*, Brissot's old journal, and the Commune promptly summoned him to its bar. The Assembly was indignant at the Commune's attributing to itself such immense powers, and not only cancelled the summons, but called to its own bar the president and secretary of the Commune. Huguenin and Tallien were nothing loth, and in the Assembly itself attacked the leaders of the Girondins. Then the Legislative Assembly, by a large majority, ordered that the insurrectionary Commune should be immediately dissolved, and that a new and legal municipality should be elected. On September 1 the Com-

mune discussed this decree, and Robespierre advised that it should dissolve to avoid open dissension and rupture. He failed in his attempts to secure peace, and nothing was for the time decided. Early in the morning of Sunday, September 2, the electoral assembly of Paris met again in the old hall of the Archbishop's palace—the same hall in which the electoral assembly had met in 1789. The day was spent in verifying the powers of the various electors, and in making preparations for the election of deputies to the Convention. On the same day the council-general of the Commune resolved that, though it would not dissolve itself, it should be increased to the number of 298, and thus partially obey the decree of the Legislative Assembly. In the Assembly itself appeared Danton; and, as he spoke, the tocsin was heard to ring as if another great day of revolt was hanging over Paris. As it rung, he cried, "That tocsin sounds the charge on the enemies of France! Conquer them! Courage, courage, for ever courage, and France is saved!" Amidst loud applause the Assembly decreed that every one who was unable to march to the frontier himself and did not give his weapons to some one who could, should be declared infamous; and then the session closed.

The tocsin which rang while Danton spoke, rang, it has been said, for two purposes—to summon the volunteers to the Champ de Mars to march to the frontier, and to summon murderers to come at their leader's call to murder defenceless prisoners. But the most recent researches have shown that this explanation of the summons is rather an imagination of theatrical writers than real truth. There can be no doubt that the same bell caused both results. The feeling was the same. "Can we go to the war and leave three thousand prisoners behind us in Paris, who may break out and destroy our wives and children?" It is impossible that the brave men who assembled on the Champ de Mars could really have feared this outbreak of prisoners, but they had a vague feeling that, while they were away at the frontier, there would be a reaction behind them at Paris, and that in some way or other they would be betrayed. The French people are always on

the point of crying out, "Nous sommes trahis!" They are always suspicious, and Marat's popularity among them was due to the fact that he was the very genius of suspicion. Marat openly confessed that he suspected every man with money or authority of any sort to be a "contre-révolutionnaire," and very many persons thought the same thing, though they did not express it so clearly. This feeling of suspicion was inborn in them, and it is unnecessary to describe the massacres in the prisons as being the result of an elaborate plot when there were perfectly natural reasons for their taking place. What is indeed surprising is, that all the constituted authorities should not have been able to check the massacres when they had begun; that the Assembly, the ministers, the national guards, and the municipality alike allowed the dreadful deeds to be done by a mere handful of men. The brave volunteers on the Champ de Mars did not actually massacre the prisoners, but they permitted them to be massacred. At the outside, throughout the September massacres, there were not two hundred murderers, the official list says 173; and yet not a single battalion of the National Guard, not a single group of men collected by chance and seeing the terrible scene, interfered to prevent its completion. No soldier, no volunteer, no passer-by, interfered to save the wretched prisoners from their fate. For this reason, Paris, with all its inhabitants, must bear the blame of the massacres; and, at the same time, this apathy on the part of the people of Paris shows clearly enough that the massacres in the prisons were not regarded with disgust by them at the time, but possibly as a convenient means of disposing of a very inconvenient body of prisoners. This said, it becomes unnecessary to minutely examine who ought to have stopped the perpetration of these murders. It was every man's duty, and yet, as often occurs, no man interfered. The first massacre arose by chance, and no one had the courage or the humanity to interfere during the three days of bloodshed.

The massacres¹ began at midday on Sunday, September 2,

¹ The best authorities on the massacres in the prisons are Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. iii.; *Les Massacres de Septembre*, in

when some unfortunate priests were being conveyed from the prison at the Mairie to the Abbaye. On their passage the priests were hooted and yelled at, and, when they began to dismount, from wanton love of murder some of the unfortunate men were slain. Their companions would all have perished had they not rushed for rescue to the room in which the sectional committee was sitting, where two of them found refuge by sitting at the table as though members of the section. A third, the Abbé Sicard, was saved by the courage of a watchmaker, who shouted, "It is the Abbé Sicard, the friend of the deaf and dumb." And, instead of murdering, the populace cheered him. These murderers were soon reinforced by a crowd of others, mostly street ruffians, and rushed to the other end of Paris to the convent of the Carmelites, where were imprisoned more than one hundred and fifty priests who had not taken the oath. At first the unfortunate priests were driven out into the garden, where a volley was fired at them. Then their names were called over, and one hundred and twenty of them were hunted down and slaughtered one by one, beginning with the Archbishop of Arles.¹ This slaughter completed, the murderers went back to the Abbaye. At the Abbaye appeared one of those men whose peculiar function it was, in the history of the Revolution, to attempt to control and organize rebellion on every important day. Stanislas Maillard,² who had never been, as is generally stated, an usher in the law courts, had made his name famous as the chief captain in the taking of the Bastille. He had there shown great courage, and gained great personal popularity. On October 5, when the women were about to hang the unfortunate Abbé Ledoyen, it was Maillard who gave a new direction to their energies, and prevented the riot from becoming a massacre by

Barrière's series of *Mémoires*; Granier de Cassagnac, *Histoire des Massacres de Septembre*; and Buchez and Roux, *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. xviii.

¹ There is a valuable monograph on this massacre: *Le Couvent des Carmes et le Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice pendant la Terreur*, by Alexandre Sorel.

² Stanislas Maillard, *L'homme du 2 Septembre*, by Alexandre Sorel. 1862.

leading the women to Versailles. Now, again, on the terrible September 2, Stanislas Maillard appeared before the murderers of the Abbaye, and knowing well that unless some restraint were put upon them they would murder every one in the prisons, he contrived to get himself appointed judge, and sat at an informal tribunal which indeed caused the death of about one hundred and seventy prisoners, but which saved the lives in that prison alone of more than two hundred. The first victims of Maillard's tribunal were the unfortunate Swiss, fifty-four of whom had been sent to that prison after August 10, all of whom were now massacred. Then came the turn of the forgers of assignats, whom the people regarded as the cause of the depreciation of assignats. After the forgers, were slain the Comte de Montmorin Saint Hérem, the old friend of Mirabeau, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Comte de Wittgenstein, and M. de Laleu, the ex-adjutant-general of the Parisian National Guard, and many another; but, except individuals who had made themselves obnoxious to the Parisians as ministers, as implicated in August 10, or as forgers, none were murdered, and very many who were merely suspected, and who did not carry their royalism in their faces or their actions, in their names or their words, were allowed to return safely home. All through the night the massacre continued, and the committee of the section of Quatre Nations was compelled to send in wine and food to sustain the murderers during their horrible labours.

At the Conciergerie, La Force, and the Châtelet, the massacres did not begin till very late at night, and continued during September 3 without interruption, as has been said, either from constituted authority, or from passers-by; and it was remarked by Jourgniac de Saint Méard, who himself escaped, that the large crowd which surrounded the few actual murderers contained many national guards in uniform, who, though they did not interfere to prevent the murders, yet showed the greatest joy when any prisoner was pardoned by the judges within. Manuel, the procureur-syndic of the city of Paris, and Billaud-Varenne, his substitute, paid a visit to